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ABSTRACT 
 
JAHYUN KANG: Prevention of Healthcare-Associated Infections in U.S. Hospital Settings 
(Under the direction of Barbara A. Mark, PhD) 
 
  Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) are among the most common adverse 
events that threaten patient safety in the United States. However, many aspects of HAIs 
related to hospital infection control are unknown. Using a “chain of HAIs” conceptual model, 
this dissertation study examined HAIs from the agent (the healthcare-associated pathogen) 
to the infection control measures that can interrupt the interactions (transmission) among 
agent, host, and environment at the hospital level by connecting three areas that lacked 
critical information. 
 First, changes in the incidence of HAIs by pathogen were examined using hospital-
wide surveillance data. This study found significant changes in the incidence rate of HAIs 
by healthcare-associated pathogen that occurred between 2005 and 2011. Overall, across all 
service categories, the incidence of both overall HAIs and device-associated HAIs caused by 
the top 10 pathogens decreased, despite a significant increase in the number of patient-days. 
Only Clostridium difficile showed a significant increase in incidence.  
Second, a cost-effectiveness analysis was conducted using a decision-tree model to 
determine the most cost-effective active surveillance screening strategy for methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) from an academic hospital perspective. Despite the 
possibility of variation and uncertainty in the input parameters, our model was robust and 
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demonstrated that targeted surveillance of intensive care unit patients was the dominant cost-
saving strategy for reducing MRSA HAIs.  
Third, current hospital policies regarding visitor use of personal protective 
equipment when entering the rooms of patients on isolation precautions were examined 
using an online survey of North Carolina hospitals. Among 82 participating acute care 
hospitals, 71% had a hospital visitor policy. This study illuminated variations in hospitals’ 
policies regarding visitor isolation precautions. The current problems with hospital visitor 
policies (e.g., refusal to comply) call for a standard guideline.  
This study’s findings suggest a need for further research related to C. difficile, 
active surveillance screening for important HAI pathogens, implementing isolation 
precautions (including issues related to cost, ethics, and practice), hospital infection control 
efforts, and enhancing the host defense mechanism (e.g., immunoprophylaxis) to prevent 
HAIs. Although we may not be able to create the desired HAI-free hospital, the rigorous 
battle against invisible healthcare-associated pathogens should never stop. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS AND INFECTION CONTOL  
IN HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
Background 
Healthcare-associated infections 
 The terms nosocomial infections and hospital-acquired infections have traditionally been 
used to indicate acute infections that occur in inpatient settings during hospitalization (Archibald, 
2012). However, as the delivery of healthcare has evolved to encompass not only hospitals, but 
also ambulatory centers, outpatient clinics, long-term care facilities (e.g., nursing homes), and 
home care services, these infections may occur across any level of healthcare; therefore, the term 
healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) has replaced the above traditional terms (Archibald, 
2012; Ostrowsky, 2007). Because the risk factors for and characteristics of HAIs in non-hospital 
type healthcare facilities are relatively unknown compared to those of acute-care hospitals 
(Archibald, 2012), this dissertation study focuses on HAIs and infection control in acute care 
hospital settings in the United States. 
Hospitals in the United States 
 According to the 2010 annual survey from the American Hospital Association (AHA), 
36,915,331 people were admitted to 941,995 staffed beds at 5,754 AHA-registered hospitals in 
the United States; 87% (n=4,985) of these were community hospitals, including university 
hospitals (American Hospital Association, 2012). The total expense for all U.S. hospitals was 
$750 billion in 2010 (American Hospital Association, 2012). Overall, 7.9% of the U.S. 
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population was admitted to a hospital at least once in 2010, and the average length of hospital 
stay in 2009 was 4.9 days (CDC, 2012). Although the average length of hospital stay has 
decreased along with the decreasing number of hospitalized patients, the severity of patients’ 
illness has increased among hospitalized populations, and the highly complicated U.S. hospital 
environment presents the serious potential to cause adverse events, including HAIs (Nettleman, 
Roach, & Wenzel, 2012). The more that the factors that contribute to HAIs (e.g., aging patient 
population, increasing severity of illness, and increased use of invasive indwelling devices and 
broad-spectrum antibiotics) increase in U.S. hospital settings, the greater the risk that 
hospitalized patients acquire HAIs (Nettleman et al., 2012).  
Significance of healthcare-associated infections 
HAIs are one of the most common adverse events that threaten patient safety in the 
United States (Burke, 2003; Pittet & Donaldson, 2006). HAIs are estimated to be one of the top 
10 causes of death in the United States (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). 
In the most recent data available, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported 
that approximately 1.7 million HAIs and 99,000 HAI-related deaths occurred in the U.S. in 2002 
alone (Klevens et al., 2007). In addition, HAIs place a substantial economic burden on the 
healthcare system, contributing an estimated $28.4 to 33.8 billion per year in additional 
healthcare costs (Scott, 2009). 
Governmental authorities, accreditation bodies, and payers have responded to concerns 
about continuing patient safety, public health and economic issues related to HAIs by taking 
several actions (Anderson et al., 2007; Klevens et al., 2007). The Joint Commission (TJC; 
formerly the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations [JCAHO]) has 
raised awareness about the perils of HAIs by including HAI prevention in their accreditation 
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criteria as a key element of national patient safety goals (Anderson et al., 2007; JCAHO, 2006; 
Weinstein, 1998). The first TJC standards, published in 1976, emphasized hospital infection 
control programs, while recent TJC standards have focused on infection control and prevention 
(Bartley, 2009). TJC added HAI reduction as a National Patient Safety Goal in the 2004 
standards and expanded this goal in the 2009 standards (Bartley, 2009).  
Following the Deficit Reduction Act in 2006, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) on October 1, 2008 began prohibiting hospitals from receiving additional 
payment for hospital-acquired conditions that were not present on admission, including such 
HAIs as vascular catheter-associated infections, catheter-associated urinary tract infection, and 
selected surgical site infections (SSIs) following coronary artery bypass graft, certain orthopedic 
procedures, and bariatric surgery for obesity (CMS, 2011; Graves & McGowan, 2008; Stone, 
2009; Wachter, Foster, & Dudley, 2008). Currently, CMS has considered expanding “pay for 
performance” and “no pay for errors” policies by adding additional HAI conditions to the list, 
including the following: ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP), Clostridium difficile-associated 
disease, and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections (Wachter et al., 
2008). Following CMS’s lead, some health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United 
States no longer reimburse costs for selected HAIs (Carlet, Fabry, Amalberti, & Degos, 2009). 
Furthermore, in January 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
and nine other federal organizations, including the CDC, announced an Action Plan to Prevent 
Healthcare-Associated Infections that provides priority recommendations (DHHS, 2009). In 
addition, HAIs have received increasing attention as a key component for improving quality and 
safety in healthcare reform (DHHS Press Office, 2009). Within the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Public Law 111-5 (ARRA), $50 million was assigned to support the 
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prevention and reduction of HAIs (CDC, 2009a), and the CDC announced plans to allocate $40 
million to state health authorities to support HAI prevention (CDC, 2009b). This funding is 
expected to advance infection control efforts, including HAI surveillance, collaboration for 
implementing interventions, training the healthcare workforce, and measuring outcomes (CDC, 
2009a). In addition, the CDC reports an emerging movement to mandate that healthcare facilities 
report HAIs to federal and state agencies as part of healthcare reform (CDC, 2010). Between 
2003 and 2010, 28 states mandated hospital reporting of selected HAIs (Mascola, Kainer, & 
Pollock, 2010). As of October 2011, 27 states have developed HAI-related laws requiring the 
public reporting of HAI rates, while two states (Nebraska and Nevada) have laws that mandate 
the confidential reporting of HAI rates to state bureaus. Three states (Arkansas, Arizona, and 
Wisconsin) allow voluntary public reporting of HAI information, while five states (Alaska, 
Georgia, Indiana, New Mexico, and North Carolina) have considered public reporting laws, and 
several other states have pending bills for public reporting (Committee to Reduce Infection 
Deaths, 2011).  
Concurrently, public concerns about HAIs and requests to improve HAI prevention have 
increased markedly. The Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports, has 
actively pressured hospitals for more effective infection control by campaigning to reduce HAIs 
and lobbying state legislatures to enact the Consumers Union Model Hospital Infections 
Disclosure Act (Edmond & Eickhoff, 2008). This act asks states to enforce such penalties as 
terminating the licensure of hospitals that violate its provisions (Consumers Union, 2006). 
Another example of increasing public concern is the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI). 
The IHI, a non-profit organization, created the “100,000 Lives Campaign” and the “5 Million 
Lives Campaign” to emphasize best practices for reducing HAIs (McCannon, Hackbarth, & 
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Griffin, 2007). The “5 Million Lives Campaign” aimed to achieve a decrease of 5 million 
unintended medical harms between December 2006 and December 2008 by adding six new 
interventions—including the reduction of MRSA rates. This campaign was modeled after the 
“100,000 Lives Campaign” which focused on six interventions, including the prevention of 
central line infections, SSI, and VAP, and which attracted more than 3,100 hospitals and avoided 
an estimated 122,000 deaths between December 2004 and December 2006 (McCannon et al., 
2007).  
Occurrence of Healthcare-Associated Infections 
An HAI is defined as “a localized or systemic condition resulting from an adverse 
reaction to the presence of an infectious agent(s) or its toxin(s)” with no evidence of infection at 
the time of admission (Hidron et al., 2008); p. 309). Infections that develop within 48 hours of 
admission are not usually considered HAIs because of the typical incubation period of bacterial 
pathogens (Garner, Jarvis, Emori, Horan, & Hughes, 1996).  
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Figure 1.1 Explanatory diagram for the chain of healthcare-associated infections. Adapted from the CDC guidelines 
for environmental infection control in health-care facilities: Recommendations of CDC and the Healthcare Infection 
Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC), MMWR, 2003: 52(RR10); p.4 ‘Box 3. Chain of infection 
components’. 
 
The “Chain of HAIs” model (Figure 1.1) serves as a useful framework for understanding 
how HAIs occur (CDC, 2003). This model identifies the characteristics of the infectious agent 
itself; potential reservoirs of infection in hospitals; how the agent is communicated, including the 
portal of exit, the mode of transmission, and the portal of entry; and includes the characteristics 
of hospital patients that increase their susceptibility to infection. 
Infectious agent. The first link in the chain describes the characteristics of the specific 
healthcare-associated pathogen as an infectious agent. Most HAIs are caused by bacteria and 
viruses, and some are caused by fungi (Ostrowsky, 2007). The factors that differentiate the agent 
are dose, pathogenicity, virulence, infectiousness, infectivity, specificity, and antimicrobial 
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resistance (Ostrowsky, 2007). Dose is the amount of an agent needed to cause an HAI 
(Ostrowsky, 2007). The greater the number of microorganisms present, the greater the possibility 
that an infection will occur. Pathogenicity is the agent’s ability to induce HAIs (Ostrowsky, 
2007). Virulence, as an element of pathogenicity, refers to the infection-evoking power of a 
healthcare-associated pathogen in a given host (Last, 2001). Sometimes, avirulent or low-
virulence pathogens, such as Serratia marcescens, are isolated from HAIs under particular 
conditions (e.g., a high infecting dose or/and host immunodeficiency; Archibald, 2012; 
Ostrowsky, 2007). Infectiousness refers to the number of infected people among susceptible 
hosts after exposure to an agent (Ostrowsky, 2007). Infectivity is the ability of a healthcare-
associated pathogen to transmit from a source to a host (Ostrowsky, 2007). Specificity refers to 
the specific range of hosts for an agent (Ostrowsky, 2007). Antimicrobial resistance refers to the 
agent’s acquired resistance to antibiotics. Antimicrobial resistance may increase the frequency of 
HAIs because of the spread of resistant strains of pathogens (Ostrowsky, 2007).                             
National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) data from 2006 to 2007 reported the top 10 
most commonly isolated healthcare-associated pathogens as follows: coagulase-negative 
staphylococci (CoNS; 15.3%), Staphylococcus aureus (14.5%), Enterococcus species (12.1%),  
Candida species (6.8%), Escherichia coli (9.6%), Pseudomonas aeruginosa (7.9%), Klebsiella 
pneumonia (5.8%), Enterobacter species (4.8%), Acinetobacter baumannii (2.7%), and 
Klebsiella oxytoca (1.1%; Hidron et al., 2008). However, the spectrum of healthcare-associated 
pathogens may have changed over time as a result of the increased use of broad-spectrum 
antibiotics and invasive procedures and increasing numbers of immunocompromised patients 
(Weber, Rutala, Samsa, Wilson, & Hoffmann, 1992). Recently, multidrug-resistant (MDR) 
pathogens (e.g., MRSA) have emerged as significant healthcare-associated pathogens. MDR 
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pathogens are defined as “microorganisms, predominantly bacteria, that are resistant to one or 
more classes of antimicrobial agents” (P. S166; Siegel, Rhinehart, Jackson, & Chiarello, 2007). 
In describing MDR pathogens, “resistant” refers to the loss of susceptibility to major 
antimicrobial treatments, which may be either a first-line antimicrobial (e.g., oxacillin for S. 
aureus) that is preferred because of its low toxicity or superior efficacy or a marker-antimicrobial 
for broader resistance (e.g., ceftazidime-resistant K. pneumonia that produces extended-spectrum 
β-lactamase [ESBL]; Lin, Weinstein, & Hayden, 2007). Although a particular MDR pathogen’s 
name implies resistance to only one antimicrobial agent (e.g., MRSA, vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci [VRE]), these pathogens are typically resistant to many other antimicrobial agents, 
and treatment options for MDR pathogens are often limited (Siegel et al., 2007). Thus, the 
treatment and prevention of HAIs caused by MDR pathogens poses an increasing challenge in 
hospital settings (Hidron et al., 2008).  
Reservoir. A reservoir is the place where an infectious agent can live and multiply. 
Reservoirs can be any person, animal, or inanimate substance, such as water and soil (Last, 
2001). In hospital settings, reservoirs for healthcare-associated pathogens can be humans and the 
hospital environment, including any surface of the patient care area (CDC, 2003). Human 
reservoirs are people in the hospital setting, including hospitalized patients, healthcare personnel 
(HCP), environmental cleaning personnel and hospital visitors (Siegel, Rhinehart, Jackson, & 
Chiarello, 2007). For example, humans are the principal reservoir of S. aureus. According to the 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 2004, approximately 1.5% of U.S. residents 
carry MRSA in their nasal cavities (Gorwitz et al., 2008). VRE outbreak investigation reports 
provide another example. VRE contamination is often found on various hospital surfaces that are 
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frequently touched by patients and HCP, including bedrails, computer tables, blood pressure 
cuffs, doorknobs, and gowns (CDC, 2003).  
Portal of exit. The portal of exit of healthcare-associated pathogens is generally 
respiratory tracts, gastrointestinal tracts, skin, blood, and wounds (Ostrowsky, 2007). In fact, 
depending on the pathogen, any patient’s secretion or excretion can be a portal of exit 
(Ostrowsky, 2007). For example, VRE and C. difficile are contained in patients’ stool. Thus, 
patients with bowel incontinence or uncontained secretions secondary to poor personal hygiene 
(e.g., infants and patients with altered mental status) represent a significant source of enteric 
pathogen outbreaks (Siegel et al., 2007).  
Mode of transmission. The mode of transmission differs by type of healthcare-
associated pathogen and includes contact (direct or indirect), droplet, and airborne transmission 
(Siegel et al., 2007a). Some pathogens are transmitted via more than one transmission route (e.g., 
S. aureus, which can be transmitted via direct or indirect contact), and some are not transmitted 
from person to person at all (e.g., Legionella; Siegel et al., 2007a). Contact transmission is the 
most common mode of transmission, and it consists of two subgroups: direct and indirect contact 
(Siegel et al., 2007a). Direct contact transmission occurs when pathogens are transmitted from a 
source patient to another person without an intermediate object or person (Siegel et al., 2007a). 
Indirect contact transmission of a pathogen occurs through contact with a contaminated object 
(e.g., endoscopes or isolation gowns) or intermediate people (Siegel et al., 2007a). The 
transmission of MDR pathogens results primarily from direct or indirect contact, including an 
HCP’s contaminated hands or contaminated equipment (Salgado & Farr, 2006). Droplet 
transmission involves respiratory droplets containing pathogens. Such droplets are generated by 
patients coughing, sneezing, or talking, or during procedures (e.g., suctioning; Siegel et al., 
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2007a). Droplets are usually defined as greater than 5 μm in size, and the typically defined 
distance of risk for droplet transmission is 3 feet, based on prior epidemiologic research (Siegel 
et al., 2007a). Droplet transmission occurs when infectious droplets are deposited on the host’s 
mucosal surface (e.g., conjunctiva; Ostrowsky, 2007). Examples of droplet-transmitted 
pathogens are the influenza virus, Bordetella pertusis, and Neisseria meningitides (Siegel et al., 
2007a). Airborne transmission occurs when airborne droplet nuclei smaller than 5 μm travel with 
air currents, which carry such infectious pathogens as Mycobacterium tuberculosis, varicella-
zoster virus and rubeola virus (Siegel et al., 2007a). Airborne microorganisms can be suspended 
in the air for hours or days and may be inhaled by a susceptible host at a much greater distance 
than non-airborne pathogens are; thus, a respiratory protection program (e.g., education 
regarding the proper use of a mask/respirator) is required to reduce infection risk (Siegel et al., 
2007a; Ostrowsky, 2007).   
Portal of entry. The portal of entry refers to an opening that permits the healthcare-
associated pathogen to enter the susceptible host. Portals include body orifices, mucous 
membranes, skin wounds, and medical devices, such as Foley catheters and endotracheal tubes. 
HCP experience occupational exposure to blood from patients with hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C 
virus, and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) via percutaneous injuries, direct contact with 
mucous membranes and nonintact skin as portals of entry in hospital settings (O’Malley et al., 
2007). For droplet and airborne routes of transmission, portals of entry may include mucosal 
surfaces, such as conjunctivae and nasal mucosa (Siegel et al., 2007a). 
Susceptible host. A susceptible host is a person who becomes infected by a healthcare-
associated pathogen secondary to reduced immunity or body function. In hospital settings, 
patients, HCP, and visitors may be susceptible hosts. Host-specific factors, such as underlying 
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comorbidities (e.g., malignancy, diabetes) or poor physiologic reserve (e.g., old age), can 
increase the risk of infection (Siegel et al., 2007a). In addition, the administration of 
antimicrobials impairs the growth of normal intestinal flora and is a well-known risk factor for C. 
difficile infection (Lo Vecchio & Zacur, 2012). Furthermore, specific medical treatments, such as 
surgery or radiation therapy, can impair host defense mechanisms, thus increasing the risk of 
infection. Invasive devices (e.g., endotracheal tubes, central-line catheters) can facilitate the 
occurrence of HAIs by allowing pathogens to avoid local biologic defenses that would normally 
allow the host to resist pathogen invasion. This occurs because the device provides a surface that 
allows pathogens to develop biofilms, which enhance their adherence to device surfaces and 
confer protection from antimicrobials (Siegel et al., 2007a). Although many patients may be 
exposed to the same healthcare-associated pathogen, exposure results vary; some patients 
become transient or permanent asymptomatic carriers, whereas others become severely ill 
(Ostrowsky, 2007; Siegel et al., 2007). The patient’s immune status at the time of exposure to a 
healthcare-associated pathogen, the virulence of the healthcare-associated pathogen, and the 
host-agent interaction are important factors that affect patient outcomes (Siegel et al., 2007a).  
Considering the chain of HAIs (Figure 1.1), the solution for controlling and preventing 
HAIs, particularly in the hospital setting is to break any link in the chain. However, the most 
effective infection control intervention breaks the chain of an HAI at its weakest point 
(Ostrowsky, 2007). Knowing the chain of HAIs should help guide the development of specific 
interventions to control HAIs and help avoid the atheoretical adoption of nonspecific 
interventions (Ostrowsky, 2007). However, predictions about HAI occurrences and the 
development of effective infection control measures, which are assumed to be straightforward 
based on the chain of HAIs, are surprisingly difficult in hospital settings. This difficulty arises 
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because both the occurrence and prevention of HAIs involves more than one component of the 
chain of HAIs. In fact, the occurrence of HAIs depends on a variety of factors, particularly those 
related to healthcare-associated pathogens, mode of transmission, and host susceptibility. In 
addition, even when many patients experience identical exposure to a healthcare-associated 
pathogen, their outcomes may differ (from asymptomatic colonization to death due to HAI) 
depending on host factors (Archibald, 2012; Ostrowsky, 2007). Thus, it is difficult to guarantee 
that HAIs will be controlled by interrupting any one specific component in the chain of infection. 
The interruption of a single component may not be effective enough to completely prevent the 
occurrence of HAIs.  
 
Figure 1.2 Explanatory diagram for the interaction between healthcare-associated pathogens and a susceptible host 
within the hospital environment. Note. Six components of the chain of HAIs are marked to show multifactorial 
interactions (created by the author). 
 
Although the chain of HAIs model provides six conceptual components of HAI 
occurrence, in brief, HAIs result from multifactorial interactions (Figure 1.2) between a 
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healthcare-associated pathogen and a susceptible host (i.e., a hospitalized patient) within the 
environmental ecology of HAIs (Archibald, 2012; Ostrowsky, 2007). As the explanatory 
diagram in Figure 1.2 shows, the multifactorial interactions (transmission) can occur via any 
mode of transmission (e.g., contact, airborne, and droplet; from portal of exit to portal of entry) 
between a HAI pathogen (an infectious agent) and a hospitalized patient (a susceptible host) 
within the hospital environment. The hospital environment may affect the chain of HAIs because 
a patient in a hospital bed is frequently surrounded by multiple medical devices or equipment 
and surfaces (Ostrowsky, 2007). For example, the humidity of a patient’s room can affect 
multiple components in the chain of HAIs: the persistence of the healthcare-associated pathogen 
at the reservoir, the transmission of pathogens through the airflow, and the effectiveness of the 
host’s mucous membrane resistance (Ostrowsky, 2007). 
The risk of HAIs during patient care in hospitals is most influenced by the healthcare-
associated pathogen’s mode of transmission (Fauerbach, 2002). Therefore, most infection control 
intervention efforts aim to affect various factors to prevent the transmission of healthcare-
associated pathogen among susceptible hosts in the hospital environment rather than focusing on 
one specific component in the chain of infection. For example, hand hygiene or wearing gloves 
is primarily directed at interrupting the contact transmission route, wearing a surgical mask is 
directed at interrupting the droplet transmission route, and surface disinfection is directed at both 
eliminating the reservoir of the hospital environment and interrupting the contact transmission 
route. Thus, when infection control guidelines are applied in hospital settings, interventions (e.g., 
isolation precautions) simultaneously address multiple components of the chain of HAIs and 
interrupt interactions (transmission) among them.  
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The Control and Prevention of Healthcare-Associated Infections 
CDC/Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) guidelines 
To assist hospital infection control intervention efforts, the CDC and HICPAC have 
published a variety of guidelines (e.g., CDC/HICPAC, Guideline for Disinfection and 
Sterilization in Healthcare Facilities, 2008) based on scientific evidence (Rutala, Weber, & 
HICPAC, 2008; Umsheid, Agarwal, Brennan, & HICPAC, 2009). All of the recommendations in 
the CDC/ HICPAC guidelines were developed using targeted systematic reviews of the best 
available evidence for preventing HAIs by interrupting components of the chain of HAIs 
(Umsheid et al., 2009). Each recommendation in the guidelines is categorized into five levels (IA, 
strongly recommended and supported; IB, strongly recommended; IC, required by regulations or 
standards; II, suggested; and III, unresolved issue) based on the strength of evidence, such as the 
existing theoretical rationale, scientific data, economic impact, and practical applicability across 
the six components of the chain of HAIs (O'Grady et al., 2011).  
Isolation precautions 
Isolation precautions have been recommended as standard infection control practices for 
HCPs across the range of care. Isolation precautions can simultaneously affect several 
components in the chain of HAIs and prevent the potential transmission of healthcare-associated 
pathogens in hospital environments. In terms of the traditional concept of quarantine, “isolation” 
means isolating people with communicable disease from interactions with others (Patterson, 
2004). Precautions indicate the set of interventions (e.g., gloving) required to prevent the 
potential transmission of communicable disease. Overall, “isolation precautions” can be 
described as the physical isolation of the identified patient to avoid the cross-transmission of 
infectious disease to other patients. Isolation precautions require that the HCP implement extra 
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precautions when caring for the isolated patient. The use of isolation precautions is becoming 
more important in hospital settings to control potential exposure to patients with emerging 
disease events, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) world-wide epidemic 
(Patterson, 2004).  
The terminology for isolation precautions has changed since 1970, when the CDC 
published the first Isolation Techniques for Use in Hospitals guidelines. These guidelines 
consisted of two general approaches: a category-specific system with limited isolation protocols 
based on categorized infectious diseases, and a disease-specific system that presented specific 
measures for each disease (Van den broek, 2003). Increased awareness of the dangers of blood 
and blood-containing body fluids resulted from the emergence of acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS) epidemic; therefore, in 1985, the recommendations were changed to the 
universal precautions and body substance isolations because of the difficulty of verifying which 
patients are infectious on admission (Van den broek, 2003). Later, standard precautions were 
developed to emphasize the importance of hand hygiene and the use of personal protective 
equipment (PPE; gloves, gown, mask/respirator, eye shield, and face shield) for routine patient 
care while reducing the number of different isolation precautions (Van den broek, 2003). The 
most recent CDC/HICPAC isolation guidelines, the 2007 Guideline for Isolation Precautions: 
Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings, recommend three types of 
transmission-based isolation precautions—contact precautions, droplet precautions, and airborne 
precautions—along with standard precautions in hospital settings (Siegel et al., 2007a). 
Transmission-based precautions are preferred when standard precautions alone do not 
completely interrupt transmission of pathogens (Siegel et al., 2007a). For pathogens with 
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multiple transmission routes, such as SARS, more than one set of transmission-based precautions 
may be needed to reduce the risk of HAIs (Siegel et al., 2007a).  
Standard precautions. Standard precautions are a set of universal precautions and body 
substance isolations that includes hand hygiene, safe injection practices, proper management of 
contaminated items, and the use of PPE when appropriate (Siegel et al., 2007a). Recently, three 
new practices were added to standard precautions: respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette for cold 
symptoms in a healthcare facility (including education, sign posting, the use of a surgical mask, 
hand hygiene, and spatial separation), safe injection practices for ambulatory care facilities (the 
use of single-use disposable needles and syringes), and use of a surgical mask for lumbar 
puncture procedures to prevent the transmission of clinicians’ oral flora to patients (Siegel et al., 
2007a).  
Contact precautions. Contact precautions are recommended to prevent the transmission 
of healthcare-associated pathogens via direct or indirect contact with patients (Siegel et al., 
2007a). Contact precautions are needed for contact-transmitted pathogens, such as MDR 
pathogens, and for patients who have body discharges, including fecal incontinence and 
excessive wound drainage (Siegel et al., 2007a). For patients with contact precautions, a private 
room is preferred, and HCP need to use PPE whenever they interact with the patient or with 
contaminated items in the patient’s room (Siegel et al., 2007a). Contact precautions require HCP 
to perform hand hygiene, to wear gown and gloves on room entry, and to dispose of gown and 
gloves properly upon room exit for all care practices that involve any contact with a patient or 
the patient’s environment (Clock, Cohen, Behta, Ross, & Larson, 2010; Siegel et al., 2007). 
However, reports regarding adherence to contact precautions in actual practice are limited, and 
there is no guideline for evaluating adherence to contact precautions (Clock et al., 2010).  It is 
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challenging for hospitals to implement contact precautions concurrently with other infection 
control strategies, such as the timely detection of infected/colonized patients with MDR 
pathogens, the prompt initiation of single room placement, and communication for HCP and 
visitor adherence to isolation precautions (Clock et al., 2010).  
Droplet precautions. Droplet precautions are needed for droplet-transmitted pathogens, 
such as influenza virus, adenovirus, rhinovirus, Bordetella pertussis, Neisseria meningitidis, and 
group A streptococcus (Siegel et al., 2007a). A single patient room is preferred, and HCP need to 
wear a mask when entering the patient’s room (Siegel et al., 2007a). If a single room is not 
available, the patient needs to be separated from other patients by a minimum of 3 feet, and the 
patient should wear a mask and maintain respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette (Siegel et al., 
2007a). 
Airborne precautions. Airborne precautions are required for infectious particles (e.g., M. 
tuberculosis) that can be suspended in air and travel long distances (Siegel et al., 2007a). The 
preferred room for a patient requiring airborne precautions is a single-occupancy airborne 
infection isolation room that meets American Institute of Architects/Facility Guideline Institute 
standards. These standards include monitoring negative pressure, 12 air exchanges per hour for 
areas under construction/renovation and six air exchanges per hour for already constructed area, 
and air exhaustion through high-efficiency particulate air [HEPA] filtration (Siegel et al., 2007a). 
Airborne precautions also include education about respirator use and an N95 mask fitting test for 
HCP (Siegel et al., 2007a). A properly fitting personal-use respirator or N95 mask must be worn 
by HCP while they are in the airborne isolation room.  
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Precautions for multidrug-resistant pathogens 
Although the above four types of isolation precautions are recommended based on the 
mode of transmission of specific healthcare-associated pathogens in hospital settings, more than 
one type of transmission-based precautions may be necessary to control MDR pathogens and 
emerging diseases (e.g., SARS) to ensure the most effective implementation of infection control 
for each component in the chain of HAIs and for the interactions among the components. As a 
part of the 2007 Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious 
Agents in Healthcare Settings, CDC also published Management of Multidrug-Resistant 
Organisms in Healthcare Settings, 2006 to enhance the prevention of MDR pathogens (Siegel et 
al., 2007a). To prevent the transmission of epidemiologically important healthcare-associated 
pathogens (e.g., MRSA), patient isolation in a private room and the implementation of contact 
precautions is generally recommended (Salgado & Farr, 2006; Siegel et al., 2007b). Contact 
precautions require wearing gown and gloves before entering the isolation rooms of patients who 
are infected with or colonized by MDR pathogens. Such precautions have been reported to be 
successful measures for reducing MDR pathogen transmission in hospital settings (Salgado & 
Farr, 2006). In addition, hand hygiene, environmental cleaning (or disinfection), and detection of 
MRSA-colonized patients and placing them under contact precautions have been emphasized as 
prevention strategies (Diekema & Climo, 2008). Furthermore, antimicrobial stewardship, 
reducing the lengths of hospital stays, ensuring an appropriate staff-patient ratio, “staff cohorting” 
(i.e., assigning staff to infected/colonized patients to prohibit staff from crossover care for 
uninfected/uncolonized patients), and staff education may help prevent the transmission of MDR 
pathogens (Henderson, 2006a). The CDC guideline Management of Multidrug-Resistant 
Organisms in Healthcare Settings, 2006 recommends a combination of interventions (e.g., 
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contact precautions, active surveillance screening, environmental cleaning) to control the spread 
of MDR pathogens, including MRSA (Siegel et al., 2007b). However, the efficacy of each 
individual intervention remains unknown because many studies report the results of the 
simultaneous implementation of several control interventions and because MDR pathogen 
transmission involves multiple complex factors in hospital settings (Henderson, 2006).  
Hospital infection control program 
To implement infection control guidelines for the prevention of HAIs, an effective 
infection control program is essential in hospital settings. A CDC Study on the Efficacy of 
Nosocomial Infection Control (SENIC) reported the four essential components of a hospital 
infection control program that contributed to a 32% reduction in HAIs: conducting active 
surveillance, employing a trained infection control physician, having a full-time infection control 
nurse for every 250 beds, and providing surgeons with feedback about HAI rates (Haley et al., 
1985).  
Surveillance has been the core scientific foundation of hospital epidemiology and the 
essential function of infection control programs in the United States since the 1960s (Archibald, 
2012). The general goals of surveillance are to determine the endemic incidence rate of HAIs, to 
identify an epidemic event, and to evaluate the efficacy of interventions and programs (Weber, 
Sickbert-Bennett, Brown, & Rutala, 2007). Since 1989, when the CDC National Nosocomial 
Infections Surveillance System (NNIS) did not recommend hospital-wide surveillance (NNIS, 
1998), most hospitals have conducted targeted HAIs surveillance, either unit-directed (e.g., 
intensive care units [ICU]) or site-directed (e.g., for specific surgical procedures). Targeted 
surveillance is widely used because infection control resources are scarce and because data 
acquisition through surveillance is both labor-intensive and costly (Edmond, 2007). Thus, it has 
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become increasingly difficult to acquire the information necessary to evaluate the hospital-wide 
incidence of HAIs, hospital-wide epidemic events, and hospital-wide interventions. However, to 
comprehensively understand epidemiologically important healthcare-associated pathogens (e.g., 
MRSA), hospital-wide surveillance may be necessary (Siegel et al., 2007a). In addition, hospital-
wide surveillance can provide the critical infection control function of case-finding (a single 
patient or cluster of patients) to help isolate infectious patients using the appropriate 
transmission-based precautions (Siegel et al., 2007a). 
Understaffing is a constant problem in hospital infection control. In 1985, SENIC 
recommended that one full-time infection control nurse be available for every 250 occupied beds 
in acute healthcare facilities; in 2002, the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and 
Epidemiology (APIC) suggested the staffing ratio of 0.8 to 1.0 infection control nurse for every 
100 occupied acute care beds (O'Boyle, Jackson, & Henly, 2002). However, most hospital 
infection control departments are still understaffed and do not have adequate administrative 
support (Wright et al., 2010). Despite rapidly evolving infection control issues and a 145% 
increase in infection control activities between 1982 and 2001, resources for infection control 
have persistently lagged behind increased infection control activities (Goldrick, 2005). 
The primary goal of a hospital infection control program is to prevent HAIs in a cost-
effective manner (Jones & Woeltje, 2007). To reduce HAIs, effective infection control methods 
should be applied continuously and collaboratively in daily practice by every healthcare provider 
(Aziz & Murphy, 2009). Unfortunately, although detailed evidence-based guidelines are 
available, hospitals often deviate from existing guidelines that have clear descriptions about what 
is recommended and what should be avoided. For example, according to a 2007 Leapfrog Group 
survey, 87% of U.S. hospitals failed to put recommended guidelines into practice to prevent 
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HAIs (Sprague, 2009). As the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report To Error Is Human: Building a 
Safer Health System on medical errors stated, improving patient safety calls for a systems 
approach to modify conditions that contribute to errors, which are often caused by a convergence 
of multiple factors (IOM, 2000). Flawed systems—processes that make HCP fail—can also 
contribute to HAIs (Murphy, Alvarado, & Fawal, 2002). A multifaceted approach, including 
continuous assessment of HCP and modifications of work environments, is required to increase 
adherence to infection control recommendations in healthcare practices (Siegel et al., 2007a). 
Outline of Dissertation Study 
Although prior research has been conducted since the national adoption of hospital 
infection control programs in the 1970s, and it has provided useful evidence in infection control 
(Jones & Woeltje, 2007), further studies are still needed to fill the gaps between our knowledge 
and the reality of the HAIs that currently occur in hospital settings. Among the many unknown 
aspects of HAIs and hospital infection control issues, this dissertation study examined three areas 
related to hospital infection control that lacked critical information: the change in the incidence 
of HAIs by healthcare-associated pathogen, the cost-effectiveness analysis of MRSA active 
surveillance screening, and current hospital policies for isolation precautions for visitors (see 
Figure 1.3). Under the overarching theme of prevention of HAIs, this dissertation demonstrated 
an infection-control connection among three research areas. The study began with basic data-
driven evidence (area 1, basic incidence) based on an examination of the HAI incidence by each 
pathogen group. It then progressed to the proactive intervention of finding carriers upon their 
admission to the hospital (area 2, guideline issue), and then proceeded to examine hospital policy 
issues regarding PPE use for visitors of patients on isolation precautions (area 3, implementing 
policy). The aims for each research area are described below. 
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Figure 1.3 Study framework. Note. MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SHEA, the Society for 
Healthcare Epidemiology of America; HICPAC, Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee.   
 
Area 1. Basic incidence (Chapter 2: The Changes in the Incidence of Healthcare-Associated 
Infections by Pathogen at a University Hospital from 2005 to 2011) 
Research needs. Although the CDC/HICPAC isolation precautions guideline 
recommends transmission-based precautions for pathogen-specific HAIs, current knowledge is 
limited concerning the change in the HAI incidence by pathogen, which plays a role as an 
infectious agent in the “chain of HAIs”. However, without knowing the incidence of HAIs by 
pathogen across hospital settings, we cannot plan infection control measures that focus on 
epidemiologically important healthcare-associated pathogens (e.g., MRSA) or identify patients 
who should be isolated and treated under transmission-based precautions. Thus, studies of the 
change in the HAI incidence by pathogen (i.e., information about longitudinal outcomes 
associated with the surveillance guideline-concordant interventions) within a hospital with an 
effective hospital infection control program is necessary to provide much-needed evidence with 
robust outcomes data to support desirable infection control policy in hospital settings.  
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Aim. This study aimed to examine the incidence of HAIs by pathogen using hospital-
wide surveillance data to describe the epidemiology of HAIs at a university hospital. Using the 
incidence density per 1,000 person-days (patient-days or device-days), the incidence change in 
HAIs by pathogen was examined over time in the following categories: service (medicine, 
surgery, and pediatrics; ICU vs. non-ICU); device-associated infections (central line-associated 
bloodstream infection [CLABSI], CAUTI, and VAP); and MDR pathogens (MRSA, VRE, MDR 
Acinetobacter, and MDR Pseudomonas).  
Area 2. Guideline issue (Chapter 3: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Active Surveillance 
Screening for Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in an Academic Hospital Setting) 
Research needs. When the guidelines provided by CDC/HICPAC or other professional 
societies cannot recommend solutions for HAI problems secondary to insufficient  knowledge or 
evidence, hospitals must determine their own policy/intervention based on their unique 
characteristics, such as acute care setting or long-term care facility status. In particular, MRSA 
active surveillance screening remains a controversial topic that has conflicting guidelines from 
the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) and HICPAC (Jackson, Jarvis, & 
Scheckler, 2004). Thus, further study is needed to compare the costs and outcomes among 
different MRSA surveillance screening strategies and to provide evidence regarding the most 
cost-effective MRSA screening policy on patient admission to academic hospitals that have 
distinctive characteristics (e.g., acute care facilities with more severely ill patients and frequent 
transfer-ins from other facilities). 
Aim. This study aimed to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of three alternative active 
screening strategies for MRSA in an academic hospital setting (from the hospital perspective) to 
detect MRSA-colonized patients who should be isolated with contact precautions upon hospital 
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admission. The screening strategies were universal surveillance screening (USS) for all hospital 
admissions, targeted surveillance screening (TSS) for ICU admissions, and no surveillance 
screening (NSS). From the academic hospital perspective, a cost-effectiveness analysis was 
conducted using a decision-tree model to determine the most cost-effective active surveillance 
screening strategy for MRSA.  
Area 3. Implementing policy (Chapter 4: Survey of North Carolina Hospital Policies 
Regarding Visitor Use of Personal Protective Equipment for Entering the Rooms of Patients 
on Isolation Precautions) 
Research needs. Every human has many endogenous microorganisms within his or her 
own body and can be either a susceptible host or an intermediate transmission route of infectious 
agents. HCP are required to adhere to isolation precautions during their daily interactions with 
infected/colonized patients. However, there are no clear recommendations for hospital visitors, 
who could acquire healthcare-associated pathogens as susceptible hosts or could transmit these 
pathogens as reservoirs during their visit. Thus, a study on current hospital visitor policies is 
needed to suggest appropriate hospital policies related to isolation precautions. 
Aim. This study explored the range of hospital policies for visitor use of personal 
protective equipment when entering the rooms of patients on isolation precautions. Using an 
online survey of hospitals in North Carolina, this study examined current hospital visitor policies 
related to isolation precautions and, based on lessons from infection preventionists (IPs)’ 
experience, suggested appropriate future policy directions, including difficulties with such 
policies and ideas for improving them.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE CHANGES IN THE INCIDENCE OF HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED 
INFECTIONS BY PATHOGEN AT A UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL FROM 2005 TO 2011 
 
Background 
Surveillance for incidence of healthcare-associated infections 
Monitoring the changes in the HAI incidence rate through surveillance is essential to 
planning, implementing, and evaluating infection control measures to prevent HAIs in hospital 
settings. According to a dictionary of epidemiology, “incidence” refers to the new cases of a 
disease in a defined population for a specific time period, and incidence density refers to the 
incidence rate per person-time (Last, 2001). Healthcare-associated infection (HAI) surveillance 
is the systematic, ongoing collection, analysis, and dissemination of HAI data (Allen-Bridson, 
Morrell, & Horan, 2012). Its goals are reducing the overall HAI incidence, establishing endemic 
rates, detecting outbreaks, convincing administrators and healthcare personnel to take measures 
against HAIs, evaluating control measures, satisfying accrediting and regulatory requirements, 
defending the institution against lawsuits, and comparing HAI rates within or between hospitals 
(Andrus, Horan, & Gaynes, 2007; Perl & Chaiwarith, 2010). To compare the incidence rate of 
HAIs in a hospital (across units or hospitals) over time, the incidence rate must be adjusted using 
the incidence-density approach for variations in the distribution of denominators (population at 
risk), such as length of hospital stay and device use (Allen-Bridson et al., 2012; Tokars, 2012). In 
this dissertation, incidence is used interchangeably with incidence density. 
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Healthcare-associated pathogens  
Information about pathogens isolated from patients’ HAIs has implications for both 
treatment and the implementation of infection control and prevention strategies (Henderson, 
2006). However, in contrast to the increasing focus on antimicrobial-resistant pathogens, there 
are few reports on HAI pathogens (McDonald, 2006). In addition, data on HAIs occurring 
outside of intensive care units (ICU) are scarce since targeted (priority-based) surveillance 
emerged as a cost-effective method, leading to the discontinuation of hospital-wide surveillance 
in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Nosocomial Infections 
Surveillance System (NNIS) in 1986 (NNIS, 1998). However, according to a recent study 
comparing the number of HAIs included in targeted surveillance (the National Healthcare Safety 
Network [NHSN] surveillance) and hospital-wide surveillance, targeted surveillance found only 
77.7% of the bloodstream infections (BSIs), 74.5% of the surgical site infections (SSIs), 62.3% 
of the urinary tract infections (UTIs), and 18.6% of the respiratory tract infections (including 100% 
of the ventilator-associated pneumonia [VAP] cases) that were identified with hospital-wide 
surveillance (Weber, Sickbert-Bennett, Brown, & Rutala, 2012). Therefore, comprehensive data 
on healthcare-associated pathogens based on hospital-wide surveillance data is currently lacking 
in most hospitals using targeted surveillance.  
A healthcare-associated pathogen is an organism that causes healthcare-associated 
infections (HAIs) within a healthcare setting, thus serving as the infectious agent in the “Chain of 
HAIs” model (see Chapter 1, Figure 1.1). Healthcare-associated pathogens include bacteria, 
fungi, and viruses (Ostrowsky, 2007). The NHSN report from 2006 to 2007 named the 10 most 
common infectious agents, which were isolated from 84% of the reported HAIs. They were 
coagulase-negative staphylococci (CoNS; 15.3%), Staphylococcus aureus (14.5%), 
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Enterococcus species (12.1%), Candida species (6.8%), Escherichia coli (9.6%), Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa (7.9%), Klebsiella pneumonia (5.8%), Enterobacter species (4.8%), Acinetobacter 
baumannii (2.7%), and Klebsiella oxytoca (1.1%; Hidron et al., 2008). According to a study that 
examined the relative frequency of healthcare-associated pathogens at one university hospital 
from 1980 to 2008, 18 groups of HAI agents were found through hospital-wide surveillance: in 
order of decreasing frequency, the agents were S. aureus, E. coli, CoNS, “Candida and other 
yeast”, Enterococcus species, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Klebsiella species, Enterobacter species, 
other streptococci, “Clostridium difficile and other anaerobes”, Proteus species, Serratia species, 
Acinetobacter species, Haemophilus species, Bacteroids species, Citrobacter species, Group B 
streptococci, and others (Kang, Sickbert-Bennett, Brown, Weber, & Rutala, 2012b).  
The characteristics of the main healthcare-associated pathogens 
 Staphylococcus aureus. S. aureus has been the predominant healthcare-associated 
pathogen in hospital settings since the 1950s. It is a common community pathogen that causes 
soft tissue infections and furuncles (John & Shukla, 2012). S. aureus is commonly part of the 
normal flora of the human body. It is not an environmental pathogen, but it can persist on 
hospital surfaces for hours to days (John & Shukla, 2012; Salgado & Calfee, 2012). 
Asymptomatic colonization of S. aureus has been reported in one-third of the human population, 
and hospitalization itself is a risk factor for S. aureus colonization (John & Shukla, 2012; 
Salgado & Calfee, 2012). S. aureus may cause bacteremia, endocarditis, SSI, pneumonia, burn 
wound infections, hemodialysis shunt infections, meningitis, prosthetic device infections, urinary 
tract infection (UTI), osteomyelitis, septic arthritis, and toxic shock syndrome (John & Shukla, 
2012). Methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) is a S. aureus strain that is resistant to 
antistaphylococcal penicillins (e.g., methicillin, oxacillin) and most of the currently available 
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beta-lactam antibiotics, such as cephalosporins (except ceftaroline which is a new cephalosporin 
that has activity against MRSA) and carbapenems (Salgado & Calfee, 2012). Since the first 
report of MRSA in 1961, it has become a common, endemic HAI problem in hospital settings 
throughout much of the world except Netherlands (Salgado & Calfee, 2012). 
Coagulase-negative staphylococci. CoNS are low-pathogenic bacteria that reside on 
human skin and mucosa. They are a rare source of disease in healthy individuals outside the 
hospital setting (Ziebuhr & Flückiger, 2012). Staphylococcus epidermidis is the most common 
HAI pathogen among the CoNS, which also include S. capitis, S. haemolyticus, S. hominis, S. 
lugdunensis, S. saprophyticus, S. schleiferii, and S. swarneri (Ziebuhr & Flückiger, 2012). In 
recent decades, CoNS have emerged as common HAI pathogens among patients who are 
critically ill, immunocompromised, have central venous access devices, and experiencing long-
term hospitalization. CoNS infection has been linked to the use of foreign materials, such as 
indwelling medical devices (Ziebuhr & Flückiger, 2012). CoNS may cause BSI associated with 
central-line catheters, prosthetic valve endocarditis related to pacemakers or implantable 
defibrillators, sternum osteomyelitis after cardiac surgery, prosthetic joint infections after joint 
replacement, meningitis/encephalitis associated with cerebrospinal fluid shunt implantation, and 
other device-related infections (Ziebuhr & Flückiger, 2012). 
Enterococcus species. Enterococci are normally found in the human intestinal flora, but 
they may be found on hospitalized patients’ skin and wounds (e.g., pressure ulcers) and in the 
hospital environment, including the surfaces of medical equipment (Shuman & Chenoweth, 
2012). E. faecalis, E. faecium, and E. gallinarum are the major healthcare-associated pathogen 
groups among the 33 species of Enterococcus, and they cause UTI, BSI, endocarditis, intra-
abdominal/pelvic infections, and skin/soft tissue infections (Shuman & Chenoweth, 2012). Most 
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enterococci have inherent antimicrobial resistance to many antibiotics.  In the past 10-20 years, 
vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) have become increasingly challenging to treat with the 
small number of options (e.g., linezolid, daptomycin, and tigecycline), and infection control is 
difficult because of heavy environmental contamination (Shuman & Chenoweth, 2012). 
Gram-negative bacilli. The reservoirs for Gram-negative bacilli (e.g., P. aeruginosa, 
Acinetobacter species) are water, soil, human body (e.g., the pharyngeal, genitourinary and 
gastrointestinal tracts), and hospital environments (Black, Bonten, & Weinstein, 2012; Stosor & 
Flaherty, 2012). The human gastrointestinal tract is a reservoir for E. coli and Klebsiella species 
(Black et al., 2012). Enterobacter species thrive in moist environments (e.g., infusion fluids and 
humidifiers), and Serratia species have been found in contaminated solutions, patients’ urinary 
and respiratory tracts, and such devices as endotracheal tubes (Black et al., 2012). Gram-negative 
bacilli can cause UTI, BSI, SSI, respiratory tract infections, and central nervous system 
infections (Black et al., 2012; Stosor & Flaherty, 2012). P. aeruginosa and Acinetobacter species 
have become important HAI pathogens often associated with multiclass antimicrobial resistance 
(Stosor & Flaherty, 2012). 
Clostridium difficile. C. difficile is the etiologic pathogen of most healthcare-associated 
gastrointestinal infections such as healthcare-associated diarrhea and antibiotic-associated 
pseudomembranous colitis (Johnson & Gerding, 2012). C. difficile infection occurs under three 
conditions: 1) the disruption of normal intestinal microbiota after the use of broad spectrum 
antibiotics (e.g., third-generation cephalosporins, quinolones); 2) exposure to a C. difficile strain 
through asymptomatic carriers, or exposure to C. difficile spores from contaminated 
environmental surfaces; and 3) conducive host factors, such as host antibody response or the 
presence of intestinal epithelial cell receptors for C. difficile toxin A (Gough, Shaikh, & Manges, 
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2011; Johnson & Gerding, 2012). Over the past several years, C. difficile has been reported as a 
leading HAI pathogen, and it has replaced MRSA as the leading HAI pathogen in community 
hospitals in the southeastern United States (Miller, Chen, Sexton, & Anderson, 2011). 
Candida. The only source of Candida is the endogenous fungal flora of the patients’ own 
skin and gastrointestinal tract, although Candida species have been isolated from hospital 
environments (McNeil & Chiller, 2012). The HAIs caused by Candida are BSI, SSI, and 
mucocutaneous infections (e.g., neonatal oral thrush) usually among immunocompromised 
patients, such as low-birth weight infants and cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy (McNeil 
& Chiller, 2012). According to a NHSN report, Candida was the fourth most common HAI 
pathogen and the second most common etiologic agent for central line-associated bloodstream 
infection (CLABSI) from 2006 to 2007 (Hidron et al., 2008).  
Multidrug-resistant pathogens. Multidrug-resistant (MDR) pathogens refer primarily to 
bacteria that have developed resistance to more than two unrelated key antimicrobial agents that 
are usually used as first-choice treatments for a given infection (Lin et al., 2007). The mortality 
rate is high for patients with MDR pathogen infections, and treatment options are few and 
challenging (Maragakis, 2010). Risk factors for MDR pathogen infection include prior 
antimicrobial exposure, intensive care unit (ICU) admission, and prolonged hospital stays 
(French, 2012). In addition to MRSA and VRE, MDR Pseudomonas and MDR Acinetobacter 
have recently emerged as important healthcare-associated MDR pathogens (French, 2012; 
Maragakis, 2010). 
Aim of this study 
Changes in the spectrum of healthcare-associated pathogens may arise from increasing 
numbers of immunocompromised patients, older patients with multiple comorbidities, and the 
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increased use of broad-spectrum antibiotics and invasive procedures (Weber et al., 1992). 
According to a study of the relative frequency of healthcare-associated pathogens (n=33,797) 
from 1980 to 2008 in a university hospital setting, the occurrence of S. aureus, CoNS, 
Enterococcus species, and “C. difficile and other anaerobes” significantly increased, while the 
relative proportion of E. coli, P. aeruginosa, Klebsiella species, Enterobacter species, and other 
streptococci significantly decreased during the study period (Kang et al., 2012b). Based on 
infection site, this study showed significant increasing trends for the following pathogens and 
sites: S. aureus in UTIs, SSIs, and respiratory tract infections; CoNS in BSIs and SSIs; Candida 
in SSIs; and Enterococcus in BSIs and UTIs. However, a study on the incidence of HAIs by 
pathogen is needed to better interpret the relative frequency of healthcare-associated pathogens 
because relative frequency calculations are influenced by the magnitude of the actual numbers of 
isolated pathogens, and they allow each pathogen’s proportions to change in response to the 
proportion changes in the other isolated pathogens (Kang et al., 2012b).  
There is no established framework for determining the incidence of HAIs according to 
pathogen based on hospital-wide surveillance data. Despite challenges (e.g., potential inaccuracy 
if the population of patients at risk is small), hospital-wide surveillance has the strong advantage 
of providing comprehensive HAI data, including information about HAI pathogens isolated 
across hospital settings. Therefore, this study aimed to review the hospital-wide incidence of 
HAIs by pathogen using hospital-wide surveillance data to describe the epidemiology of HAIs at 
a university hospital. 
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Methods  
Study Design 
This study was designed as an epidemiological study focusing on the incidence of HAIs 
by pathogen among a cohort of hospitalized patients. This incidence-density study, a type of 
cohort study, used person-time at risk as a denominator (Tokars, 2012). This study involved a 
secondary analysis of preexisting HAI data collected through prospective hospital-wide 
surveillance, which is an ongoing descriptive study of HAI occurrence using standard CDC 
definitions and methods (Abramson, 2012). This study was approved by the UNC Biomedical 
Institutional Review Board.   
Setting/Sample 
This study was conducted at University of North Carolina Health Care (UNCHC), an 
806-bed academic facility. UNCHC consists of North Carolina Memorial Hospital, a children’s 
hospital, a women’s hospital, a cancer hospital, and a neurosciences hospital. UNCHC has 
conducted comprehensive hospital-wide surveillance by trained full-time infection preventionists 
(IPs) using CDC NNIS/NHSN HAI definitions since 1980. All information about HAI cases 
detected by surveillance through hospital inpatient records has been stored in the UNCHC 
electronic epidemiology database’s clinical repository. The study sample included all HAIs that 
occurred among hospitalized patients during the study period from January 1, 2005 to December 
31, 2011. 
Data Collection 
The collected data for this study were both numerators and denominators to calculate 
incidences. For the numerator, all healthcare-associated pathogen data with information about 
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the service location (nursing station), HAI category, and MDR were extracted from the UNCHC 
electronic epidemiology database for 2005 to 2011. The denominator data included patient-days, 
including overall total hospital stay, to calculate the service-associated incidence and device-days 
to calculate the incidence of device-associated infection. Patient-days data were extracted from 
hospital census data (DSS Business Universe) for the study period (2005 to 2011). Device-days 
(e.g., ventilator-days, central-line days, and Foley-catheter days) were extracted for the years 
2006 to 2011 because of incomplete data for 2005, which was when UNCHC first mandated the 
daily recording (QuadraMed Acuity Plus®) of device-days at each nursing station.   
Data Management/Measures 
Pathogen data. Based on previous studies at UNCHC (Kang et al., 2012b; Weber et al., 
1992), pathogens were grouped into 18 categories of related species (Figure 2.1). Non-
informative data about pathogens, such as “no growth” and “mixed flora”, were deleted. To 
investigate changes in the incidence of MDR pathogens, the following additional subgroups of 
MDR pathogens were created for data analysis using MDR information from the epidemiology 
database: MRSA, VRE, MDR Acinetobacter, and MDR Pseudomonas (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Grouping categories for the isolated healthcare-associated pathogens. MDR = Multidrug resistant; MRSA = 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; VRE = Vancomycin-resistant enterococci. 
 
 
Categorization for analysis. To analyze the incidence of isolated pathogens in device-
associated HAI, all pathogens related to device utilization were sorted according to infection site 
information and then classified into five major categories: CLABSI, catheter-associated urinary 
tract infection (CAUTI), VAP, SSI, and other infections (e.g., endocarditis, osteomyelitis, and 
meningitis), as specified by NHSN definitions (Horan, Andrus, & Dudeck, 2008). To analyze the 
pathogen incidence according to service type, all cases (regardless of infection site) and all 
pathogen-isolated locations (based on nursing station and inpatient hospital service location) 
were classified into major service categories: two acuity-based categories (ICU vs. non-ICU) and 
four service-based categories (medicine vs. surgery vs. pediatrics vs. other services [e.g., 
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dermatology, gynecology, psychiatry, ophthalmology, rehabilitation medicine]). Step-down units 
(SDU) were categorized as non-ICU because the HAI rates in SDUs were closer to those rates in 
the general wards than to the rates in the ICUs (Weber et al., 2007). Denominator data (device-
days and patient-days) were classified into the same major infection site and service categories as 
the numerator (pathogens) data.  
Incidence density calculation. The incidence densities of HAIs according to the 
healthcare-associated pathogen for each service and overall hospital total were calculated as the 
number of HAIs per 1,000 patient-days for each service (Formula 2.1; Tokars, 2012). In this 
study, the incidence density is defined as the incidence rate per 1,000 person-days at risk 
(operational definition of incidence, also can be called as adjusted incidence).  
Formula 2.1  
Incidence Density general =  
                             
                          
        
The incidence of device-associated HAIs (CLABSI, CAUTI, and VAP) according to 
healthcare-associated pathogen were calculated as the number of each device-associated HAI per 
1,000 device-days: i.e., central-line days for CLABSI (Formula 2.2), Foley-catheter days for 
CAUTI (Formula 2.3), and ventilator days for VAP (Formula 2.4).  
Formula 2.2  
Incidence Density CLABSI =  
                                
                               
        
Formula 2.3  
Incidence Density CAUTI =  
                               
                                 
        
Formula 2.4  
Incidence Density VAP =  
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Data Analysis 
SAS Version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC) was used to compute descriptive statistics 
(e.g., the total number of isolated S. aureus cases in the ICU in 2005, the mean incidence, the 
median incidence, and the incidence range) of the yearly incidence density of HAIs for the study 
period for each category of analysis (Figure 2.2). The mean incidence was used for the “overall 
(hospital total)” and “by service” analyses. The median incidence was used for “device-
associated HAI” and “MDR pathogens” because missing or insufficient yearly numbers for 
isolated pathogens in some categories made the use of the mean incidence inappropriate.  
Because the number of patient-days is a continuous variable, simple linear regression 
(dependent variable: patient-days; independent variable: year) was used to test for overall 
changes in patient-days during the study period to reflect the yearly total numbers of hospitalized 
patients and the total length of hospital stay at UNCHC for each patient. 
 
Figure 2.2 Conceptual data analysis framework for each category. MDR = Multidrug resistant; ICU = Intensive care unit; 
CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; CAUTI = Catheter-associated urinary tract infection; VAP = 
Ventilator-associated pneumonia.  
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To estimate the yearly incidence densities of HAI according to pathogen across the study 
years, Poisson regression analysis that treated each year discretely was used to determine 
goodness of fit and adjust for overdispersion. Poisson regression is a valid method to determine 
the incidence density by accounting for person-days (e.g., patient-days and device-days; Tokars, 
2012). When the overall effect of the Poisson regression model was statistically significant (i.e., 
the null hypothesis that there are no differences among the yearly incidence densities over time 
was rejected), logistic regression models were conducted for portions of each HAI occurrence by 
pathogen using linear fit across time to estimate the trend change (increase or decrease) in 
incidence densities across the study years. Where appropriate, the incidence difference between 
the first and last years of the study was estimated using the linear fit of logistic regression 
(Figure 2.3). When the Poisson regression found non-significant differences in the pathogen-
specific HAI incidence densities, no linear distribution over time was assumed, and the incidence 
density difference was not estimated using logistic regression. 
 
Figure 2.3 The concept of estimated incidence density difference based on the linear fit of the logistic regression.  
* Null hypothesis line (slope = 0): there is no difference in the incidence density over time 
 
 44 
 
To help interpret the incidence density difference, the relative difference in incidence 
density (the proportion of the first year to the last year, based on the estimated trend line; Tolley, 
2012) was calculated using Formula 2.5. 
Formula 2.5  
          Relative incidence difference (RID) 
=  |
                                                                              
                                       
|       (%) 
 
Results 
Overall, at least one pathogen was isolated for 8,784 (87.2%) of the 10,070 HAIs that 
occurred during the 7-year study period. Because some HAIs had multiple pathogens, a total of 
10,585 pathogens were isolated (Table 2.1). The mean number of pathogens per HAI was 1.21. 
For the remaining 1,286 HAIs, no pathogen was isolated.  During the study period, the number 
of total patient-days per year increased significantly (p-value, <0.05). However, among the top 
10 pathogens, the incidence of E. coli, Enterococcus species, CoNS, “Candida and other yeasts”, 
Enterobacter species, and “other streptococci” decreased significantly, whereas the incidence of 
C. difficile increased significantly per 1,000 patient-days (Table 2.1, Figure 2.4). The estimated 
incidence density of C. difficile increased by 0.42 per 1,000 patient-days between 2005 and 2011; 
the relative incidence difference was 159% during that period. 
  
4
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Table 2.1  
Overall Incidence (per 1,000 Patient-Days) of Healthcare-Associated Pathogens over a Seven-Year Period (2005-2011) 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from  
comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
 
  
Pathogen group 
Total (2005-2011)  Incidence rate per 1,000 patient-days Incidence 
Mean (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* Rank No. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Staphylococcus aureus 1 1,743 1.26 1.06 0.86 1.16 1.23 1.07 1.09 1.10 (0.86-1.26) NS - 0.8883 
Escherichia coli 2 1,149 0.74 0.80 0.95 0.71 0.53 0.69 0.68 0.73 (0.53-0.95) -0.18  8 0.0054 
Enterococcus species 3 1,114 0.73 0.79 0.79 0.70 0.63 0.61 0.70 0.70 (0.61-0.79) -0.13 4 0.0471 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 4 849 0.77 0.74 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.41 0.30 0.54 (0.30-0.77) -0.47 61 <.0001 
Candida and other yeast 5 792 0.80 0.59 0.55 0.35 0.39 0.46 0.41 0.50 (0.35-0.80) -0.34 49 <.0001 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 6 747 0.53 0.56 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.47 (0.42-0.56) NS - 0.0557 
Clostridium difficile 7 685 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.55 0.83 0.43 (0.29-0.83) 0.42 159 <.0001 
Klebsiella species 8 608 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.38 (0.33-0.44) NS - 0.1435 
Enterobacter species 9 563 0.49 0.35 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.36 (0.30-0.49) -0.14 39 0.0019 
Other streptococci 10 292 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.18 (0.12-0.26) -0.07 27 0.0239 
Proteus species 11 224 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.14 (0.10-0.17) NS - 0.8654 
Serratia species 12 193 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 (0.08-0.15) NS - 0.7278 
Acinetobacter species 13 176 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.11 (0.05-0.20) NS - 0.3487 
Group B Streptococcus 14 94 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 (0.05-0.07) NS - 0.6269 
Haemophilus species 15 92 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 (0.03-0.11) NS - 0.6862 
Bacteroides species 16 91 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 (0.05-0.07) NS - 0.4250 
Citrobacter species 17 83 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.05 (0.02-0.08) NS - 0.1113 
Other 18 1,090 0.76 0.74 0.67 0.70 0.59 0.60 0.77 0.69 (0.59-0.77) NS - 0.1968 
Total pathogens isolated  10,585 1,581 1,505 1,535 1,495 1,386 1,486 1,597     
Total patient-days 1,582,872 205,390 213,709 226,723 230,016 229,971 234,389 242,674     
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Figure 2.4 Healthcare-associated infection pathogens with significantly changed incidence trends over a seven-year 
period (2005-2011) 
 
Service. The incidences according to pathogen and service category are summarized in 
Table 2.2 (see Appendix Table 2.9-2.13 for details of incidence according to each service 
category). Overall, across service categories, decreasing trends in incidence density were 
observed for all pathogens except C. difficile. C. difficile was the most frequently occurring 
healthcare-associated pathogen in medicine service, and it showed a significantly increased 
incidence across almost all service categories except pediatrics. S. aureus was the most common 
pathogen in other service categories, and it showed a significantly decreased incidence in 
medicine and ICUs. A significant decrease in E. coli incidence was observed in medicine and 
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non-ICU settings. CoNS and “Candida and other yeast” showed significant decreases in 
incidence in all categories of service. Enterococcus species and P. aeruginosa showed significant 
decreases in incidence in medicine services. Enterobacter species showed significant decreases 
in medicine and ICU settings. Other streptococci showed significantly decreased incidences in 
pediatrics and non-ICU settings.  
Device-associated infections. Overall and across service categories, all device-associated 
HAIs by pathogen showed significant decreases or no significant change in the incidence rate per 
1,000 device-days (Tables 2.3–2.5). The incidence of specific pathogens decreased most in 
CLABSI cases, less so in CAUTI cases, and least in VAP cases.  
4
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Table 2.2 
The Overall Incidence Rate (per 1,000 Patient-Days) of the Top 10 Healthcare-Associated Pathogens by Service Category over a 
Seven-Year Period (2005-2011) 
Note. R = Rank within the category; EID = Estimated incidence difference for the compared incidences from 2005 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = 
Relative incidence difference for the compared incidence from 2005 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; † = 0.01≤ p ˂0.05; ¶ = p ˂0.01. See Appendix Table 
2.9-2.13 for details for each service category. 
Pathogen group 
(Overall top 10) 
Service-based category  Acuity-based category 
Medicine  Surgery  Pediatrics  ICU  Non-ICU 
R Mean EID 
RID 
(%) 
R Mean EID 
RID 
(%) 
R Mean EID 
RID 
(%) 
R Mean EID 
RID 
(%) 
R Mean EID 
RID 
(%) 
Staphylococcus aureus 4   0.62  -0.26† 48 1    2.57  NS - 1    0.77  NS - 1    1.64  -0.67¶ 34 1    0.97  NS - 
Escherichia coli 3   0.64  -0.37¶ 39 3    1.34  NS - 4    0.47  NS - 4    1.11  NS - 2    0.63  -0.23¶ 17 
Enterococcus species 2   0.65  -0.29¶ 15 2    1.39  NS - 3    0.50  NS - 3    1.12  NS - 3    0.60  NS - 
Coagulase negative   
                 staphylococci 
6   0.41  -0.59¶ 71 5    0.94  -0.42¶ 48 2    0.67  -0.71¶ 67 6    0.96  -1.11¶ 67 4    0.43  -0.30¶ 58 
Candida and other yeast 5   0.61  -0.60¶ 64 6    0.86  -0.36† 37 8    0.36  -0.32¶ 52 2    1.26  -1.15¶ 59 7    0.30  -0.13† 40 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 7   0.24  -0.19† 38 4    1.09  NS - 5    0.44  NS - 5    1.11  NS -  6    0.31  NS - 
Clostridium difficile 1   0.71  0.87¶ 262 9    0.52  0.47¶ 164 9    0.23  NS - 9    0.49  0.62¶ 224 5    0.42  0.38¶ 145 
Klebsiella species 8   0.24  NS - 8    0.76  NS - 6    0.41  NS -  8    0.77  NS - 8    0.29  NS - 
Enterobacter species 9   0.14  -0.12† 63 7    0.80  NS - 7    0.40  NS - 7    0.92  -0.48¶ 42 9    0.21  NS - 
Other streptococci 10   0.14  NS - 10    0.37  NS - 11    0.13  -0.16¶ 50 12    0.20  NS - 10    0.18  -0.08† 29 
 49 
 
Central-line associated bloodstream infection. The incidence changes in CLABSI 
according to pathogen are summarized in Table 2.3 (see Appendix Table 2.14 for overall 
incidence of CLBSI over a 6-year period). Overall, the incidence of CLABSI decreased 
significantly for most pathogens, with the exception of E. coli. Of note, the incidence of CoNS 
and “Candida and other yeast” in CLABSI decreased significantly across all service categories. 
Areas of significant decreases for each pathogen were as follows: S. aureus overall and in 
medicine and non-ICU settings; Enterococcus species overall and in medicine, surgery, and non-
ICU settings; Klebsiella species overall and in surgery and non-ICU settings; Enterobacter 
species overall and in pediatrics, and ICU settings; and P. aeruginosa and other streptococci 
overall.  
 
 
Table 2.3 
The Incidence Change in Central-Line Associated Bloodstream Infections Caused by the Top 10 
Pathogens per 1,000 Central-Line Days over a Six-Year Period (2006-2011) 
Note. ICU = Intensive care unit; EID = Estimated incidence difference for the compared incidence from 2006 to 2011, based on 
the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference for the compared incidence 
from 2006 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression. 
 
 
Pathogen group 
(overall top 10) 
Overall 
 Service-based  Acuity-based 
 Medicine  Surgery  Pediatrics  ICU  Non-ICU 
Incidence  
median 
(range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
Staphylococcus aureus 0.31 (0.10-0.38) -0.25 73 -0.41 93 NS - NS - NS - -0.35 84 
Escherichia coli 0.19 (0.08-0.23) NS - NS - NS - NS - NS - NS - 
Enterococcus species 0.49 (0.32-0.71) -0.36 55 -0.36 36 -0.85 92 NS - NS - -0.39 60 
Coagulase negative     
     staphylococci 
0.63 (0.29-1.00) -0.71 71 -0.57 53 -0.50 78 -1.51 89 -1.02 66 -0.53 73 
Candida and other yeast 0.22 (0.10-0.53) -0.34 81 -0.39 83 -0.30 82 -0.45 73 -0.58 82 -0.21 76 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 0.12 (0.01-0.16) -0.09 93 NS - NS - NS - NS - NS - 
Clostridium difficile - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Klebsiella species 0.17 (0.13-0.26) -0.15 46 NS - -0.30 82 NS - NS - -0.15 54 
Enterobacter species 0.19 (0.06-0.26) -0.21 77 NS - NS - -0.34 76 -0.46 83 NS - 
Other streptococci 0.09 (0.05-0.18) -0.09 44 NS - NS - NS - NS - NS - 
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Catheter-associated urinary tract infection. Overall CAUTI incidence showed 
significant decreases for all of the top 10 pathogens except S. aureus and “other streptococcus” 
(Table 2.4; see Appendix Table 2.15 for overall incidence of CAUTI over a 6-year period). 
According to service category, the significantly decreased pathogens were as follows: E. coli and 
Klebsiella species overall and in medicine, surgery, and non-ICU settings; Enterococcus species 
overall and in medicine and non-ICU settings; CoNS, P. aeruginosa, and Enterobacter species 
overall and in surgery and non-ICU settings; and “Candida and other yeast” overall and in 
pediatrics and ICU settings.  
 
 
Table 2.4 
The Incidence Change in Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infections Caused by the Top 10 
Pathogens per 1,000 Foley-Days over a Six-Year Period (2006-2011) 
Note. ICU = Intensive care unit; EID = Estimated incidence difference for the compared incidence from 2006 to 2011, based on 
the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference for the compared incidence 
from 2006 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression. 
 
Ventilator-associated pneumonia. For the VAP incidence changes (Table 2.5), only S. 
aureus showed a significant decrease overall (see Appendix Table 2.16 for overall incidence of 
VAP over a 6-year period). In the surgery service, there was a significant decrease in the 
incidence density of VAP caused by S. aureus, and Klebsiella species.  
Pathogen group 
(overall top 10) 
Overall 
 Service-based  Acuity-based 
 Medicine  Surgery  Pediatrics  ICU  Non-ICU 
Incidence  
median 
(range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
  Staphylococcus aureus 0.07 (0.05-0.15) NS - NS - NS - - - NS - NS - 
  Escherichia coli 1.00 (0.48-1.59) -1.01 51 -1.55 78 -0.84 40 NS - NS - -1.41 70 
  Enterococcus species 0.63 (0.58-1.06) -0.34 25 -0.96 72 NS - NS - NS - -0.61 45 
Coagulase negative   
      staphylococci 
0.09 (0.03-0.25) -0.19 88 NS - -0.20 79 NS - NS - -0.26 80 
  Candida and other yeast 0.64 (0.48-1.02) -0.36 36 NS - NS - -2.17 88 -0.80 48 NS - 
  Pseudomonas aeruginosa 0.45 (0.23-0.62) -0.26 26 NS - -0.47 39 NS - NS - -0.27 33 
  Clostridium difficile - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  Klebsiella species 0.37 (0.14-0.60) -0.40 69 -0.32 85 -0.56 59 NS - NS - -0.48 80 
  Enterobacter species 0.21 (0.16-0.33) -0.17 47 NS - -0.34 55 NS - NS - -0.27 77 
  Other streptococci 0.03 (0.02-0.03) - - NS - NS - - - - - - - 
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Table 2.5 
The Incidence Change in Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia Caused by the Top 10 Pathogens per 
1,000 Ventilator-Days over a Six-Year Period (2006-2011) 
Note. ICU = Intensive care unit; EID = Estimated incidence difference for the compared incidence from 2006 to 2011, based on 
the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference for the compared incidence 
from 2006 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression. 
 
Multidrug-resistant pathogens. All MDR pathogens (MRSA, VRE, MDR 
Acinetobacter, and MDR Pseudomonas) showed no significant change in the overall HAI 
incidence in almost all service categories (Table 2.6-2.7).  
 
Table 2.6  
Overall Incidence of Healthcare-Associated Infections by Multidrug Resistant Pathogens per 
1,000 Patient-Days over a Seven-Year Period (2005-2011) 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from 
linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the 
estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
Pathogen group 
(overall top 10) 
Overall 
 Service-based  Acuity-based 
 Medicine  Surgery  Pediatrics  ICU  Non-ICU 
Incidence  
median 
(range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
  Staphylococcus aureus 0.95 (0.64-1.23) -0.53 48 NS - -1.04 74 NS - NS - - - 
  Escherichia coli 0.16 (0.11-0.27) NS - - - NS - NS - NS - - - 
  Enterococcus species 0.10 (0.10-0.21) NS - - - NS - NS - NS - - - 
Coagulase negative  
     staphylococci 
0.10 (0.06-0.11) NS - - - - - NS - NS - - - 
  Candida and other yeast 0.06 (0.05-0.11) NS - - - NS - NS - NS - - - 
  Pseudomonas aeruginosa 0.71 (0.50-0.86) NS - NS - NS - NS - NS - - - 
  Clostridium difficile - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  Klebsiella species 0.29 (0.11-0.32) NS - - - -0.46 82 NS - NS - - - 
  Enterobacter species 0.31 (0.26-1.02) NS - - - NS - NS - NS - - - 
  Other streptococci 0.15 (0.05-0.24) NS - - - NS - NS - NS - - - 
MDR-Pathogen No. 
 Incidence rate per 1,000 patient-days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
MRSA 798 0.56 0.52 0.39 0.51 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.52 (0.39-0.56) NS - 0.9746 
VRE 212 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.14 (0.09-0.17) NS - 0.2123 
MDR Acinetobacter 95 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.07 (0.00-0.13) NS - - 
MDR Pseudomonas 21 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00-0.03) NS - - 
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Only MRSA showed a significantly increased incidence in pediatrics, with an estimated 
0.29 incidence difference per 1,000 patient-days between 2005 and 2011 based on the estimated 
trend line from linear fit logistic regression. The relative incidence density difference of MRSA 
was a 264% increase between 2005 and 2011 (Table 2.7); however, the total number of MRSA 
cases isolated in the pediatric service was only 92 (data are not shown).   
 
Table 2.7  
 
The Overall Incidence Rate (per 1,000 Patient-Days) of Multidrug Resistant Pathogens by 
Service Category over a Seven-Year Period (2005-2011)  
Note. MDR = Multidrug resistant; ICU = Intensive care unit; MI = Median incidence; EID = Estimated incidence difference for 
the compared incidence from 2005 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative 
incidence difference for the compared incidence from 2005 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic 
regression; MRSA = Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; VRE = Vancomycin-resistant enterococci; NS = Not 
significant. 
 
For CLABSI (Table 2.8), MRSA showed significant decreases overall and in non-ICU 
settings, medicine, and surgery settings, and the incidence of VRE decreased among CLABSI 
cases in the surgery service. Other MDR pathogens showed no significant change or could not be 
included in the incidence analysis because too few cases were isolated. For the other device-
associated HAIs (CAUTI and VAP), there was no significant trend in incidence density change 
among the MDR pathogens. 
 
MDR 
pathogen 
Service-based category  Acuity-based category 
Medicine  Surgery  Pediatrics  ICU  Non-ICU 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MRSA 0.34 NS - 1.31 NS - 0.27 0.29 264 0.66 NS - 0.47 NS - 
VRE 0.23 NS - 0.21 NS - 0.04 NS - 0.19 NS - 0.12 NS - 
MDR 
Acinetobacter 
0.00 - - 0.24 - - 0.00 - - 0.32 - - 0.01 - - 
MDR 
Pseudomonas 
0.00 - - 0.02 - - 0.00 - - 0.02 - - 0.00 - - 
 53 
 
Table 2.8 
The Incidence Change in Central-Line Associated Bloodstream Infections Caused by Multidrug 
Resistant Pathogens per 1,000 Central-Line Days over a Six-Year Period (2006-2011)  
Note. MDR = Multidrug resistant; ICU = Intensive care unit; MI = Median incidence; EID = Estimated incidence difference for 
the compared incidence from 2006 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative 
incidence difference for the compared incidence from 2006 to 2011, based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic 
regression; MRSA = Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; VRE = Vancomycin-resistant enterococci; NS = Not 
significant. 
 
 
Discussion 
This study is unique because it provided information about changes in HAI incidence by 
pathogen based on hospital-wide surveillance, which is not commonly used in U.S. hospitals. 
This study examined the incidence of HAIs by pathogen for each category of interest and 
provided many kinds of HAI incidence information across hospital categories. Using hospital-
wide surveillance, this study found significant changes in the incidence rate of infections caused 
by healthcare-associated pathogens during the study period. Overall, and across service 
categories, decreasing trends in the incidence rate of HAIs per 1,000 patient-days were observed 
for all pathogens except C. difficile. Overall and across all service categories, all device-
associated HAIs by pathogen showed significant decreases or no significant change in the 
incidence rate per 1,000 device-days.  
This study has several strengths. First, it reflects the hospital-wide magnitude of HAIs by 
pathogen, based on prospective, comprehensive (hospital-wide) surveillance during the study 
MDR 
pathogen 
Overall 
Service-based category  Acuity-based category 
 Medicine  Surgery  Pediatrics  ICU  Non-ICU 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MI EID 
RID 
(%) 
MRSA 0.15 -0.20 75 0.22 -0.33 94 0.14 -0.27 44 0.08 NS - 0.12 NS - 0.17 -0.34 92 
VRE 0.17 NS - 0.33 NS - 0.06 -0.18 78 0.05 NS - 0.10 NS - 0.16 NS - 
MDR 
Acinetobacter 
0.03 - - 0.00 - - 0.09 - - - - - 0.06 - - 0.02 - - 
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period (2005 to 2011). In the absence of a hospital-wide surveillance system, a point-prevalence 
survey method has been used in U.S. hospitals to estimate the magnitude of the HAI burden 
(Magill et al., 2012). However, some reported point-prevalence data can be criticized as an 
undefined mixture of both prevalence and incidence; furthermore, it can suffer from 
overestimation caused by the calculation method used (e.g., the number of HAIs on the visit 
day/the number of beds visited), and its findings may be ungeneralizable over time, even for the 
studied institution (Allen-Bridson et al., 2012). Thus, this study fills a need by accessing the 
comprehensive magnitude of hospital-wide HAIs in a way that point-prevalence studies and 
targeted surveillance do not. Second, this incidence analysis of HAI according to pathogen and 
across service categories was made possible by the use of hospital-wide surveillance; targeted 
surveillance does not detect any HAIs outside of selected units, nor does it always detect 
infections based on its own priorities. One study reported that approximately 50% of HAIs were 
missed when targeted surveillance method results were compared with the results of 
comprehensive, hospital-wide surveillance (Weber et al., 2012). Third, this study used incidence 
density based on person-days at risk (e.g., patient-days, central-line days) by pathogen as the 
representative measure of the HAI rate. To our knowledge, very few studies have reported 
incidence density according to pathogen; thus, our result may be used as reference data for 
pathogen-categorized HAI incidence. In sum, our study provides information about HAI 
incidence density by person-days at risk by pathogen across every hospital-related category (e.g., 
service type and device-related HAIs), thus providing information that has not previously been 
available in HAI studies.  
This study also has some limitations. First, the method we used to estimate incidence 
difference (i.e., the use of a trend line based on the linear fit of logistic regression) might not be 
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an exact statistical tool for determining the possible non-linear distribution of yearly incidence 
density for the study period. However, we believe this method provides the best possible 
statistical measurement of trend changes given the absence of a gold standard for analyzing 
trends in the incidence of HAIs. Second, we were unable to examine the causative factors behind 
the changes in the HAI pathogen spectrum. Most likely the decreasing incidence of many 
pathogens was related to dramatic decreases in the incidence of HAIs including CLABSI, 
CAUTI, and VAP. Other factors may have included changes in the hospitalized patients’ 
underlying diseases and changes in antimicrobial use, such as the defined daily dose per 1,000 
beds recommended by the World Health Organization’s Alliance for the Prudent Use of 
Antibiotics (Polk, 2003). To understand the association between the significant increase in C. 
difficile incidence and the changes in the use density of various antimicrobials, further study is 
necessary. Third, the changes in the incidence of specific healthcare-associated pathogens may 
not be representative of all acute care university hospitals in the United States. However, this 
study adds clinical support to recent HAI studies’ reports of a significant increase in C. difficile 
and its emergence as a healthcare-associated pathogen in hospital settings.  
Despite the significant increase in person-time at risk (patient-days) over the study period, 
the study hospital showed successful reductions in both overall HAIs and device-associated 
HAIs for all pathogens except C. difficile. Although we could not identify exactly what kinds of 
infection control interventions reduced the HAI incidence according to pathogen between 2005 
and 2011, the observed decrease in the incidences of HAIs by most healthcare-associated 
pathogens was assumed to be the result of continuous, comprehensive infection control efforts at 
the study hospital. The following factors are assumed to be involved in the success of infection 
control efforts at the study hospital.  
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First, the outstanding infection control program that has been implemented for more than 
three decades might be the most important driving force for success. Since 1980, the study 
hospital has been a leading infection control program in North Carolina and has shared two 
faculty leaders with the North Carolina Statewide Program for Infection Control and 
Epidemiology (SPICE). SPICE provides mandatory educational courses as the administrator of 
North Carolina-approved infection control courses under North Carolina Infection Control Law 
10A NCAC 41A. 0206 Infection Prevention – Health Care Settings (North Carolina Office of 
Administrative Hearings, 2012; SPICE, 2012). As of October 2012, the study hospital 
Department of Hospital Epidemiology is led by two world-renowned infection control experts 
and employs six IPs, one laboratory technician, and one public health epidemiologist, without 
frequent changes in personnel. Because it is difficult and expensive to recruit qualified IPs and to 
train new ones (Leape, 2002), the low turnover rate of IPs over time might help to maintain the 
study hospital’s outstanding infection control program and professional work atmosphere. Its 
stable, congenial work environment allows the study hospital’s department of hospital 
epidemiology to continuously conduct hospital-wide surveillance. Periodic feedback from 
department of hospital epidemiology to each service and nursing station based on the hospital-
wide surveillance may improve healthcare personnel’s attention to HAI prevention. In addition, 
efficient and cooperative communication might have made it possible for the study hospital team 
to find solutions to infection control issues based on their long-term teamwork within the 
hospital epidemiology department and their rapport with healthcare personnel outside the 
department.  
Second, the implementation of multiple infection control interventions based on scientific 
evidence guidelines might have led to the reduction in HAIs at the study hospital. For example, a 
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73% reduction in CLABSI was reported at the study hospital between 1999 and 2008 as a result 
of multiple infection control measures: enhanced medical staff education for proper catheter 
insertion and the use of ChloraPrep (70% isoprophyl alcohol plus 2% chlorhexidine) for skin 
preparation in 2000; mandatory nurse training in intravenous line care in 2001; the introduction 
in 2003 of a customized central catheter insertion kit that included ChloraPrep, a large sterile 
drape, and safety devices to prevent sharps injuries; enhanced nurse education in catheter care in 
2004; the introduction of a revised customized central catheter insertion kit in 2005, which added 
a second-generation antibiotic- (or antiseptic-) impregnated catheter; introduction of the Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) central line bundle in the medical ICU in 2006; and the use of 
the IHI central line bundle in all ICUs in 2007 (Weber, Brown, Sickbert-Bennett, & Rutala, 
2010). 
Third, organizational efforts to improve the quality of care at the study hospital, including 
the introduction of the Six Sigma quality improvement (QI) process, may have contributed to the 
reduced incidence of HAIs across all hospital services. Statistically, Six Sigma means an error-
free rate of 99.99966%, and the hospital quality improvement culture is expected to be achieved 
via purposely training healthcare teams to implement a rigorous Six Sigma processes of define, 
measure, analyze, improve, and control (Ruiz & Simόn, 2012). In fact, the study hospital 
reported a reduction in HAIs (CLABSI and VAP) and a 2.3% decrease in the mortality rate in the 
pediatric ICU between 2007 and 2009 by improving compliance with hand hygiene, oral care, 
and central-line catheter care using the Six Sigma QI process (Harris et al., 2011). 
Lastly, the infection control liaison program, which was established in the fall of 2007 at 
the study hospital, may have contributed to the sustained reduction in HAIs by pathogen by 
collaborating with nursing leadership, enhancing education, improving bedside care infection 
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control practices, and including more than 100 personnel from more than 50 clinical areas. The 
study hospital’s infection control liaison program was associated with a 10% increase in 
compliance with hand hygiene procedures and a substantial reduction in HAIs (47% for CLABSI, 
44% for CAUTI, and 36% for VAP), which exceeded the original objectives set to be achieved 
by March 1, 2008 (Brown, 2012). In fact, the establishment of infection control liaison nurses 
has been reported as a successful strategy for reducing CLABSI in neonatal ICU because these 
nurses served as highly visible infection control resource people who could monitor practices, 
collect data, and provide appropriate feedback (Wright, Stover, Wilkerson, & Bratcher, 2002). 
The only HAI pathogen that emerged as problematic at the study hospital over the study 
period was C. difficile. Given that other recent HAI studies have reported a significant increase 
in the incidence of C. difficile (Miller et al., 2011), the emergence of this pathogen may be 
inevitable in modern healthcare settings characterized by the frequent use of antimicrobial agents, 
prolonged hospital stays, and an increased number of immunocompromised patients. However, 
because no single intervention has proven effective in controlling and preventing C. difficile 
infections (Johnson & Gerding, 2012), it would be very challenging to reduce the incidence of C. 
difficile in every hospital setting. Although some control measures including barrier precautions 
(e.g., patient isolation, hand hygiene, and gloving), environmental cleaning/disinfection, 
antimicrobial restriction, and the identification/treatment of asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile 
(Johnson & Gerding, 2012), more research is needed to establish the gold standard of infection 
control practice for C. difficile infection in hospital settings. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Table 2.9 
The Incidence (per 1,000 Patient-Days) of Healthcare-Associated Pathogens in Medicine Service over a Seven-Year Period (2005-
2011) 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from 
comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
Pathogen group 
Total (2005-2011)  Incidence rate per 1,000 patient-days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* Rank No. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Clostridium difficile 1 340 0.37 0.49 0.58 0.48 0.56 1.01 1.34 0.71 (0.37-1.34) 0.87 262 <.0000 
Enterococcus  species 2 310 0.80 0.89 0.67 0.58 0.52 0.44 0.68 0.65 (0.44-0.89) -0.29 15 0.0054 
Escherichia coli 3 306 0.82 0.71 0.87 0.68 0.38 0.56 0.50 0.64 (0.38-0.87) -0.37 39 0.0006 
Staphylococcus aureus 4 299 0.99 0.66 0.42 0.64 0.47 0.71 0.51 0.62 (0.42-0.99) NS - 0.0267 
Candida and other yeast 5 294 1.29 0.76 0.45 0.38 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.61 (0.38-1.29) -0.60 64 <.0000 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 6 197 0.86 0.63 0.39 0.29 0.32 0.22 0.25 0.41 (0.22-0.86) -0.59 71 <.0000 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 7 117 0.42 0.38 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.26 0.24 (0.13-0.42) -0.19 38 0.0042 
Klebsiella species 8 117 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.12 0.22 0.37 0.18 0.24 (0.12-0.37) NS - 0.6119 
Enterobacter species 9 69 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.14 (0.07-0.22) -0.12 63 0.0158 
Other streptococci 10 69 0.26 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.14 (0.07-0.26) NS - 0.3763 
Proteus species 11 53 0.11 0.08 0.19 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.11 (0.01-0.19) NS - 0.5647 
Acinetobacter species 12 23 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 (0.03-0.07) NS - 0.5592 
Citrobacter species 13 21 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 (0.01-0.10) NS - 0.0602 
Serratia species 14 13 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.03 (0.00-0.07) - - . 
Group B Streptococcus 15 11 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 (0.00-0.06) - - . 
Bacteroides species 16 10 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 (0.00-0.04) - - . 
Haemophilus species 17 8 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 (0.00-0.05) - - . 
Other 18 227 0.59 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.26 0.44 0.56 0.47 (0.26-0.59) NS - 0.3565 
Total pathogens isolated  478,753 62,551 63,249 67,012 68,616 67,955 73,017 76,353     
Total patient-days 1,582,872 205,390 213,709 226,723 230,016 229,971 234,389 242,674     
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Table 2.10 
The Incidence (per 1,000 Patient-Days) of Healthcare-Associated Pathogens in Surgery Service over a Seven-Year Period (2005-2011) 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from 
comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
 
Pathogen group 
Total (2005-2011)  Incidence rate per 1,000 patient-days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* Rank No. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Staphylococcus aureus 1 1018 2.81 2.40 1.94 2.79 3.12 2.49 2.47 2.57 (1.94-3.12) NS - 0.6927 
Enterococcus species 2 551 1.43 1.37 1.63 1.30 1.32 1.35 1.33 1.39 (1.30-1.63) NS - 0.4535 
Escherichia coli 3 531 1.29 1.44 1.58 1.36 1.13 1.47 1.13 1.34 (1.13-1.58) NS - 0.2545 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 4 432 1.14 1.22 1.02 1.21 1.03 1.07 0.97 1.09 (0.97-1.22) NS - 0.2805 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 5 371 1.14 1.20 0.78 1.05 0.85 1.02 0.59 0.94 (0.59-1.20) -0.42 48 0.0031 
Candida and other yeast 6 339 1.20 0.90 1.08 0.54 0.70 0.87 0.76 0.86 (0.54-1.20) -0.36 37 0.0108 
Enterobacter species 7 316 1.10 0.67 0.78 0.96 0.52 0.81 0.76 0.80 (0.52-1.10) NS - 0.1461 
Klebsiella species 8 302 0.86 0.75 0.92 0.79 0.68 0.66 0.70 0.76 (0.66-0.92) NS - 0.1393 
Clostridium difficile 9 208 0.39 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.26 0.61 1.03 0.52 (0.26-1.03) 0.47 164 0.0016 
Other streptococci 10 148 0.47 0.43 0.36 0.43 0.23 0.35 0.36 0.37 (0.23-0.47) NS - 0.1355 
Acinetobacter species 11 134 0.14 0.17 0.38 0.66 0.52 0.42 0.08 0.34 (0.08-0.66) NS - 0.8090 
Proteus species 12 123 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.31 (0.26-0.36) NS - 0.3985 
Serratia species 13 111 0.39 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.38 0.24 0.24 0.28 (0.23-0.39) NS - 0.4601 
Bacteroides species 14 64 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.16 (0.12-0.19) NS - 0.8671 
Haemophilus species 15 53 0.26 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.13 (0.05-0.26) NS - 0.9490 
Group B Streptococcus 16 43 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.11 (0.06-0.17) NS - 0.7677 
Citrobacter species 17 40 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.10 (0.05-0.14) NS - 0.8799 
Other 18 541 1.63 1.52 1.30 1.50 1.20 1.21 1.25 1.37 (1.20-1.63) -0.39 23 0.0277 
Total pathogens isolated  396,234 50,975 53,394 57,645 55,989 57,413 57,756 63,062     
Total patient-days 1,582,872 205,390 213,709 226,723 230,016 229,971 234,389 242,674     
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Table 2.11 
The Incidence (per 1,000 Patient-Days) of Healthcare-Associated Pathogens in Pediatrics Service over a Seven-Year Period (2005-
2011) 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from 
comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
 
Pathogen group 
Total (2005-2011)  Incidence rate per 1,000 patient-days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* Rank No. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Staphylococcus aureus 1 266 0.80 0.70 0.62 0.84 0.89 0.59 0.96 0.77 (0.59-0.96) NS - 0.5081 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 2 229 0.84 0.95 1.04 0.53 0.65 0.39 0.28 0.67 (0.28-1.04) -0.71 67 <.0000 
Enterococcus species 3 172 0.40 0.60 0.42 0.67 0.51 0.39 0.50 0.50 (0.39-0.67) NS - 0.9948 
Escherichia coli 4 160 0.24 0.48 0.62 0.51 0.36 0.41 0.62 0.47 (0.24-0.62) NS - 0.1139 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 5 153 0.44 0.52 0.34 0.51 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.44 (0.34-0.52) NS - 0.9551 
Klebsiella species 6 140 0.33 0.46 0.36 0.45 0.49 0.37 0.38 0.41 (0.33-0.49) NS - 0.8168 
Enterobacter species 7 137 0.51 0.46 0.22 0.59 0.42 0.31 0.30 0.40 (0.22-0.59) NS - 0.1611 
Candida and other yeast 8 124 0.42 0.54 0.48 0.39 0.22 0.29 0.20 0.36 (0.20-0.54) -0.32 52 0.0016 
Clostridium difficile 9 79 0.33 0.14 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.36 0.23 (0.14-0.36) NS - 0.6396 
Serratia species 10 61 0.20 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.27 0.12 0.18 (0.08-0.27) NS - 0.6932 
Other streptococci 11 46 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.13 (0.04-0.24) -0.16 50 0.0069 
Haemophilus species 12 28 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.08 (0.02-0.13) NS - 0.8821 
Group B Streptococcus 13 24 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.07 (0.00-0.11) - - . 
Proteus species 14 17 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 (0.02-0.08) NS - 0.5800 
Citrobacter species 15 17 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.05 (0.00-0.10) - - . 
Acinetobacter species 16 13 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.04 (0.00-0.08) - - . 
Bacteroides species 17 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 (0.00-0.02) -  . 
Other 18 245 0.64 0.74 0.68 0.67 0.79 0.49 0.96 0.71 (0.49-0.96) NS - 0.5696 
Total pathogens isolated  343,952 45,189 48,333 49,820 51,073 50,550 48,936 50,051     
Total patient-days 1,582,872 205,390 213,709 226,723 230,016 229,971 234,389 242,674     
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Table 2.12 
The Incidence (per 1,000 Patient-Days) of Healthcare-Associated Pathogens in Intensive Care Units over a Seven-Year Period (2005-
2011) 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from 
comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
 
Pathogen group 
Total (2005-2011)  Incidence rate per 1,000 patient-days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* Rank No. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Staphylococcus aureus 1 531 2.58 1.76 1.33 1.45 1.41 1.35 1.69 1.64 (1.33-2.58) -0.67 34 0.0026 
Candida and other yeast 2 410 2.09 1.67 1.52 0.80 0.93 1.10 0.86 1.26 (0.80-2.09) -1.15 59 <.0000 
Enterococcus species 3 365 1.24 1.40 1.04 1.06 0.89 1.02 1.24 1.12 (0.89-1.40) NS - 0.2712 
Escherichia coli 4 360 1.10 0.94 1.48 1.08 0.79 1.14 1.22 1.11 (0.79-1.48) NS - 0.8887 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 5 359 1.34 1.38 0.93 1.13 0.91 0.97 1.12 1.11 (0.91-1.38) NS - 0.0852 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 6 311 1.58 1.31 1.25 0.87 0.64 0.66 0.52 0.96 (0.52-1.58) -1.11 67 <.0000 
Enterobacter species 7 299 1.48 0.91 0.78 1.13 0.62 0.74 0.86 0.92 (0.62-1.48) -0.48 42 0.0039 
Klebsiella species 8 249 0.83 0.71 0.82 0.71 0.89 0.74 0.66 0.77 (0.66-0.89) NS - 0.5728 
Clostridium difficile 9 159 0.34 0.36 0.30 0.37 0.33 0.57 1.10 0.49 (0.30-1.10) 0.62 224 <.0000 
Acinetobacter species 10 132 0.17 0.18 0.47 0.76 0.62 0.51 0.12 0.41 (0.12-0.76) NS - 0.4758 
Serratia species 11 129 0.54 0.27 0.36 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.28 0.40 (0.27-0.54) NS - 0.5497 
Other streptococci 12 66 0.34 0.22 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.28 0.20 (0.10-0.34) NS - 0.6565 
Haemophilus species 13 66 0.39 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.12 0.25 0.20 0.20 (0.12-0.39) NS - 0.6653 
Proteus species 14 55 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.17 (0.12-0.24) NS - 0.1000 
Citrobacter species 15 29 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.09 (0.02-0.15) NS - 0.9089 
Group B Streptococcus 16 28 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.09 (0.02-0.19) -0.13 68 0.0120 
Bacteroides species 17 12 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 (0.02-0.06) NS - 0.2948 
Other 18 482 1.85 1.92 1.31 1.78 1.27 0.85 1.51 1.48 (0.85-1.92) -0.68 18 0.0004 
Total pathogens isolated  324,739 41,082 44,902 47,302 46,191 48,164 47,270 49,828     
Total patient-days 1,582,872 205,390 213,709 226,723 230,016 229,971 234,389 242,674     
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Table 2.13  
The Incidence (per 1,000 Patient-Days) of Healthcare-Associated Pathogens in Non-Intensive Care Unit Settings over a Seven-Year 
Period (2005-2011) 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from 
comparison incidence 2005 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
 
Pathogen group 
Total (2005-2011)  Incidence rate per 1,000 patient-days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* Rank No. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Staphylococcus aureus 1 1212 0.93 0.87 0.73 1.08 1.18 1.01 0.94 0.97 (0.73-1.18) NS - 0.0520 
Escherichia coli 2 789 0.65 0.77 0.81 0.62 0.46 0.58 0.54 0.63 (0.46-0.81) -0.23 17 0.0007 
Enterococcus species 3 749 0.60 0.62 0.72 0.61 0.57 0.51 0.56 0.60 (0.51-0.72) NS - 0.1115 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 4 538 0.57 0.59 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.35 0.24 0.43 (0.24-0.59) -0.30 58 <.0000 
Clostridium difficile 5 526 0.31 0.32 0.39 0.28 0.28 0.55 0.76 0.42 (0.28-0.76) 0.38 145 <.0000 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 6 388 0.32 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.31 (0.29-0.34) NS - 0.3342 
Candida and other yeast 7 382 0.48 0.31 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.29 0.30 (0.23-0.48) -0.13 40 0.0104 
Klebsiella species 8 359 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.25 0.29 (0.24-0.34) NS - 0.1561 
Enterobacter species 9 264 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.21 (0.16-0.25) NS - 0.1488 
Other streptococci 10 226 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.18 (0.12-0.24) -0.08 29 0.0214 
Proteus species 11 169 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.13 (0.09-0.18) NS - 0.4524 
Bacteroides species 12 79 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 (0.05-0.08) NS - 0.2036 
Group B Streptococcus 13 66 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 (0.04-0.06) NS - 0.2550 
Serratia species 14 64 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 (0.03-0.07) NS - 0.1804 
Citrobacter species 15 54 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.04 (0.02-0.07) NS - 0.0748 
Acinetobacter species 16 44 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.04 (0.02-0.06) NS - 0.7478 
Haemophilus species 17 26 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 (0.01-0.04) NS - 0.1428 
Other 18 608 0.49 0.43 0.51 0.44 0.41 0.54 0.58 0.48 (0.41-0.58) NS - 0.1764 
Total pathogens isolated  1,255,701 164,308 168,807 179,421 183,607 181,112 185,924 192,522    . 
Total patient-days 1,582,872 205,390 213,709 226,723 230,016 229,971 234,389 242,674     
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Table 2.14  
The Overall Incidence of Central-Line Associated Bloodstream Infections Caused by Healthcare-Associated Pathogens per 1,000 
Central-Line Days over a Six-Year Period (2006-2011) 
 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2006 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from 
comparison incidence 2006 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
 
 
Pathogen group 
Total  
(2006-2011) 
 Incidence rate per 1,000 central-line days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* 
Rank No. 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 1 374 1.00 0.79 0.69 0.56 0.39 0.29 0.63 (0.29-1.00) -0.71 71 0.0000 
Enterococcus species 2 275 0.71 0.54 0.53 0.45 0.36 0.32 0.49 (0.32-0.71) -0.36 55 0.0001 
Staphylococcus aureus 3 180 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.27 0.25 0.10 0.31 (0.10-0.38) -0.25 73 0.0002 
Candida and other yeast 4 144 0.53 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.14 0.10 0.22 (0.10-0.53) -0.34 81 0.0000 
Klebsiella species 5 106 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.17 (0.13-0.26) -0.15 46 0.0119 
Enterobacter species 6 90 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.19 (0.06-0.26) -0.21 77 0.0001 
Escherichia coli 7 87 0.18 0.22 0.08 0.20 0.23 0.10 0.19 (0.08-0.23) NS - 0.4686 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 8 64 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.12 (0.01-0.16) -0.09 93 0.0038 
Other streptococci 9 55 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.09 (0.05-0.18) -0.09 44 0.0354 
Acinetobacter species 10 39 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.09 (0.01-0.12) NS - 0.1856 
Serratia species 11 38 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 (0.02-0.11) NS - 0.0531 
Bacteroides species 12 16 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 (0.01-0.04) NS - 0.3668 
Group B Streptococcus 13 8 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.00-0.03) - - - 
Citrobacter species 14 8 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 (0.00-0.03) - - - 
Proteus species 15 6 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.00-0.03) - - - 
Haemophilus species 16 1 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00-0.01) - - - 
Other 17 131 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.23 (0.07-0.31) -0.16 39 0.0085 
Total pathogens isolated 1,622 300 261 234 201 183 131     
Total central-line days 477,340 73,715 76,402 74,267 81,472 84,036 87,448     
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Table 2.15  
The Overall Incidence of Catheter Associated Urinary Tract Infections Caused by Healthcare-Associated Pathogens per 1,000 Foley-
Catheter Days over a Six-Year Period (2006-2011) 
 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2006 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from 
comparison incidence 2006 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
 
 
Pathogen group 
Total  
(2006-2011) 
 Incidence rate per 1,000 Foley-catheter days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* 
Rank No. 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Escherichia coli 1 438 1.36 1.59 1.29 0.48 0.71 0.66 1.00 (0.48-1.59) -1.00 51 0.0000 
Candida and other yeast 2 329 0.90 1.02 0.48 0.56 0.71 0.58 0.64 (0.48-1.02) -0.36 36 0.0114 
Enterococcus species 3 291 0.77 1.06 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.63 (0.58-1.06) -0.34 25 0.0158 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 4 181 0.62 0.55 0.44 0.23 0.30 0.46 0.45 (0.23-0.62) -0.26 26 0.0093 
Klebsiella species 5 153 0.45 0.60 0.51 0.27 0.28 0.14 0.37 (0.14-0.60) -0.40 69 0.0000 
Proteus species 6 104 0.30 0.44 0.33 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.24 (0.14-0.44) -0.26 53 0.0011 
Enterobacter species 7 103 0.32 0.33 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.21 (0.16-0.33) -0.17 47 0.0274 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 8 54 0.25 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.09 (0.03-0.25) -0.19 88 0.0010 
Staphylococcus aureus 9 36 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.07 (0.05-0.15) NS - 0.4082 
Citrobacter species 10 30 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.06 (0.02-0.11) NS - 0.4250 
Acinetobacter species 11 26 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.07 (0.00-0.11) - - - 
Serratia species 12 23 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.07 (0.02-0.10) NS - 0.4321 
Other streptococci 13 12 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 (0.00-0.03) - - - 
Group B Streptococcus 14 11 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.02 (0.00-0.07) - - - 
Haemophilus species 15 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 (0.00-0.02) - - - 
Other 16 118 0.45 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.15 0.25 0.27 (0.15-0.45) -0.22 44 0.0077 
Total pathogens isolated 1,910 342 398 277 201 216 187     
Total Foley-catheter days 363,225 59,676 61,515 60,699 61,982 60,368 58,985     
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Table 2.16  
The Overall Incidence of Ventilator Associated Pneumonia Caused by Healthcare-Associated Pathogens per 1,000 Ventilator Days 
over a Six-Year Period (2006-2011) 
 
Note. EID = Estimated incidence difference from comparison incidence 2006 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; RID = Relative incidence difference from 
comparison incidence 2006 to 2011 based on the estimated trend line from linear fit of logistic regression; NS = Not Significant; *based on Poisson regression 
 
 
 
Pathogen group 
Total  
(2006-2011) 
 Incidence rate per 1,000 ventilator days Incidence 
Median (range) 
EID 
RID 
(%) 
p 
value* 
Rank No. 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Staphylococcus aureus 1 149 1.23 1.12 0.97 0.88 0.94 0.64 0.95 (0.64-1.23) -0.52 48 0.0459 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 2 93 0.74 0.86 0.68 0.78 0.50 0.64 0.71 (0.50-0.86) NS - 0.3297 
Enterobacter species 3 68 0.30 0.27 1.02 0.26 0.33 0.49 0.31 (0.26-1.02) NS - 0.5705 
Acinetobacter species 4 40 0.20 0.37 0.74 0.36 0.39 0.00 0.37 (0.00-0.74) - - - 
Klebsiella species 5 34 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.11 0.15 0.29 (0.11-0.32) NS - 0.1145 
Serratia species 6 28 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.36 0.06 0.29 0.14 (0.05-0.36) NS - 0.1491 
Haemophilus species 7 23 0.20 0.05 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.13 (0.05-0.23) NS - 0.9897 
Escherichia coli 8 20 0.20 0.27 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.13 (0.00-0.27) - - - 
Other streptococci 9 17 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.24 0.13 (0.00-0.24) - - - 
Enterococcus species 10 8 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.05 (0.00-0.21) - - - 
Coagulase negative staphylococci 11 7 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.08 (0.00-0.11) - - - 
Candida and other yeast 12 6 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 (0.00-0.11) - - - 
Group B Streptococcus 13 4 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 (0.00-0.10) - - - 
Proteus species 14 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 (0.00-0.05) - - - 
Citrobacter species 15 2 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 (0.00-0.06) - - - 
Other 16 111 1.08 0.91 1.54 0.47 0.22 0.49 0.70 (0.22-1.54) -0.85 55 0.0001 
Total pathogens isolated 613 97 86 105 80 54 67     
Total ventilator days 114,437 20,309 18,709 17,582 19,353 18,071 20,413     
  
CHAPTER 3 
 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE SCREENING 
FOR METHICILLIN-RESISTANT STAPHYLOCOCCUS AUREUS  
IN AN ACADEMIC HOSPITAL SETTING 
 
 
Background 
The treatment and prevention of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) caused by 
antibiotic-resistant pathogens poses an increasing challenge in hospitals (Hidron et al., 2008). 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has become the most prevalent antibiotic-
resistant, healthcare-associated pathogen and is a substantial cause of morbidity and mortality as 
well as a financial burden on healthcare systems (Nelson, Samore, Smith, Harbarth, & Rubin, 
2010; Shorr, 2007). According to a 2006-2007 report by the National Healthcare Safety Network 
(NHSN), 56.2% of Staphylococcus aureus isolated from HAIs was methicillin-resistant (Hidron 
et al., 2008). The National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System reported that in 2002 
more than 55% of HAIs in intensive care units (ICUs) were caused by MRSA (NNIS System, 
2003). 
 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) guideline to 
control the spread of MRSA and other multidrug-resistant organisms, a combination of 
interventions is necessary (e.g., contact precautions, active surveillance screening, environmental 
cleaning; Siegel et al., 2007). However, the strength of the evidence for each intervention’s 
effectiveness and the validity of the specific recommendations are still debated (Jackson et al., 
2004; Steinberg & Luce, 2005). Any intervention is likely to reduce MRSA HAI rates in high 
prevalence situations, although interventions in low prevalence situations may be less effective, 
and MRSA eradication may be more difficult or impossible (Peterson & Diekema, 2010).  
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Active surveillance screening has been considered an effective intervention at reducing 
MRSA HAI in high prevalence situations (Peterson & Diekema, 2010). Active surveillance 
screening is a microbiological screening method for detecting colonized patients at the time of 
admission to an inpatient unit or a hospital (McGinigle, Gourlay, & Buchanan, 2008). European 
countries such as the Netherlands have reported a very low prevalence of MRSA in the hospital 
setting after implementing aggressive “search and destroy” policies, which include universal 
surveillance screening for all admitted patients, contact precautions on admission before negative 
screening report, and closure of units when there are two or more MRSA-positive cases 
(McGinigle et al., 2008; Nulens et al., 2008; Siegel et al., 2007). Although Huang et al. reported 
a 75%-reduction in MRSA infections in an ICU through the use of active surveillance screening, 
the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of active surveillance screening have not been validated 
(Huang et al., 2006; McGinigle et al., 2008).
 
Moreover, expert groups disagree about whether the control of MRSA necessitates active 
surveillance screening (Jackson et al., 2004). The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of 
America (SHEA) strongly supports active surveillance screening in order to guarantee the 
prompt isolation of colonized patients, whereas the Healthcare Infection Control Practices 
Advisory Committee (HICPAC) recommends that individual healthcare facilities make the 
decision of whether or not to implement active surveillance screening procedures (Jackson et al., 
2004). Though, other related issues regarding active surveillance screening—including 
identification of target population, identification of microbiologic methods of active surveillance 
screening for MRSA, and the appropriate interval of active surveillance screening—have not 
been defined clearly in the U.S., at least two U.S. states and the Department of Veterans Affairs 
have recently introduced a policy requiring mandatory active surveillance screening for MRSA 
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(Chang, Sethi, Stiefel, Cadnum, & Donskey, 2010; McGinigle et al., 2008; Peterson & Diekema, 
2010; Weber et al., 2007). 
Overall, the issue of whether active surveillance screening is a cost-effective strategy to 
reduce the incidence of MRSA infection remains unresolved (McGinigle et al., 2008; Shorr, 
2007). Most studies on the cost-effectiveness of active surveillance screening for MRSA have 
used a pre-post observational method for a targeted unit (e.g., surgery or ICU) or across 
associated hospitals (Anderson et al., 2009; Clancy et al., 2006; McGinigle et al., 2008; Murthy 
et al., 2010). Some studies investigated the effectiveness of screening all hospital admissions 
(Lee et al., 2010; Nelson et al., 2010). However, according to McGinigle et al., none of the active 
surveillance screening and MRSA-related outcomes studies in adult ICUs from 1955 to 2007 
were of high quality, threatening the validity of the study results (McGinigle et al., 2008). 
Although various observational studies suggest that active surveillance screening has an effect on 
reducing MRSA infections, rigorous guidelines regarding the appropriateness of active 
surveillance screening have not been published due to the general poor quality of evidence and 
conflicting results (McGinigle et al., 2008). This study aimed to model the cost-effectiveness of 
alternative screening strategies for MRSA colonization upon admission: universal surveillance 
screening (USS) for all hospitalized patients, targeted surveillance screening (TSS) for ICU 
admitted patients only, and no surveillance screening (NSS).  
 
Methods 
Setting  
This evaluation was modeled from the perspective of a large academic hospital defined as 
having approximately 800 beds, 40,000 annual admissions, and 6,000 ICU admissions (Huang et 
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al., 2006; Robicsek et al., 2008). The study cohort included all hospitalized patients except those 
patients with community-acquired MRSA infections on admission. The time horizon for this 
study is the period of hospitalization, since HAIs are defined as infections occurring during the 
course of hospitalization (Horan et al., 2008). In addition, we assume a real-time polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) method is used for detecting MRSA-colonized patients via a nasal sample. 
We also assume that PCR method may contribute to prevent MRSA transmission by reducing the 
time interval between admission and isolation initiation (Conterno et al., 2007). This is the same 
logic that SHEA supports for active screening in terms of guaranteeing the prompt isolation of 
MRSA-colonized patients (Jackson et al., 2004). 
 
Modeling approach  
Three active surveillance screening strategies (USS, TSS, and NSS) are modeled using a 
decision tree (Figure 3.1). The decision node represents the choice among three surveillance 
screening strategies. The chance nodes indicate the pathways to the location (ICU vs. all other 
floors [non-ICU]), the active surveillance screening result (positive vs. negative), and the 
occurrence of MRSA HAI (yes vs. no) in order. The terminal node is the end point of 
hospitalization (discharge including transfer to other institution and death).  
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Figure 3.1. Decision tree model comparing MRSA surveillance screening approaches. USS = Universal surveillance 
screening; TSS = Targeted surveillance screening; NSS = No surveillance screening; MRSA = Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus; HAI = Healthcare-associated infection; ICU = Intensive care unit; Screen + = Positive result 
from rapid-PCR (polymerase chain reaction) test (indicates MRSA-colonized status); Screen - = Negative result 
from rapid-PCR test (indicates free from MRSA colonization)  
 
Model Inputs  
Input probabilities, cost, and outcome (MRSA HAI) data (Table 3.1) were extracted from 
the MEDLINE PubMed database through a systematic literature review of U.S. studies published 
since 2000 using combinations of the following terms: methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus, surveillance, screening, colonization, cost-effectiveness, intensive care unit, cost and 
economics.  
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Table 3.1  
Model Input Estimates and Ranges 
 
All costs were adjusted to 2009 dollars using the medical care component of the 
Consumer Price Index (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010a). The cost of active surveillance 
Input parameter Base-case Range Source* 
Prevalence of MRSA colonization at admission    
  ICU patients 0.083 0.037-0.12 1,2,3 
  Non-ICU patients 0.063 0.009-0.085 3,4,5 
Probability of MRSA HAI   
  ICU 0.03 0.02-0.06 6,7 
  Non-ICU (% lower than ICU) 33% 10-75% Author assumption 
Reduction in MRSA HAI rates due to screening and isolation  
  ICU 33% 1-57% 8 
  Non-ICU 10% 1-33% 8 
% of patients admitted to ICU 0.15 ± 10%† 1 
Incremental cost of MRSA HAI $13,050 $5,202-$20,899 9 
Cost of rapid PCR test $50 $20-$80 10 
Cost of contact precautions     
  Cost per gown $0.9 ± 10%† 10,11 
  Cost per pair of gloves $0.08 ± 10%† 10,11 
  Time to don gown and gloves 2 min 1-3† Author assumption 
  Cost/RN visit $1.10  12 
  Cost/physician visit $2.80  12 
  No. of RN visits/day    
        ICU 30 20-40 Author assumption 
        Non-ICU 15 10-20 Author assumption 
  No. of physician visits/day    
        ICU  6 3-9 Author assumption 
        Non-ICU 3 1-6 Author assumption 
Average length of stay (days)     
  ICU 4.6 1-20† 13 
  Non-ICU 4.6 1-10† 13 
Note. 
†
Assumed range. All costs are reported in 2009$. * see Appendix for selected references. HAI = healthcare-
associated infection; ICU = intensive care unit; MRSA = methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; RN = 
registered nurse; PCR = polymerase chain reaction. 
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screening is the sum of the cost of screening patients and the additional cost associated with 
isolating patients who screen positive for MRSA. The cost of the rapid-PCR test includes the 
laboratory technician’s wage and fringe benefits. The depreciation cost of the test equipment was 
excluded due to the assumption that the test equipment had already been purchased. The 
additional costs associated with isolating patients were calculated by multiplying the additional 
cost of contact precautions by the number of daily contacts and the average length of stay. The 
cost of contact precautions includes the cost of time to don a gown and gloves and to conduct 
hand hygiene, which we assume takes approximately two minutes. The costs per visit of 
registered nurses and general physicians were calculated based on the 2009 mean hourly wage 
estimates for each profession obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2010b).  
 
Analytical Approach 
For each screening strategy, the total number of MRSA HAI was calculated, as well as 
the costs associated with each screening strategy, using Microsoft Excel
®
 (2007 version, 
Microsoft, Redmond, WA). The difference in costs and outcomes between the screening 
strategies represents the additional costs and MRSA HAI prevented, respectively. The 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs; i.e., the additional costs to prevent a MRSA HAI) 
were calculated using the following formula, 

ICER 
CostAlternative1 CostAlternative2
Effectiveness Alternative1  Effectiveness Alternative2
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where Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 correspond with the strategies compared (i.e., USS, TSS or 
NSS) and effectiveness is the number of MRSA HAI that would be expected to occur with each 
strategy.  
Sensitivity analysis included one-way deterministic analysis and probabilistic analysis, 
conducted using Oracle Crystal Ball
®
 (Oracle, Redwood Shores, CA). One-way sensitivity 
analysis consisted of allowing each input parameter, probability or cost, to vary from the 
minimum to the maximum value of its range. For probabilistic sensitivity analysis Monte Carlo 
simulations were conducted with 1,000 trials. In each trial, values were selected for each input 
parameter from a specific distribution and the incremental costs, effectiveness, and cost-
effectiveness ratio was calculated. Probabilities were assumed to follow beta distributions, cost 
data were assumed to follow log-normal distributions, and count variables were assumed to 
follow gamma distributions (Briggs, Claxton, & Sculpher, 2006). Data from these trials are 
shown in an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) plane and as cost-effectiveness 
acceptability curves (CEAC; Briggs et al., 2006). 
Pairs of incremental costs and HAIs avoided were plotted on the ICER plane to show the 
possible variation in the ICERs and how a decision to accept a screening strategy might vary.  
Points lying in the northeast quadrant represent cost-effective strategies (compared to NSS)—
that is, strategies that cost more but deliver better outcomes (i.e., fewer MRSA HAIs); points 
lying in the southeast quadrant indicate a cost-saving strategy (i.e., one that costs less and 
delivers better outcomes).    
To calculate CEACs, we used the net-benefits framework, which involves implementing 
a screening strategy only if its ICER is less than a particular decision threshold (i.e., the amount a 
decision maker would be willing to avert a MRSA HAI; Stinnett & Mullahy, 1998). For each set 
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of trial values and a particular willingness to pay threshold, we calculated the net-benefit for each 
strategy and selected the one with the highest net-benefit. The CEAC for a strategy is the 
proportion of trials that strategy has the greatest net-benefit for all possible willingness to pay 
values (Briggs et al., 2006). The preferred strategy is generally the one with the highest 
likelihood of cost-effectiveness for a given willingness to pay threshold.  
 
Results 
TSS was found to be a dominant strategy compared to NSS in the base-case analysis; it 
cost less while preventing more MRSA HAI (Table 3.2). Relative to NSS, TSS prevented 59 
MRSA HAI and cost $282,770 less. Also relative to NSS, USS prevented 93 MRSA HAIs but 
cost $1,391,742 more than NSS, resulting in incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of 
$14,955 per MRSA HAI prevented. Compared to targeted screening, universal screening would 
be expected to prevent an additional 34 MRSA HAIs at an additional cost of nearly $1.7 million 
(ICER $49,749 per MRSA HAI prevented).   
Table 3.2 
Base-Case Costs and Outcomes Comparing MRSA Surveillance Screening Strategies 
Screening 
Strategy 
Total Costs Total MRSA 
HAIs 
 
USS $8,133,372 423.5  
TSS $6,458,860 457.2  
NSS $6,741,630 516.6  
Comparison Incremental  
Costs (A) 
MRSA HAIs 
Prevented (B) 
ICER 
(A/B) 
USS vs. NSS $1,391,742 93.1 $14,955 
TSS vs. NSS -$282,770 59.4 Dominant 
USS vs. TSS $1,674,512 33.7 $49,748 
Note. Dominant indicates a strategy that costs less and prevents more MRSA HAI than the comparison strategy. Costs and 
incremental costs reported in 2009$. ICER = Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; MRSA = Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus; HAI = Healthcare-associated infection; USS = Universal surveillance screening; TSS = Targeted surveillance screening; 
NSS = No surveillance screening  
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Table 3.3  
One-Way Analysis Result for ICER of MRSA HAI Prevented 
  Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio 
Meaningful 
Threshold 
  USS vs. NSS  TSS vs. NSS  USS vs. TSS 
Variable Range Min Max  Min Max  Min Max 
Prevalence of MRSA colonization at admission         
ICU 0.037-0.12 $13,638 $15,692  -$6,620 -$3,414  § §  
Non-ICU 0.009-0.085 $10,989 $16,319  § §  $39,211 $54,041  
Probability of MRSA HAI          
ICU 0.02-0.06 $28,689 $863  -$740 -$8,947  $81,147 $18,349  
Non-ICU (% lower than ICU) 10%-75% $24,075 $6,043  § §  $194,183 $14,581  
        
Reduction in MRSA HAI rates due to screening and isolation        
ICU 1%-57% $60,446 $6,076  $260,505 -$8,251  § § 21% 
Non-ICU 1%-33% $28,079 $2,086  § §  $614,928 $5,791  
Additional cost of MRSA HAI $5,202-$20,899 $22,624 $6,927  $3,005 -$12,692  $57,596 $41,899 $8,291 
Cost of rapid PCR Test $20-$80 $1,964 $27,588  -$7,843 -$1,843  $19,445 $80,051  
Cost of contact precautions          
Cost per gown 0.81-0.99 $14,526 $15,026  -$4,967 -$4,720  $49,274 $50,222  
Cost per pair of gloves 0.07-0.09 $14,748 $14,804  -$4,857 -$4,830  $49,695 $49,801  
Time to don gown and gloves 1-3 min $12,899 $16,653  -$5,773 -$3,913  $46,183 $53,312  
No. of RN visits/day           
ICU 20-40 $14,276 $15,277  -$5,625 -$4,062  § §  
Non-ICU 10-20 $13,700 $15,852  § §  $46,753 $52,743  
No. of physician visits/day          
ICU 3-9 $14,500 $15,052  -$5,275 -$4,412  § §  
Non-ICU 1-6 $13,984 $15,965  § §  $47,543 $53,055  
Average length of stay (days)          
ICU 1-20 $13,168 $21,653  -$7,353 $5,892  § § 11.35 
Non-ICU 1-10 $11,319 $19,962  § §  $40,127 $64,179  
Note. Negative values indicate dominant strategies (i.e., those strategies that cost less and prevent more MRSA HAI). Meaningful thresholds are the value at which a strategy 
analyzed switches from being cost-effective to dominant, or vice versa. § indicates parameters that do not affect comparison. All costs are reported in 2009$. ICU = Intensive 
care unit; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; HAI, healthcare-associated infection; USS, universal surveillance screening; TSS, targeted surveillance screening; 
NSS, no surveillance screening; RN, registered nurse; PCR, polymerase chain reaction.  
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The dominance of TSS over NSS was found to be robust to variation in the majority of 
input parameters through one-way sensitivity analysis. In the one-way sensitivity analysis for 
MRSA HAI prevented (Table 3.3), TSS was a dominant strategy across the ranges of all but 
three input parameters—the effectiveness of screening and isolation in the ICU, the overall cost 
of a MRSA HAI, and the average length of stay in the ICU. When the effectiveness of screening 
in the ICU was above 21%, TSS was a dominant strategy. Similarly, when the cost of a MRSA 
HAI was above $8,291, TSS became a dominant strategy. Lastly, TSS was a dominant strategy 
when the average length of stay in the ICU was less than 11.4 days.  
 
Figure 3.2. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio plan for MRSA HAI prevented comparing MRSA 
surveillance screening strategies to no surveillance screening. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) 
plane is a graph of the incremental costs and incremental outcomes from each of the 1,000 Monte Carlo 
simulations. ICER plane plots the incremental costs and incremental outcomes relative to no surveillance 
screening from each trial of the probabilistic sensitivity analysis. For points in the north-east quadrant the 
strategy costs more, but results in better outcome. Points in the south-east quadrant represent trials in 
which the strategy costs less and results in a better outcome (i.e., is dominant). USS = Universal 
surveillance screening; TSS = Targeted surveillance screening; MRSA = Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus; HAI = Healthcare-associated infection 
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Probabilistic sensitivity analysis also supported the conclusion that TSS may be the most 
cost-effective surveillance screening strategy. As plotted on the ICER plane (Figure 3.2), all of 
the points associated with TSS lie to the left and below the USS points indicating that TSS is 
generally more cost-effective than USS when compared with no screening. Additionally, 61.1% 
of the simulations the TSS ICERs (relative to NSS) fell into the south-east quadrant of the ICER 
plane, indicating that TSS is cost-saving (i.e., cost less while preventing more MRSA HAI) than 
NSS; in the case of USS, only 6.9% of the simulations fall into the cost-saving quadrant and the 
ICERs are almost always greater than those of TSS (meaning that TSS would be preferred from a 
cost-effectiveness standpoint).  
 
Figure 3.3. Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves for MRSA HAI prevented comparing MRSA 
surveillance screening strategies. Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve (CEAC) indicates the likelihood 
that each alternative is cost-effective at increasing willingness to pay for the prevention of an additional 
MRSA HAI. The indicated dollar value, at the intersection of the TSS and USS curves, indicates the 
willingness to pay at which USS becomes cost-effective. USS = Universal surveillance screening; TSS = 
Targeted surveillance screening; NSS = No surveillance screening 
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In the cost-effectiveness acceptability curve for MRSA HAI prevented (Figure 3.3), 
active screening, either TSS or USS, was found to always be the cost-effective strategy. Even if a 
decision maker were unwilling to pay anything to prevent a MRSA HAI, TSS would be the 
appropriate strategy two-thirds of the time. Only when the decision maker’s willingness to pay 
exceeds $94,750 per MRSA HAI prevented, USS is the more cost-effective strategy. 
 
Discussion 
Despite the possibility of variation and uncertainty in the input parameters, our model 
was robust and demonstrated that targeted surveillance of ICU patients was the dominant or cost-
saving strategy for reducing MRSA HAIs. Altering the input parameters of our model 
demonstrated instances when TSS would not be cost-saving. When the cost of MRSA HAI is 
low it follows that active screening would not be cost-effective because the cost of screening and 
isolating patients outweighs the savings from preventing fewer MRSA HAIs. Similarly, when 
TSS is not effective at reducing the rate of MRSA HAI (less than a 21%-reduction) in the ICU, it 
is no longer a cost-effective strategy. TSS most likely would be a cost-effective strategy in high 
endemic situations of MRSA because TSS is likely to reduce MRSA HAI rate by more than 21%, 
as any intervention has a substantial likelihood to significantly reduce the MRSA HAI rate in 
high prevalence situation (Peterson & Diekema, 2010). These results are supported by Huang et 
al.’s finding that TSS resulted in a 67%-reduction in hospital-wide healthcare-associated 
bloodstream infection (Huang et al., 2006). TSS would also not be a dominant strategy when the 
average length of stay in the ICU is more than 11.4 days. As length of stay is extended, TSS 
becomes more expensive as an intervention strategy because of the additional costs related to 
contact precautions and isolation for the extended hospitalization although we have assumed no 
 95 
 
additional follow-up screening (e.g., weekly surveillance screening) in our model. Lastly, TSS is 
a cost-effective strategy at reasonable levels of willingness to pay for each prevented MRSA 
HAI. Although there is no widely agreed upon threshold for the willingness to pay for a 
prevented MRSA HAI, the thresholds (less than $94,750 per MRSA HAI prevented) observed 
for TSS suggests that it would be an attractive strategy (compared to universal or no screening at 
all) in most hospitals.  
The main limitation of this study was the lack of reliable data for some key input 
parameters, which required assumptions based on clinical expertise and therefore may limit 
validity of study results. First, limited evidence exists regarding the overall, or relative, 
effectiveness of active surveillance and isolation in either the ICU or non-ICU settings. Because 
the effect of active surveillance screening on reducing MRSA HAI is not clearly established with 
strong evidence (Nyman et al., 2011), some researchers may disagree with our assumption that 
active surveillance screening with prompt isolation will reduce MRSA, which was based on 
Mangini et al.’s finding that the implementation of contact precautions reduced MRSA HAI rate 
significantly (Mangini et al., 2007). Second, it is difficult to identify evidence on the relative 
prevalence of MRSA HAI between the ICU and non-ICU because the CDC National 
Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System and NHSN have not published data on non-ICU 
rates of MRSA as CDC has only recently begun to accumulate data on non-ICU acquired HAI 
(Hidron et al., 2008; NNIS, 1998). Thus, we had to assume that MRSA HAI rate in the non-ICU 
setting is lower than the ICU rate based on the fact that the likelihood of MRSA HAI is assumed 
to be higher among ICU patients because of patients’ vulnerable characteristics, such as high 
severity of illness and higher frequency of invasive procedures (Garrison, 2009). 
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Although a decision tree model is most appropriate for comparison of effects from three 
alternative strategies on the study outcome, the validity of the results also may be limited by the 
modeling techniques used. First, although the number of deaths that were directly attributable to 
MRSA HAI can be a significant outcome, this study did not include it as one of the end points of 
hospitalization due to lack of reliable MRSA HAI-attributable mortality data. Second, this study 
did not model transmission timing or transmission pathways because transmission of MRSA 
from asymptomatic colonized patients is complex and largely uncertain (Shorr, 2007). Therefore, 
it is impossible to determine when patients were most likely to acquire a MRSA HAI and which 
transmission pathways screening and isolation impacted the most of MRSA HAIs. In addition, 
these study results also may not be applicable to small, community hospital settings. Active 
screening may be not feasible in small hospitals where infection control programs may have 
fewer staff and less funding and may lack capacity to perform PCR for detection of MRSA 
(Anderson & Sexton, 2008).
 
 Although screening and prompt isolation of MRSA-colonized patients have been 
accepted as an effective measure to control MRSA outbreaks, many U.S. hospitals have hesitated 
to implement active surveillance screening in the absence of outbreaks due to the lack of 
evidence for routine active screening (Mangini et al., 2007). Although some studies have showed 
the impact of MRSA by estimating the costs of MRSA infection (Cosgrove et al., 2005; 
Elixhauser & Steiner, 2007), these studies did not specifically examine MRSA HAIs and did not 
differentiate community-acquired cases from cases acquired in the hospital setting. Recently, 
Nyman et al. reported that screening for MRSA in the ICU is likely to provide cost savings to a 
279-bed Veterans Affairs hospital (Nyman et al., 2011). More recently, Leonhardt et al. 
demonstrated in two community hospitals that, compared to targeted screening, universal 
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screening was not cost-beneficial; the additional costs of universal screening would be recouped 
at a rate of $.50 on the dollar compared to the avoided costs of hospital-acquired MRSA 
infection, resulting in a net loss per patient (Leonhardt et al., 2011). However, to our knowledge, 
no cost-effectiveness study compares alternative surveillance screening strategies (i.e., all 
hospitalized patients vs. ICU patients only vs. no screening) using a modeling approach in the 
United States. Thus, our study fills a unique, but necessary niche, and complements Leonhardt et 
al.’s study. 
Overall, the results of this modeling study indicate that TSS is cost saving compared to 
no surveillance screening, and cost-effective relative to universal screening of all admitted 
patients.  However, more research is needed, including data from real-world hospital settings. 
First, further studies are needed in order to determine the recommended protocols for 
implementing active surveillance screening along with rigorous analyses of its cost-effectiveness. 
Second, more studies are necessary to determine where, and when, TSS is most effective at 
reducing MRSA HAIs. Currently, most research available regarding targeted surveillance 
focuses on ICU patients and surgical patients (Anderson et al., 2009; Clancy et al., 2006; 
McGinigle et al., 2008). Although these patients are likely to be most at risk for MRSA HAIs, it 
is important to determine among which categories of patients active surveillance is most 
effective at reducing MRSA HAI rates. Third, since control of MRSA is a significant concern 
across healthcare settings, more research is needed regarding the prevalence of MRSA HAIs and 
effectiveness of screening in various healthcare settings, including small community hospitals. 
The results of this study suggest that in academic hospital settings with a high prevalence of 
MRSA HAIs or high costs associated with MRSA HAIs, targeted active surveillance screening 
of ICU patients is the most cost-effective screening strategy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA HOSPITAL POLICIES REGARDING VISITOR USE 
OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR ENTERING THE ROOMS OF 
PATIENTS ON ISOLATION PRECAUTIONS 
 
Background 
Isolation precautions have been recommended for healthcare personnel (HCP) across the 
continuum of care as a standard infection control practice for infectious diseases with possible 
person-to-person transmission in the healthcare setting. The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) 2007 Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of 
Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings recommends that patients be isolated in a single room 
with proper transmission-based isolation precautions: contact precautions, droplet precautions, 
and airborne precautions (Siegel et al., 2007). Contact precautions target contact-transmitted 
pathogens (e.g., those transmitted by direct or indirect contact with patients), such as multidrug-
resistant (MDR) pathogens (Siegel et al., 2007). When using contact precautions, HCP perform 
hand hygiene prior to room entry, and use gown and gloves for any contact with a patient or the 
patient’s environment (Siegel et al., 2007). Droplet precautions require HCP to wear a surgical 
mask in the rooms of patients who are isolated for droplet-transmitted pathogens, such as the 
influenza virus (Siegel et al., 2007). Patients with pathogens that are transmitted by the aerosol 
route (e.g., Mycobacterium tuberculosis) require airborne precautions, including a negative-
pressure private room with direct out-exhausted air along with HCP use of an N95 mask (Siegel 
et al., 2007). Although enteric precautions are not listed in the current CDC guidelines and all 
enteric pathogens should prompt the use of contact precautions, some hospitals have developed 
and implemented enteric precautions to reinforce the use of isolation precautions for enteric 
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pathogens, especially for Clostridium difficile, which has become a major healthcare-associated 
pathogen in the past several years (Kang, Sickbert-Bennett, Brown, Weber, & Rutala, 2012a; 
Miller et al., 2011). In addition, protective precautions have been used to protect 
immunocompromised patients (e.g., those with hematologic malignancy, organ transplantation, 
and usually neutropenia) in hospital settings, although the CDC eliminated the use of these 
precautions in 1983 (Bowling, Cadena, & Patterson, 2012). 
The use of isolation precautions can simultaneously disrupt several components in the 
chain of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs; see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 for detail) and 
prevent the transmission of healthcare-associated pathogens in hospital environments. The 
hospital environment comprises the animate environment (the human reservoir) as well as the 
inanimate environment (e.g., beds, medical equipment) as previously specified (see Chapter 1 
Figure 1.2). The implementation of isolation precautions as a preventive method to disrupt/avoid 
transmission of infectious agents includes two main components: the reservoir (particularly the 
human reservoir) and the transmission in the chain of HAIs, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 in 
Chapter 1. In addition, the use of personal protective equipment (PPE: gloves, gown, mask, and 
N95 respirator) can disrupt the chain of HAIs by closing entry and exit portals; humans serve as 
both potential reservoirs and susceptible hosts, depending upon their current health condition and 
host defense mechanisms (e.g., specific immunity from vaccination). For example, wearing a 
mask can prevent both the spread of infectious droplets from an infectious person’s cough and a 
susceptible person’s inhalation of the infectious droplets. In fact, isolation precautions (contact, 
droplet, and airborne), including the use of appropriate PPE, can be a broadly effective 
prevention method by disrupting multiple components in the chain of HAIs.  
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The human reservoir includes patients, HCP, and visitors in hospital settings. To control 
patients’ role as human reservoirs who can spread infectious agents into the hospital environment,  
prompt implementation of appropriate isolation precautions is necessary for patients with a 
known or suspected communicable disease (Siegel et al., 2007) and those who are colonized or 
infected with an MDR pathogen (Siegel et al., 2007). In addition to appropriate isolation 
precautions, single-room isolation is recommended as a quarantine method for isolating 
infectious patients. For HCP with communicable diseases, appropriate occupational health 
management, including work restrictions, are used in hospital settings (Bolyard et al., 1998). 
Current CDC guidelines for isolation precautions recommend the use of PPE by HCP (Siegel et 
al., 2007). For patients on droplet or airborne isolation precautions, all persons entering the 
patient’s room (visitors and HCP) are required to wear either a surgical mask or an N95 (for 
tuberculosis, as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration) respirator, as 
recommended by the CDC guideline (Siegel et al., 2007). HCP entering the room of a patient on 
contact precautions for an MDR pathogen are required to wear gloves and a gown. 
The association between visitors’ behavior in hospital settings and transmission risks has 
not been fully evaluated (Birnbach et al., 2011). Two infection control issues are related to 
hospital visitors: handling sick visitors to prevent the introduction of infections into hospitals and 
the use of PPE by visitors to prevent the transmission of HAIs in hospital settings. First, efforts 
to prevent visitors from introducing infections into hospitals focus on screening and excluding 
sick visitors. According to the current CDC guideline, visitors should maintain respiratory 
hygiene/cough etiquette if they have symptoms of a respiratory infection (Siegel et al., 2007). 
Hospital signs usually request that sick visitors not enter clinical areas (Clock et al., 2010). 
However, there have been several reports of visitors introducing infections into hospitals. During 
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the 2003 worldwide outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), visitors were linked 
to 13 to 14% of all healthcare-associated SARS cases in Canadian hospitals (Quinlan, Loughrey, 
Nicklin, & Roth, 2003). Second, visitors have also been reported as the source of HAIs with M. 
tuberculosis, pertussis, influenza, and other respiratory viruses (Siegel et al., 2007a). Although 
visitors have been implicated in the introduction of airborne and droplet diseases (e.g., measles) 
into a hospital (Quinlan, Loughrey, Nicklin, & Roth, 2003; Siegel et al., 2007; Weber & Rutala, 
2008), their role in the cross-transmission of MDR pathogens (e.g., methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus [MRSA] and vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus [VRE]) has been less 
clear. Visitors are usually informed by hospital signs about recommendations for the prevention 
of HAIs (e.g., the importance of hand hygiene); however, visitor awareness of and compliance 
with behaviors requested by hospital signage is unknown. For example, despite the placement of 
additional signs and a freestanding dispenser of alcohol-based hand sanitizer in a hospital lobby, 
hospital visitor hand hygiene compliance remained lower than 10% in the lobby of a university 
teaching hospital (Birnbach et al., 2011). Recently, one observational study of adherence to 
contact precautions found environmental contamination even when visitors followed contact 
precautions, particularly when visitors removed their gloves in the isolation rooms (Clock et al., 
2010). Additional studies of hospital visitors’ behavior and of the relationship between visitors 
and the transmission of healthcare-associated pathogens are critically needed.  
In fact, the effectiveness of implementing isolation precautions among hospital visitors, 
including use of gowns, gloves, or masks in hospital settings, has not been studied well (Siegel et 
al., 2007a). Some studies have focused on the use of gowns and gloves to control MDR 
pathogens, but they did not measure the effectiveness of visitors’ use of these precautions. Some 
visitors who provide care and are in close contact with the patient can facilitate transmission if 
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they do not follow isolation precautions properly (Siegel et al., 2007a). The CDC recommends 
that each hospital determine specific recommendations for visitors by facility, unit, and level of 
interaction (Siegel et al., 2007a). However, research examining the diversity of hospital visitor 
recommendations does not exist. Such research is critically needed because visitors play 
significant roles as both reservoirs and susceptible hosts of healthcare-associated pathogens. 
Therefore, to examine the diversity of hospital policies for visitor PPE use when visiting patients 
on isolation precautions, we conducted a survey of hospitals in North Carolina.  
 
Methods 
Study Design 
This study used an online survey to investigate current hospital policies for visitors and to 
guide the development of future policies for visitors’ isolation precautions in hospital settings. 
This study design includes survey questionnaire development, survey execution, and response 
analysis. 
Sample/Setting 
The study population was all acute care hospitals in North Carolina. Due to lack of the 
exact information about all of the acute care hospitals in North Carolina, the hospitals that were 
among all the healthcare facilities registered in the North Carolina Statewide Program for 
Infection Control and Epidemiology (SPICE) listserv were selected as a convenience sample for 
this survey. We do not know exactly what proportion of North Carolina hospitals is represented 
in the SPICE listserv, but we are certain the SPICE listserv provided a good sample of hospitals 
in North Carolina for the following reason: SPICE was established in 1980 to help develop 
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infection control programs at community hospitals and for tuberculosis management by a 
contract between the University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill School of Medicine and 
the North Carolina Department of Human Resources (SPICE, 2012). Under the North Carolina 
Infection Control law 10A NCAC 41A. 0206 Infection Prevention – Health Care Settings, every 
healthcare organization that performs invasive procedures shall require the infection control staff 
to complete an approved course in infection control in order to prevent transmission of 
bloodborne pathogens, such as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), hepatitis B and hepatitis 
C (North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, 2012). As the administrator of the North 
Carolina- approved infection control courses, SPICE has provided educational courses and 
consultations, including outbreak investigation, to all North Carolina healthcare facilities since 
2000 (SPICE, 2012). In the two decades from 1990 to 2009, SPICE provided 12,359 consults, 63 
onsite investigations, 85 full courses, 352 workshops, and 61 newsletters (Hoffman, 2010). 
SPICE disseminates timely, up-to-date infection control information to course attendees and 
registered users of the SPICE website via newsletters and SPICE listserv-generated emails.  
To select only hospitals from among the healthcare facilities registered in the SPICE 
listserv, the names and information of healthcare facilities were checked through their websites 
and the list of Hospitals Licensed by the State of North Carolina Department of Health and 
Human Services – Division of Health Service Regulation as of January 2012 (North Carolina 
Division of Health Service Regulation, 2012). The non-hospital type facilities, such as clinics, 
hospice care, student health services, psychiatric programs, county health departments, surgical 
centers, endoscopy centers, and ambulatory care centers, were excluded. In addition, healthcare 
facilities that had no identified email address in the SPICE listserv were excluded because an 
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email address of at least one infection preventionist (IP) at each hospital was required for online 
survey distribution.  
IPs were chosen as the most appropriate respondent for this survey among HCP because 
IPs practice infection prevention. IPs’ practices include identifying HAI processes, surveillance, 
outbreak investigation, intervention to control HAI transmission, management of HCP after 
exposure to the risk of infectious disease (e.g., a sharps injury during surgery), participation in 
hospital policy-making processes for infection control (e.g., updates of hospital infection control 
policy and attendance at hospital infection control committee meetings), education and 
consulting, and research (Feltovich & Fabrey, 2010). 
Measures/Survey Questionnaire Development 
The questionnaire (see Appendix 4.1) was developed with both the director and the 
infectious diseases consultant of SPICE to examine hospital policy issues related to visitor 
isolation precautions. The final questionnaire included four parts: respondent information, 
hospital characteristics, isolation room characteristics, and specific hospital visitor policies for 
isolation precautions, including PPE use. The questions followed a categorical choice (e.g., Yes, 
No, and not applicable), multiple choice (e.g., please check all that apply), short text, or open-
ended format, depending on the question context. A total of 29 questions were included in the 
main-request survey questionnaire. 
Questions about respondent information. Questions about the name, hospital job title, 
hospital name, and contact information of the person completing the survey were included to 
identify duplicate responses from the same hospital, to identify non-responding hospitals and 
send reminder emails, and to contact the respondents for clarification of responses when 
indicated.  
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Questions about hospital characteristics. Information about the operating 
characteristics of the participating hospitals was collected through questions about the number of 
licensed beds, which was used to categorize the hospitals into three groups according to size 
(small, medium, and large); hospital type, with subcategories (general/acute care, subspecialty, 
long-term care, and other) to search for differences in visitor policy by hospital type; number of 
full-time equivalent (FTE) IPs, to examine staffing levels for infection control at the respondent 
hospitals; and number of patients admitted to the hospital between January 1, 2011 and 
December 31, 2011, to examine the hospital visitor policy and its correlation with admission 
volume. Because the IPs were not likely to know the yearly number of hospitalized patients 
without checking with their hospital administration departments or accessing their electronic 
administration systems, a “do not know” option was included.  
Questions about isolation room characteristics. The following questions were included 
to examine the characteristics of the hospitals’ isolation rooms: the availability of inpatient 
airborne isolation rooms; the languages (English and Spanish) used on isolation precaution signs; 
visitor-specific content on isolation precaution signs; posted infection control information for 
visitors; whether visitor education for isolation precautions is provided and, if so, who provides  
education for visitors.  
Questions about the hospital’s policy for visitors’ isolation precautions. Hospital 
policy information was explored through questions about the following issues: existing hospital 
visitor policy regarding isolation precautions; the IP’s opinions about this policy; the IP’s 
experience of related outbreaks; the hospital’s policy for handling non-compliant and sick 
visitors; and the IP’s suggestions for facilitating visitors’ compliance with isolation precautions. 
We included enteric precautions in addition to the three transmission-based precautions to 
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examine the current use of each precaution category in hospital settings. Although not all PPE 
(e.g., N95 mask, surgical mask, gown, and gloves) are required for each category of isolation 
precautions, these PPE were listed with a categorical choice option (e.g., “yes”, “no”, and “not 
applicable”) to examine whether PPE were available outside the isolation rooms under current 
hospital visitor policy. In addition, questions about age restrictions for visitors, differing policies 
for child visitors, and the management of non-compliant guardians were included because the 
needs of children who are visiting hospitals may differ from those of adult visitors. An open-
ended description option was added to many questions in this section to capture the IPs’ unique 
experiences related to the issues of current hospital visitor policy regarding isolation precautions. 
Questions for survey feedback (included in the pilot-request survey only). After the 
survey questionnaire was developed, two questions were added for the pilot-request survey phase 
to elicit feedback from pilot-requested hospitals. These two questions were used to identify 
unclear parts of questions and to improve the quality of the survey questionnaire.  
Validation of questionnaire before survey execution. The questionnaire was reviewed 
by an expert in survey methodology at UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health to produce 
a questionnaire with an optimal structure and without critical errors. To estimate the response 
time and the clarity of the contents, and to ensure that the questions were appropriately 
interpreted, the questionnaire was pretested by three IPs at the Department of Hospital 
Epidemiology, UNC Health Care, which closely collaborates with SPICE at UNC. From a total 
of six IPs at UNC Health Care, three IPs were selected based on their level of infection control 
experience, which ranged from less than 1 year to more than 10 years, to assess the concurrence 
between the IPs’ understanding of the questions and the questions’ intended meaning. 
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Survey Execution Procedure 
The survey was approved by the UNC Institutional Review Board. The survey was 
constructed using the commercial online survey program SurveyMonkey
® 
(SurveyMonkey.com, 
LLC, Palo Alto, CA) because the IPs were familiar with the program through several prior 
SPICE listserv surveys. All of the SPICE listserv-enlisted IPs at the selected hospitals were 
invited to participate in this survey via an online survey link in the email requesting their 
participation. Thus survey request was sent to all enlisted IPs at the hospitals that were selected 
for this survey with the assumption that some IPs might not be available to respond to this survey 
request because of vacation, retirement, switching hospitals, or job demands. In the request (see 
Appendix 4.2), the IPs were informed that one response per hospital was sufficient and that 
duplicate responses would be deleted.  
The pilot survey was conducted by sending emails to 10 hospitals that were randomly 
chosen from the selected hospitals in SPICE listserv February 6-20, 2012 using the random 
function of Microsoft Excel
®
 (2007 version, Microsoft, Redmond, WA). After completion of the 
pilot study, email requests with a link to the survey were sent to IPs at hospitals who had not 
participated in the pilot survey between February 21, 2012 and March 6, 2012, with the online 
survey link remaining available for an additional two weeks. Hospitals that did not respond 
during that period of time were sent a reminder email between March 21 and March 30, 2012. To 
improve the response rate, the reminder email was sent to the non-respondent hospitals by the 
director of SPICE, who is well known to SPICE listserv members.  
Data Analysis 
Data management. Although pilot survey results are typically not included in the data 
analysis, we included the responses from our pilot survey for the following reasons: 1) the 
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primary questionnaire was exactly the same as the pilot questionnaire, except that the pilot email 
survey included feedback questions; and 2) the pilot survey respondents did not want to complete 
the survey again and confirmed that their pilot responses were correct so that their responses 
would be unchanged. Thus, we were able to include data collected from the pilot survey in the 
analysis. Any identifying information from the respondents was deleted prior to initiating data 
analysis to protect the confidentiality of responses. When duplicate responses were received 
from a hospital, only the most complete response (i.e., the one that answered the most questions) 
was retained for analysis.  
After examining the initial data, we discovered that based on the responses provided to 
the question about hospital type, some of the respondent hospitals were not acute-care hospitals. 
This happened because we were not able to differentiate which of the hospitals selected from the 
SPICE listserv were acute care hospitals before we sent the survey emails. Thus, at this point, we 
excluded non-acute care hospitals, such as rehabilitation, prison, long-term care, psychiatric, and 
orthopedic hospitals, because these hospitals are likely to have different characteristics, such as 
average length of hospital stay and numbers of visitors, which can substantially affect hospital 
visitor policy. As a result, only the responses of short-term, general acute care hospitals were 
included in data analysis. 
Because large hospitals may differ from small hospitals in their visitor policies for 
isolation precautions (due to possible differences in the number of visitors, services provided, 
and the availability of isolation rooms), we used the number of licensed beds provided by the 
survey respondents to group the respondent hospitals into three categories (small, ≤200 beds; 
medium, 201-500 beds; and large, >500 beds) based on the National Healthcare Safety Network 
(NHSN) hospital size category (Edwards et al., 2009). In addition, because teaching hospitals 
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may have a strong educational influence that affects hospital visitor policy, a “teaching status” 
variable with a dichotomous value (teaching vs. non-teaching) was created by matching hospital 
name with the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) list of Member Teaching 
Hospitals and Health Systems (AAMC, 2012). 
Statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics (e.g., frequencies, percentages) were conducted 
for responses with categorical choice options using SAS version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). 
The percentage for each response with a categorical choice option was calculated as the response 
number for each choice divided by the total number of responses for each question (i.e., by 
letting denominator changes) and multiplied by 100 (not all respondents answered each question, 
and several questions allowed multiple answers). The mean, standard deviation, and range were 
calculated for numeric responses, such as the number of licensed beds, the number of FTE IPs, 
and the total number of hospitalized patients for the year 2011. Mantel-Haenszel chi-square 
statistics were used to test for general associations among hospital size groups. There were too 
few teaching hospitals (less than 5) to permit a formal statistical test of comparison.  
Summary of narrative responses to the open-ended questions. The narrative 
responses to the questions with an open-ended description format (e.g., “Do you think a hospital 
should have policies to encourage visitors to comply with isolation precautions? Why?”) were 
thoroughly reviewed. Narrative responses with similar contents were grouped together to 
summarize the narrative responses. Because certain similar themes (main categories and 
subcategories) emerged when the narrative responses to different questions were reviewed, the 
narrative responses were categorized together, not question-by-question. The main categories 
were then determined based on the overall theme of each group that had similar contents. The 
narrative responses in each main category group were reviewed again and then classified into 
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subcategories, which were based on the common themes that emerged for the grouped narrative 
responses.  
Results 
As of January 18, 2012, a total of 188 healthcare facilities were registered in the SPICE 
listserv. We excluded from our survey non-hospital type facilities (e.g., clinics) and hospitals for 
which no email address was identified in the SPICE listserv, leaving a total of 136 eligible 
hospitals; a total of 338 email addresses belonging to IPs were available. Of the 136 surveyed 
hospitals, 93 hospitals (68.4%) responded (six responses from the pilot survey and 87 responses 
from the survey: 51 from the primary email and 36 from the reminder email). Excluding 11 non-
acute care hospitals from the respondents, the remaining 82 (60.3%) acute care hospitals were 
included in the data analysis (Figure 4.1).   
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Figure 4.1 Overview of the survey process. SPICE = Statewide Program for Infection Control and 
Epidemiology 
 
Hospital characteristics. Hospital characteristics are summarized in Table 4.1. Overall, 
62% (n=51) of the hospitals were small hospitals (≤200 beds). The mean number of licensed 
beds among the respondent hospitals was 272 (median, 149; standard deviation, 272), with a 
range of 18 to 1,023.  
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Table 4.1.  
Characteristics of the Study Hospitals (n=82) 
Variable Descriptive statistic 
Hospital size, n (%)  
 Small (≤200 beds)         51 (62) 
 Medium (201-500 beds)        18 (22) 
 Large (>500 beds)        13 (16) 
Teaching, n (%)  
 Teaching          4 (5) 
 Non-teaching        78 (95) 
Number of full-time equivalent IPs  
 Overall (n=79), mean (range)          2.09 (0.25 – 8) 
 Only one IP, n (%, hospital bed range)        40 (49%, 18 – 300) 
 Less than one IP, n (%, range, hospital bed range)          7 (9%, 0.25 – 0.6, 21 – 149) 
 More than one IP, n (%, range, hospital bed range)        32 (39%, 1.5 – 8, 135 – 1,023) 
Number of patient admissions in 2011 (n=31)*, mean (range) 11,374 (280 – 97,533) 
Note. *For medium and small hospitals; the large hospitals did not provide the number of patients admitted in 2011.  
IP = Infection preventionist 
 
AAMC-listed teaching hospitals comprised only 5% of the sample (n=4). All four of the 
teaching hospitals were large (>500 beds). The mean number of FTE IPs among the respondent 
hospitals was 2.09 (range, 0.25-8; standard deviation, 1.97). Among the respondent hospitals, 49% 
had only one FTE IP, and 9% had fewer than one FTE IP. Among the 32 hospitals with more 
than one FTE IP, the mean number of FTE IPs was 3.85 (range, 1.5-8). The number of FTE IPs 
per 100 licensed beds among these hospitals ranged from 0.5 to 1.5. For the 39 respondent 
hospitals that provided the number of hospital admissions, the mean number of hospitalized 
patients was 11,374 (standard deviation, 17,478) in the year 2011. 
 Isolation room characteristics. Among the 79 hospitals that responded to this part of the 
questionnaire, 78 (99%) indicated they had an inpatient airborne isolation room(s). The hospital 
that did not have an isolation room had only 18 beds. All 79 hospitals posted isolation precaution 
signs in the isolation rooms; the types of isolation signs posted were airborne (n=68, 86% of 79 
hospitals), droplet (n=65, 82%), contact (n=64, 81%), and enteric (n=57, 72%) precautions, as 
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well as protective precautions for immunocompromised patients (n=55, 70%). Twelve hospitals 
used combination signs (n=9, 11%) or special signs (n=3, 4%), such as strict contact isolation for 
highly resistant organisms such as “Klebsiella pneumonia carbapenemase producer”. Sixty-eight 
(87%) hospitals provided information in both English and Spanish, and 63 (81%) hospitals 
reported using visitor-specific signs that alert visitors to hospital policies regarding isolation 
precautions. No significant association between the use of visitor-specific signs and hospital size 
(small, 80%; medium, 82%; large, 82%; p=0.92) was noted. Other specific types of information 
provided to visitors included information on respiratory etiquette (89%) and hand hygiene (88%). 
Some hospitals used isolation signs for specific cases, such as C. difficile or “living with MRSA”. 
Education for visitors was provided in 96% of the respondent hospitals via written materials 
(59%; e.g., brochures, handouts, and pamphlets) and direct education delivered by HCP (41%). 
The respondents indicated that nurses were the primary visitor educators (73%), whereas IPs 
(13%) and physicians (11%) were much less likely to be involved in providing visitor education.  
 Hospital policies for visitors’ isolation precautions. Substantial variations were 
observed in hospital policies requiring PPE for visitors entering patient isolation rooms (Table 
4.2).  
Table 4.2.  
Response Summary of Hospital Policies for Visitors’ Use of Personal Protective Equipment 
When Entering Each Type of Isolation Room  
Isolation 
room 
N95  Surgical mask  Gown  Gloves 
n 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
NA 
(%) 
 n 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
NA 
(%) 
 N 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
NA 
(%) 
 n 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
NA 
(%) 
Airborne 51 59 37 4  52 71 23 6  37 30 57 14  30 37 47 17 
Droplet 35 6 74 20  63 98 - 2  38 39 50 11  35 37 54 9 
Contact 36 - 75 25  37 24 51 24  63 92 8 -  62 95 5 - 
Enteric 34 - 65 35  37 19 54 27  61 92 5 3  61 92 5 3 
Note. These responses were for multiple choice questions. n = total responses, % = (n in each category/total number of 
responses) x 100, NA = Not applicable in the respondent hospital.  
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The respondents reported that when rooms were designated for patients on airborne 
isolation precautions (e.g., patients with tuberculosis), 59% (n=30) of hospitals had policies that 
included the provision of N95 respirators for visitors, and 71% (n=37) had polices that provided 
visitors with surgical masks. Only one hospital (2%) did not have a policy that supported 
providing either an N95 respirator or surgical mask to visitors entering airborne isolation rooms 
(not shown in Table 4.2). When rooms were designated for patients on droplet isolation 
precautions (e.g., patients with influenza), 98% (n=62/63 respondents to this question) of the 
responding hospitals had a policy indicating that surgical masks should be provided to visitors, 
but only one hospital reported providing both N95 respirators and surgical masks (not shown in 
Table 4.2). The respondents reported that when rooms were designated for contact isolation 
precautions (e.g., for patients with MRSA), 54 (95%) had a policy that provided both a gown and 
gloves to visitors, yet only nine hospitals (24%) provided visitors with masks as well (not shown 
in Table 4.2). The respondents reported that when rooms were designated for enteric isolation 
precautions (e.g., for patients with C. difficile or norovirus), 56 hospitals (92%) provided both a 
gown and gloves for visitors. Only three hospitals (5%) reported providing “no gown and gloves” 
for both contact isolation and enteric isolation rooms.  
Regarding age restrictions for visitors to each type of isolation room, age 12 was the most 
common minimum age for visiting restrictions for all types of isolation rooms. For the airborne 
isolation rooms, the respondents reported restricted ages of 6 (n=1), 12 (n=7), 16 (n=2), and 18 
years (n=1). For the other types of isolation rooms (for droplet, contact, and enteric precautions), 
the restricted visiting ages were 0 (n=1), 12 (n=9; n=8 for enteric isolation rooms), and 16 years 
(n=1). 
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Overall, 71% of the hospitals (51/72 respondents to this question) answered affirmatively 
to having a hospital visitor policy for isolation precautions, including the use of PPE. However, 
96% of the responding hospital IPs agreed that hospitals should have a visitor policy because 
visitors can transmit healthcare-associated pathogens in hospital settings. Only two hospital IPs 
disagreed with requiring visitors to comply with isolation precautions; for example, one IP stated 
that “until we have the evidence to support that visitors contribute HAIs, this is not a priority”. 
Importantly, only 14% of hospitals reported monitoring visitor compliance with precautions, 
with reported compliance rates ranging from “very low” to 97%. Three hospitals reported having 
different policies on gowning or gloving for adults and children because PPE designed for adult 
HCP may be too large for small children. Many hospitals (n=19, 28%) reported difficulty with 
implementing visitor isolation precautions policies, citing visitors’ hostility and refusal to 
comply. Non-compliant visitors were most often managed by nurses (n=64, 74%) and/or IPs 
(n=47, 57%). Eight hospitals (10%) reported using security personnel to help remove non-
compliant visitors, and two hospitals reported excluding non-compliant guardians from visitation 
when they did not abide by hospital policies. Other approaches for handling non-compliant 
visitors were providing education, asking physicians to communicate with visitors, and inserting 
documentation in the patient’s chart. Nurses were considered critical for discouraging sick 
visitors from seeing patients and encouraging visitors to wear a surgical mask. Twenty-three 
hospitals (28%) handled sick visitors by excluding them from visitation. Only three hospitals 
used security personnel help to deal with sick visitors.  
Narrative responses to the open-ended questions. All of the narrative responses fell 
into three main themes: need for/positive aspects of visitor policies for isolation precautions, 
difficulties/negative aspects of visitor policies, and suggestions (Figure 4.2). Although there were 
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many responses supporting hospital visitor polices on isolation precautions (positive aspects), 
these responses were thematically similar and could not be divided into subcategories. The 
responses that were categorized as negative aspects were classified into subcategories, such as 
visitors’ refusal to comply, hard to enforce, conflict with open visitation policy, no standard 
policy/lack of administrative support, and other. The responses that provided suggestions were 
sorted into subcategories, such as clear standard guidelines from authorities, administrative 
support, education, and need to focus on important aspects of isolation precautions.  
 
Figure 4.2. Summary overview for narrative responses on hospital visitor policy for isolation precautions 
 
Selected quotes from the IPs’ 158 narrative responses to the seven open-ended questions 
about visitor policies are summarized in Table 4.3. Across all narrative responses, no differences 
from a descriptive standpoint were observed; the responses were similar regardless of hospital 
size and teaching status.  
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Table 4.3.  
Selected Quotes from Infection Preventionists about Hospital Visitor Policies for Isolation 
Precautions 
1. Need for/positive aspects of visitor policies 
  “Visitors are free to move around the hospital outside the patient room and therefore can transfer 
pathogens to the environment.” 
 “For reasons of safety and liability.”  
 “To protect the visitors as well as the patients.” 
 “To reinforce the policies that healthcare workers utilize to prevent the transmission of infectious 
agents/organisms.”  
 “It gives them a feeling of security when you offer them PPE for their own protection.” 
2. Difficulties/negative aspects of visitor policies 
 Visitors’ refusal to comply 
   “Family members feel they already live with the ‘germ’” 
 “Family refused to wear PPE after education. ‘We do not wear anything at home, and we are not 
going to wear anything here.’ ‘We’ve been with them forever, so why do we need to do this? After 
all, we have already been exposed.’” 
 “Impossible. Some family members do what they want.” 
 “Hostility.” 
 Hard to enforce 
   “We should encourage [it]; however, enforcement is another issue. Take a mother and baby, for 
instance: shouldn’t eat and drink in the room, but a gown and gloves all day? Not going to 
happen.” 
 “No legal recourse for handling noncompliant visitors.” 
 “Family members of extended-stay patients tend to be less compliant as time goes on.” 
 “Isolation precautions apply to all who enter the room. The problem is enforcement and patient 
satisfaction.” 
 Conflict with open visitation policy 
   “With an open visitation policy, there is no one besides the nursing staff to encounter visitors, 
give education and request [that] they not visit.” 
 “We have an ‘open visitation’ policy, which was instituted to promote ‘family-centered care’. I 
have never liked this policy.”  
 No standard policy/lack of administrative support 
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   “Policies vary depending on the department; some enforce, some don’t. [It is] very scattered and 
very inconsistent.” 
 “Policies are inconsistent for visitors; we tell them to comply to prevent the spread to the hospital 
environment and the visitor, but it's not clearly written that way in the policy.” 
 “Hospital administrations are very worried about appearance and holding onto their market share, 
and this is a very unpopular topic with both patients and visitors.”  
 Other 
   “It would be helpful to ensure that staff, MDs are compliant and then get the visitors to be 
compliant.” 
 “Our gowns/gloves are too large for young children, so that population can't wear them.”  
 “No full-time staff to monitor [compliance].” 
3. Suggestions 
 Clear standard guidelines from authorities 
   “It would be helpful if the CDC made a recommendation about visitors. The public would comply 
if they knew this came from a credible organization and research.”  
 “Regulations from DHHS would be good; something to back us up.”           
 “Generic policy to fit all hospital sizes.”  
 “It would be helpful if we had concrete information on this topic so we all were doing the same 
thing. [It is] difficult to enforce if not consistent from facility to facility.”                                             
 “Sharing policy throughout the state.” 
 “Would be great to have a state standard isolation practice for acute care so that we can all sing 
from the same page of music.” 
  “I think our policy should state that the precaution applies to all entering the isolation room.”          
 “A policy is worthless without teeth to back it up. Until there are clear guidelines, with some 
public health reinforcement, a policy would be useless” 
 “Media campaigns regarding how to help loved ones while in the hospital. No one truly wants to 
make their loved ones sicker.” 
 Administrative support 
   “Each facility has its own culture and handles the same situation in any number of ways that best 
suits that culture, so I feel if the administration supports the IP, then this will be what works in 
their facility.” 
 “I think that noncompliant visitors should be excluded from visiting and if necessary trespassed 
[sic] from the property for refusal to follow our policies.” 
 “The allowing of children under a certain age not to visit with patients on any precautions.” 
 “Once hospital personnel are compliant, ask for support from administration.” 
 Education 
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   “Educate as soon as they enter the facility by staff. Once up on the floors, the visitor might not 
see a nurse for awhile due to medication passes and other issues. If you set expectations early and 
educate prevention the right way, you can achieve higher compliance.” 
 “I think visitors and families need more education. They don't take it seriously enough, even 
when stressing the importance of environmental cleaning and hand washing.”  
 “A visitor-specific isolation DVD.” 
 “We encourage visitation and therefore provide education in a positive manner, not excluding 
them from seeing their significant other.” 
 Concentration on the important parts of isolation precautions 
   “Visitors don't do invasive tasks with our patient population as staff do, and if visiting from room 
to room, their transmission would be due to hands. If hand hygiene is performed upon entering 
and exiting the patient room, transmission of organisms from this environment is minimized. 
Until we have the evidence to support that visitors contribute to HAIs, this is not a priority.” 
 “I think if they wash their hands, in most cases that is enough. If they are actually assisting with 
care of the patient, they may need a gown and gloves, but just sitting in the room, I think that is 
unnecessary” 
 “I think it would be extremely difficult to totally enforce every visitor that enters our facility to 
comply with isolation precautions. I think we should concentrate more on airborne [and] droplet 
precautions and the importance of hand washing.” 
Note. PPE = Personal protective equipment, MD = Medical doctor, CDC = Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention,  DHHS = Department of Health and Human Services, IP = Infection preventionist, HAI = Healthcare-
associated infection 
 
 
The IPs identified the following reasons that visitor policies on isolation precautions are 
needed: visitor’s potential transmission of pathogens; hospital safety and liability concerns; the 
reinforcement of hospital policies for HCP; and the feelings of security that arise from providing 
PPE for visitors. Many IPs pointed out the relationship between visitors’ mobility and the risk of 
pathogen transmission. For example, “Visitors may visit multiple patients at one time. Visitors 
also go to other areas of the hospital (gift shop, chapel, cafeteria), where they can contaminate 
surfaces”. The reported difficulties regarding the enforcement of visitor policies included: 
visitors’ refusal to comply, enforcement difficulties, conflict with an institution’s open visitation 
policy, the lack of a standard policy, and the lack of administrative support. One IP described 
one area of difficulty: “We face fights with visitors who refuse to comply often. Just this week, 
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we had visitors who insisted on using a shared patient bathroom, even though patient with whom 
it was being shared was on isolation for C. difficile. [The] family member they were visiting now 
has C. difficile at a long-term care facility”. The IPs’ suggestions for developing visitor policies 
in the future included the following: the need for clear standard guidelines from authorities (e.g., 
the CDC), the importance of administrative support, providing more education to visitors and 
HCP, and concentrating on the most important parts among many infection control practices (e.g., 
hand hygiene for visitors). The importance of standard guidelines was supported by the IPs in 
statements such as “Hospital administrations are very worried about appearance and holding onto 
their market share, and this is a very unpopular topic with both patients and visitors. Until there 
are clear guidelines, with some public health reinforcement, a policy would be useless” and “It 
would be helpful if we had concrete information on this topic so we all were doing the same 
thing. [It is] difficult to enforce if not consistent from facility to facility.” 
 
Discussion 
 This survey found substantial variation in acute care hospitals’ policies for visitor use of 
PPE when entering patient isolation rooms. Our survey obtained a 68.4% response rate, which 
was made possible by the long-term, established relationship between SPICE and the 
participating hospitals; without that relationship, there would have been no systematic method 
for contacting the IPs (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009). Although the 136 hospitals selected 
from the SPICE listserv was a convenience sample of North Carolina hospitals, we believe that 
there was no sampling error in this study because the SPICE listserv includes most of the 
hospitals in North Carolina.  
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However, to generalize the results of this study to other NC hospitals, we compared our 
sample hospitals to the non-respondent NC hospitals by matching hospital names with the 
individual hospital statistics for North Carolina from the American Hospital Directory
®
 
(American Hospital Directory.com, 2012). For the 37 hospitals that were not included in our 
survey but were found on the NC hospital list, the proportions for each hospital size group were 
very similar to those of our studied hospitals: small, 64. 8% (non-included hospitals) vs. 62% 
(included hospitals); medium, 21.6% vs. 22%; and large, 13.5% vs. 16% (Mantel-Haenszel chi-
square test, p=0.73). The non-included hospitals were all non-teaching facilities. Thus, we 
believe our results from the 82 acute care hospitals surveyed are reasonably representative of 
hospitals in North Carolina. 
The questionnaire itself as a survey instrument has several limitations that merit 
discussion. It is possible that the length of the survey (29 questions, estimated to take 10 to 30 
minutes to complete) may have encouraged non-response given the substantial responsibilities of 
IPs, especially those from small- to medium-sized hospitals. The length of the survey may have 
resulted in reporting bias because IPs might have skipped questions or not completed open-ended 
description format questions due to their job demands or lack of willingness to respond. 
Research suggests that response rates may differ systematically between closed- and open-
question formats. In particular, the non-response rate is usually higher for open-ended questions 
(Millar & Dillman, 2012). The use of an online survey request sent by email could have 
additional limitations. Survey requests delivered by email may be rejected by the security 
function of institutional email accounts or ignored by IPs due to job demands. We were able to 
monitor some of this information using email response-tracking functions and by noting returned 
emails.  During the main survey phase, 8% of the selected hospitals’ spam-blocking software 
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rejected the survey request, and 45% of the selected hospital recipients did not open the survey 
request email during the main survey period.   
We could not clearly separate PPE use for each category of isolation precautions in the 
survey questionnaire due to the lack of a supporting rationale to clearly separate each type of 
isolation precautions. In fact, the CDC guidelines for isolation precautions have changed greatly 
since the first publication of “Isolation Techniques for Use in Hospitals” in 1970 (Garner & 
Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, 1996): diagnosis-driven, disease-
specific and category-specific guidelines with seven categories (strict isolation, contact isolation, 
respiratory isolation, tuberculosis isolation, enteric precautions, drainage/secretion precautions, 
and blood/body fluid precautions) were published in 1983; universal precautions were 
recommended in 1987 due to increasing concerns about occupational exposure to HIV; body 
substance isolation (updated universal precautions) was recommended in 1988; standard 
precautions and transmission-based precautions were recommended in 1996; and the 1996 
guideline was expanded to include respiratory etiquette in 2007 after the SARS epidemic, in 
response to increasing concern about pandemic influenza (Bowling et al., 2012). However, the 
use of terms indicating isolation precautions differ among hospitals, and some confusion among 
HCP remains as a result of changes in the guidelines (Bowling et al., 2012). Thus, we had to 
present multiple-choice options (“check all that apply”) for many questions to examine current 
visitor policies for isolation precautions across hospitals. Doing so may have contributed to the 
respondent burden and reduced the response rate in some systematic but unknown way.  
In addition, we are unable to suggest a clear guideline or recommendation for visitor use 
of specific PPE for each isolation precaution category in clinical settings because no scientific 
evidence has shown that visitors should comply with isolation precautions in hospital settings the 
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same way as HCP. However, it is reasonable to require hospital visitors to comply with airborne 
precautions (e.g., for tuberculosis) and droplet precautions (e.g., for pertussis and influenza) to 
protect all visitors who are susceptible to these diseases. On the other hand, requirements that 
hospital visitors comply with contact precautions for MDR pathogens (e.g., MRSA and VRE) 
may need to be reassessed because it is questionable whether health visitors are vulnerable to 
these pathogens. However, it is recommended that visitors not move from one patient’s room to 
another’s because visitors can transmit HAI pathogens via touch to patients and hospital 
environments. In fact, the CDC recommends that visitors who enter the rooms of 
colonized/infected patients (e.g., those with MRSA) do not touch catheters or wound sites, that 
they maintain only casual contact with patients, and that they wash their hands when leaving a 
patient’s room (CDC, 2011).  
Regarding the use of PPE by hospital visitors, some concerns arise; namely, its cost-
effectiveness and its negative effects on patient satisfaction, such as their emotional well-being 
(Vinski et al., 2012). In addition, wearing masks could impair non-verbal communication, 
especially for pediatric patients (Beck et al., 2004). Nonetheless, PPE use provides potential 
benefit as a protective barrier (Puzniak, Leet, Mayfield, Kollef, & Mundy, 2002). For example, 
gowning decreased the risk of VRE acquisition (Puzniak et al., 2002), and gloving reduced the 
risk of sharps injury (Kinlin, Mittleman, Harris, Rubin, & Fisman, 2010). However, visitors’ 
compliance with gowning was reported to be low; therefore, more intensive efforts are needed to 
educate hospital visitors about the use of PPE (Manian & Ponzillo, 2007). Because many visitors 
actively provide care for their patients and frequently move around patients’ rooms and hospital 
clean areas, visitors who do not comply with hospital recommendations for isolation precautions 
may interfere with the prevention of HAIs in hospital settings. Furthermore, hospital visitors 
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should be protected from any HAI risk during their hospital visit. Thus, enhancing visitor’s 
compliance with isolation precautions through patients and visitor education may be an 
important area that hospitals should focus on, using an organizational approach rather than 
blaming individual compliance failures. Although the CDC recommends that visitors follow 
facilities’ visitor policies (CDC, 2011), there is no sufficient supporting evidence hospitals can 
use as a basis for determining optimal visitor policies for compliance with isolation precautions. 
To solve these challenges regarding visitor use of PPE, further studies are needed to inform 
hospital visitor policies for isolation precautions.  
The strength of this survey study was the finding that regardless of hospital 
characteristics, there was substantial variation in hospital policies for visitor PPE use in North 
Carolina acute care hospitals. Regarding the related issue of visitor PPE use for isolation 
precautions, there were no descriptive differences in the survey responses, regardless of hospital 
size or teaching status.  
Based on the narrative responses from frontline IPs who deal with everyday infection 
control issues in the hospitals, we developed a schema linking current difficulties to potential 
solutions for hospital visitor policies for isolation precautions (Figure 4.3). Taking the example 
of a visitor’s refusal to comply with isolation precautions and the hospital’s difficulty enforcing 
visitors’ compliance, potential solutions include clear standard guidelines from authorities (e.g., 
the CDC), hospital administration support to enforce this policy, education, and focusing on 
important aspects of isolation precautions.  
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Figure 4.3. Schema linking current difficulties to potential solutions, based on the infection preventionists’ 
narrative responses  
 
 
 As many IPs noted in our survey, the current problems associated with hospital visitor 
policies (e.g., low compliance rate, refusal to comply, and the use of different policies across 
departments or facilities) call for public awareness of the importance of visitors’ compliance 
with isolation precautions and for a standard guideline from authorities to back up each 
hospital’s efforts. In addition, further efforts are needed to address the lack of administrative 
support for the implementation of visitor policies and, in some hospitals, to eliminate the conflict 
between open visitation policy and isolation precautions.   
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Appendix 4.1 
Statewide Program in Infection Control and Epidemiology 
Survey Questionnaire for Visitor Precautions Policy 
 
Survey Introduction   
  
    
Dear Infection Preventionists at NC Hospitals  
  
Isolation precautions are recommended as an important intervention to prevent transmission of 
healthcare associated infections between patients and healthcare providers or others. However, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines regarding the use of personal 
protective equipment for visitors entering the room of a patient on isolation are unclear. The 
purpose of this survey is to learn about YOUR HOSPITAL'S current policy on management of 
visitors entering patient isolation rooms. We hope to gain a better understanding of the range of 
policies on visitor isolation being used across NC. For your information, this survey is part of 
PhD dissertation under the mentorship of Dr. Barbara Mark at the School of Nursing, The 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Drs. William Rutala and David Weber at UNC 
Health Care.  
  
Visitors are defined as non hospital persons visiting inpatients in their hospital rooms (e.g., 
family member, friend, and clergy).  
  
Instructions: This survey will take less than 30 minutes. Please complete the survey to reflect 
your hospital policy and your experience/opinions as accurately as possible. Your response 
will be treated confidentially. This study has been approved by the UNC IRB. Please complete 
this survey by March 6, 2012.  
  
If you have any question, please feel free to contact me at the address below.  
  
Sincerely,  
JaHyun Kang  
BSN, MPH, CIC  
PhD candidate, School of Nursing  
314F Carrington Hall  
Campus Box 7460   
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
Chapel Hill, NC, 27599 7460  
jhkang@email.unc.edu. / 919 448 8484  
PART A. Respondent Information   
1. Name of person completing survey  
    
2. Hospital role / Job title  
  
3. Hospital name  
 
 
Survey Introduction 
PART A. Respondent Information 
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4. Contact information  
Telephone 
Email 
 
 
 SPICE Hospital Visitor Precautions Policy 
5. Number of licensed beds  
  
6. Please check your hospital type (please check ALL that apply)  
  
   □ General/Acute care  
   □ Subspecialty (e.g., cancer, psychiatric)  
   □ Long term care  
   □ Other  
7. Number of FULL TIME EQUIVALENT infection preventionists  
  
8. Number of patients admitted to the hospital from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011.  
  
   ○ Do not know  
    
   ○ The number  
  
  
  
 
 
 
9. Do you have inpatient airborne isolation room(s) (e.g., TB room)? 
   ○ Yes  
   ○ No  
   ○ Not applicable  
10. Does your hospital post an isolation precautions sign on the door of isolation room?   
   ○ Yes (go to question 11)  
  
   ○ No (go to question 14)  
   ○ Not applicable (go to question 14)  
  
  
 11. What kind of isolation sign does your hospital have (please check ALL that apply)? 
PART B. Hospital Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART C. Isolation Room Characteristics 
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   □ Airborne precautions (e.g., Mycobacterium tuberculosis)  
   □ Contact precautions (e.g., MRSA)  
   □ Droplet precautions (e.g., Influenza virus)  
   □ Enteric precautions (e.g., Clostridium difficile)  
   □ Immunocompromised precautions (e.g., neutropenic patient)  
  
   □ Other (please specify)  
  
  
  
12. Do isolation precautions signs include instruction/information in English AND 
Spanish? 
  
   ○ Yes  
   ○ No  
   ○ Not applicable  
13. Do isolation precautions signs have visitor specific information included? 
  
   ○ Yes  
   ○ No  
   ○ Not applicable  
14. What other kind of infection control information for visitors, if any, does your hospital 
post (please check ALL that apply)? 
  
   □ Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette (for cold symptoms)  
   □ Hand hygiene  
   □ None  
    
   □ Other (please specify)  
  
  
  
15. Does your hospital provide education for visitors about isolation precautions?   
  
   □ No  
   □ Not applicable  
   □ Not sure  
    
   □ Yes (please describe)  
  
 Visitor Precautions Policy 
 
16. If your hospital provides education for visitors, who usually teaches/provides that 
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information (please check ALL that apply)?  
   □ Physician  
   □ Nurse  
   □ Infection preventionist  
   □ Any of the above  
  
   □ Not applicable   
  
17. Does your hospital have a policy for visitors entering patient isolation rooms?   
  
   ○ Yes (go to question 19)  
   ○ No (go to question 18)  
   ○ Not applicable  
18. Do you think a hospital should have policies to encourage visitors to comply with 
isolation precautions?   
  
   ○ Yes  
   ○ No  
   ○ Not applicable  
  
Why? (please provide your opinion)  
 
  
  
  
19. Please check all categories for which your hospital has policies for visitors entering the 
'AIRBORNE isolation room (e.g., Mycobacterium tuberculosis)'.  
  No visitors under age of ( ) years  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 Yes No Not applicable 
N95 mask □ □ □ 
Surgical mask □ □ □ 
Gown □ □ □ 
Gloves □ □ □ 
PART D. Hospital Policy for Visitors’ Isolation Precautions 
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20. Please check all categories for which your hospital has policies for visitors entering the 
'DROPLET isolation room (e.g., Influenza virus)'.  
  No visitors under age of ( ) years  
  
  
     
21. Please check all categories for which your hospital has policies for visitors entering the 
'CONTACT isolation room (e.g., MRSA, VRE)'.  
  No visitors under age of ( ) years  
  
  
     
22. Please check all categories for which your hospital has policies for visitors entering the 
'ENTERIC isolation room (e.g., C. difficile, norovirus)'.  
  No visitors under age of ( ) years  
  
  
  
  
23. Does your hospital monitor compliance of visitors with isolation precautions?   
  
   ○ No  
   ○ Not applicable  
    
   ○ Yes (please provide the compliance rate (%) as measured in 2011) 
  
 
 Yes No Not applicable 
N95 mask □ □ □ 
Surgical mask □ □ □ 
Gown □ □ □ 
Gloves □ □ □ 
 Yes No Not applicable 
N95 mask □ □ □ 
Surgical mask □ □ □ 
Gown □ □ □ 
Gloves □ □ □ 
 Yes No Not applicable 
N95 mask □ □ □ 
Surgical mask □ □ □ 
Gown □ □ □ 
Gloves □ □ □ 
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24. Does your hospital have a different hospital policy on gowning or gloving for child 
visitors and adult visitors?   
   ○ No  
   ○ Not applicable  
    
   ○ Yes (please describe)  
  
  
  
25. Have you ever experienced any difficulty/issue/outbreak from visitors who entered the 
rooms of patients in isolation?   
  
   ○ No  
   ○ Not applicable  
    
   ○ Yes (please share your experience)  
  
  
  
26. How does your hospital handle non compliant visitors who are NOT guardians (e.g., 
parents of young children)?  (please check ALL that apply)  
  
   □ Discuss with nurse  
   □ Discuss with infection preventionist  
   □ Receive help from security team  
   □ Excluded (don't allow visiting)  
    
   □ Other (please specify)  
  
  
  
27. How does your hospital handle non compliant guardians (e.g., parent of young 
children)?  (please check ALL that apply)  
  
   □ Discuss with nurse  
   □ Discuss with infection preventionist  
   □ Receive help from security team  
   □ Excluded (don't allow visiting)  
    
   □ Other (please specify)  
  
  
  
Policy 
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28. What does your hospital do if a visitor is sick?  (please check ALL that apply)  
   □ Discuss with nurse  
   □ Discuss with infection preventionist  
   □ Receive help from security team  
   □ Excluded (don't allow visiting)  
  
   □ Other (please specify)  
  
  
  
29. Do you have any ideas/suggestions to make an appropriate hospital policy for 
facilitating visitors' compliance with isolation precautions?   
Thank you   
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for responding to this survey!  
We will send you a copy of the results when available.  
 
 
  
 
 
Thank you 
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Appendix 4.2 
Copy of the Survey Request Email (for the Main-Request Survey) 
 
 
Subject line  
Request for you to complete the SPICE Survey Questionnaire for Visitor Precautions Policy 
 
Email content 
Dear Infection Preventionists at NC Hospitals: 
Could you please complete “the SPICE Survey Questionnaire for Visitor Precautions Policy” by 
March 6, 2012? 
One response per facility will be enough. Duplicate response from the same facility will be fine. 
You can access the survey at http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ZJKYTRQ.  
Isolation precautions are recommended as an important intervention to prevent transmission of 
healthcare-associated infections between patients and healthcare providers or others. However, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines regarding the use of personal 
protective equipment for visitors entering the room of a patient on isolation are unclear. The 
purpose of this survey is to learn about YOUR HOSPITAL’S current policy on management of 
visitors entering patient isolation rooms. We hope to gain a better understanding of the range of 
policies on visitor isolation being used across NC.  For your information, this survey is part of 
PhD dissertation under the mentorship of Dr. Barbara Mark at the School of Nursing, The 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Drs. William Rutala and David Weber at UNC 
Health Care. 
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Visitors are defined as non-hospital persons visiting inpatients in their hospital rooms (e.g., 
family member, friend, and clergy). 
Instructions: This survey will take less than 30 minutes. Please complete the survey to reflect 
your hospital policy and your experience/opinions as accurately as possible. Your response will 
be treated confidentially. This study has been approved by the UNC IRB.  Please complete this 
survey by March 6, 2012.  
If you have any question, please feel free to contact me at the address below. 
 
Sincerely, 
JaHyun Kang 
BSN, MPH, CIC 
PhD candidate, School of Nursing 
314F Carrington Hall 
Campus Box 7460  
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Chapel Hill, NC, 27599-7460 
jhkang@email.unc.edu. / 919-448-8484 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE SYNTHESIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY FINDINGS:  
HOSPITAL INFECTION CONTROL: A CONSTANT BATTLE  
AGAINST INVISIBLE HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED PATHOGENS 
 
 
Background 
As illustrated in Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1, healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) have 
multifactorial causes. HAIs result from multifactorial interactions (via transmission) between a 
healthcare-associated pathogen (the infectious agent) and a hospitalized patient (the susceptible 
host) within the hospital environment (Archibald, 2012; Ostrowsky, 2007). These three main 
components (transmission, infectious agent, and host), along with three additional components 
(reservoir, portal of exit and portal of entry) represent the “chain of HAIs” as illustrated  in 
Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 (Ostrowsky, 2007). Within hospital settings, exposure to a healthcare-
associated pathogen, such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), via a 
contaminated environment or a hospitalized patient serving as a reservoir is necessary, but is not 
enough to cause an HAI in a hospitalized patient who is a susceptible host (Archibald, 2012). 
HAIs cannot occur without complex interactions among additional contributing factors, 
including age, immune status, invasive device use, antibiotics usage, and multi-drug resistance 
(Archibald, 2012). Thus, some hospitalized patients develop HAIs and others do not, despite the 
same exposure to a hospital-associated pathogen, because the range of a patient’s (host’s) 
response can vary according to host defense mechanisms, such as specific immunity from 
vaccination or nonspecific immunity from such factors as bodily secretions and local 
inflammatory responses  (Ostrowsky, 2007). 
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The hospital environment is very complicated and presents serious potential to cause 
harm, including the development of HAIs as adverse events (Nettleman et al., 2012). The 
delivery of healthcare is highly chaotic,  in part because patient responses to therapeutic 
interventions are often unpredictable and because healthcare personnel (HCP) must multitask 
with frequent interruptions, creating the potential for such errors as skipping hand hygiene 
(Bartley & Olmsted, 2012). HAIs occur in almost every hospital setting. The more that HAI-
contributing factors (e.g., aging patient population, severity of illness, invasive indwelling 
devices, and broad spectrum antibiotics) increase in hospital settings, the more hospitalized 
patients are at risk of acquiring HAIs (Nettleman et al., 2012). In addition, hospital infection 
control faces increasing demands from external sources, such as mandatory public reporting and 
financial constraints from third-party payers (e.g., the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services [CMS]’s non-reimbursement policy for hospital-acquired adverse events) to control 
HAIs. Given these complicated conditions in hospitals, effective infection control programs 
should include hospital-wide efforts and collaborations among multiple disciplines (Nettleman et 
al., 2012).  
To assist hospitals in their efforts to prevent HAIs, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) 
have published a variety of infection control guidelines based on scientific evidence (Umsheid et 
al., 2009). The most recent CDC/HICPAC isolation guidelines, the 2007 Guideline for Isolation 
Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings, recommend 
isolation precautions for HCPs in all healthcare settings (Siegel et al., 2007). Isolation 
precautions are a standard infection control practice that can simultaneously affect several 
components of the “chain of HAIs” and prevent the potential transmission of healthcare-
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associated pathogens in hospital environments. The use of personal protective equipment (PPE), 
including such barrier precautions as gown, gloves, and mask, is an essential element of isolation 
precautions, as is the isolation of hospitalized patients who are infected with or colonized by a 
healthcare-associated pathogen. However, there is no scientific evidence to support isolation 
precaution guidelines, which are based on attacking a link in the “chain of HAIs” based on a 
known transmission route for pathogens (Nettleman et al., 2012). In addition, although active 
surveillance screening is recommended to identify patients who are infected with or colonized by 
important healthcare-associated pathogens (e.g., MRSA, vancomycin-resistant enterococci 
[VRE]) and contact precautions have been recommended, there is insufficient scientific evidence 
of a relationship between such recommendations and a decreased incidence of HAI by 
healthcare-associated pathogens (Pogorzelska, Stone, & Larson, 2012). Following the logic of 
isolation precautions, all persons who enter an isolated patient’s room should be required to 
comply with isolation precautions; however, no scientific evidence justifies extending isolation 
precautions to hospital visitors. In sum, infection control interventions should be logical, 
evidence-based approaches; however, sometimes consensus guidelines based on expert opinions 
have been used when there is no available scientific evidence to support the use of an 
intervention (Nettleman et al., 2012). 
Information about the change in HAI incidence by pathogen through surveillance is 
useful because monitoring HAI incidence by pathogen may show that infection control measures 
(e.g., active surveillance screening upon hospital admission, isolation precautions) are effective 
(Allen-Bridson et al., 2012). In the case of HAIs, the identification of the healthcare-associated 
pathogen responsible for a patient’s HAI and an understanding of that pathogen’s characteristics 
(e.g., transmission mode, pathogenesis, and microbiology) are essential to implementing 
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appropriate infection control measures. Thus, this dissertation study aimed to examine three 
important HAI issues, including (Chapter 2) combined, extensive HAI incidence information by 
pathogen, by service, and by device-associated HAI based on hospital-wide surveillance data; 
(Chapter 3) a cost-effectiveness analysis comparing three alternative active surveillance 
screening strategies for MRSA (a healthcare-associated pathogen) using a modeling/simulation 
approach; and (Chapter 4) the range of hospitals policies governing visitors’ use of PPE when 
visiting patients on isolation precautions at the North Carolina state level. 
 
Recapitulation of the Findings According to the Study Aims 
Aim 1 (Chapter 2: The Changes in the Incidence of Healthcare-Associated Infections by 
pathogen at a University Hospital from 2005 to 2011) 
Aim. This chapter aimed to examine the incidence of HAIs according to pathogen using 
hospital-wide surveillance data to describe the epidemiology of HAIs at a university hospital. 
Using the incidence density per 1,000 person-days (patient-days or device-days), the incidence 
change in HAIs by pathogen examined over time in the following categories: service (medicine, 
surgery, and pediatrics; intensive care units [ICU] vs. non-ICU); device-associated infections 
(central line-associated bloodstream infection [CLABSI], catheter-associated urinary tract 
infection [CAUTI], and ventilator-associated pneumonia [VAP]); and multidrug resistant (MDR) 
pathogens (MRSA, VRE, MDR Acinetobacter, and MDR Pseudomonas).  
Findings. Over a 7-year period, 8,784 (87.2%) of the 10,070 HAIs at the hospital had at 
least 1 pathogen isolated. Because some of the HAIs had multiple pathogens, a total of 10,585 
pathogens were isolated. Significant changes in the incidence rate of HAIs by healthcare-
associated pathogen occurred from 2005 to 2011. However, among the top 10 pathogens, the 
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incidence of Escherichia coli, Enterococcus species, coagulase-negative staphylococci, 
“Candida and other yeasts”, Enterobacter species, and “other streptococci” decreased 
significantly, whereas the incidence of Clostridium difficile increased significantly per 1,000 
patient-days. Overall, across all service categories, decreasing trends in the incidence rate of all 
pathogens except C. difficile were observed. All device-associated HAIs by pathogen, both 
overall and in each service category, showed significant decreases or no significant change in the 
incidence per 1,000 device-days. The incidence of specific pathogens decreased most in cases of 
CLABSI, less so for CAUTI, and least for VAP. Both overall HAIs and device-associated HAIs 
caused by the top 10 pathogens decreased over the study period, even though the number of 
patient-days increased significantly. Only C. difficile showed a significant increase in incidence, 
a finding that has also been reported in other recent HAI studies. 
 
Aim 2 (Chapter 3: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Active Surveillance Screening for 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in an Academic Hospital Setting) 
Aim. This chapter aimed to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of three alternative active 
screening strategies for MRSA in an academic hospital setting (from the hospital perspective) to 
detect MRSA-colonized patients who should be isolated with contact precautions upon hospital 
admission. The screening strategies were universal surveillance screening (USS) for all hospital 
admissions, targeted surveillance screening (TSS) for ICU admissions, and no surveillance 
screening (NSS). For academic hospitals with distinctive characteristics (e.g., acute care, more 
severely ill patients, and frequent transfer-ins from other facilities), a cost-effective analysis was 
conducted using a decision-tree model to determine the most cost-effective active surveillance 
screening strategy for MRSA. The issue of active surveillance screening for MRSA remains 
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controversial, as guidelines from the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) 
and HICPAC offer conflicting recommendations (Jackson, Jarvis, & Scheckler, 2004).  
Findings. In the base-case, TSS was a dominant (i.e., less cost, better outcomes) strategy 
for preventing MRSA HAIs. USS was associated with an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of 
$14,955 per MRSA HAI. In the one-way sensitivity analysis, TSS was a dominant strategy 
across most ranges of parameters. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis also indicated that TSS was 
the most cost-effective strategy when willingness to pay to prevent a MRSA HAI was less than 
$94,750. Targeted active surveillance screening for MRSA is the most cost-effective screening 
strategy in an academic hospital setting. This finding supports current recommendations to use 
active surveillance to detect MRSA.  
 
Aim 3 (Chapter 4: Survey of North Carolina Hospital Policies Regarding Visitor Use of 
Personal Protective Equipment for Entering the Rooms of Patients on Isolation Precautions) 
Aim. Because there are no clear recommendations for hospital visitors, who could 
acquire healthcare-associated pathogens as susceptible hosts or could transmit these pathogens as 
reservoirs during their visit, this chapter explored the range of hospital policies for visitor use of 
personal protective equipment when entering the rooms of patients on isolation precautions 
because. Using an online survey of hospitals in North Carolina, we examined current hospital 
visitor policies related to isolation precautions and, based on lessons from infection 
preventionists (IPs)’ experience, suggested appropriate future policy directions, including 
difficulties with such policies and ideas for improving them.  
Findings. Among 136 targeted hospitals, 93 hospitals (response rate: 68.4%) responded 
to our survey, and 82 acute care hospitals (60.3%) were included in the analyses (11 specialty 
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hospitals were excluded). Overall, 62% of the hospitals were small (<200 beds), and most (95%) 
were non-teaching facilities. Substantial variation was observed in the hospitals’ policies on 
visitors’ use of personal protective equipment when entering the rooms of patients on isolation 
precautions. However, there was no difference in hospitals’ visitor policies according to hospital 
size. Overall, 71% of the hospitals had a hospital visitor policy. Ninety-six percent of the 
responding IPs agreed that hospitals should have a visitor policy; however, only 14% of the 
hospitals monitored visitor compliance. The reported compliance rates varied from “very low” to 
97%. Overall, 28% of the hospitals had experienced difficulties related to visitor compliance 
with isolation precautions, including hostility and refusal to comply. Our study results 
illuminated variations in hospitals’ policies regarding visitor isolation precautions. The current 
problems with hospital visitor policies (e.g., low compliance rates, refusal to comply, conflict 
with open visitation policies, lack of administrative support, and different policies across 
departments or facilities) call for a standard guideline and for increased public awareness of the 
importance of visitors’ compliance with isolation precautions. 
 
Strengths of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation study has several strengths. Overall, it fills some gaps in HAI 
knowledge by examining HAIs on multiple levels, including healthcare-associated pathogens 
(the microscopic, infectious-agent level) to hospital infection control policy (the macroscopic, 
decision-making level) using three different types of studies: an epidemiologic study of the 
incidence change in HAIs by pathogen, a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of active 
surveillance screening for MRSA, and a survey of hospital visitor policies for isolation 
precautions. Using a “chain of HAIs” conceptual model, this study examined HAIs from the 
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agent (the healthcare-associated pathogen) to the infection control measures that can interrupt the 
interactions (transmission) among agent, host, and environment at hospital level.  
Incidence study. First, based on hospital-wide surveillance, this epidemiology study 
examined the incidence of HAIs by pathogen across the whole hospital and within several 
categories, including service-based and device-associated HAIs. Incidence studies usually 
address a single specific infection, such as CLABSI, within a specific hospital setting, such as 
the ICU, because most hospitals conduct target surveillance (e.g., ICU or surgical site infection 
[SSI]) based on their priorities within the limits of their infection control resources, such as the 
number of full-time equivalent IP. However, this study examined the incidence of HAIs by 
pathogen for each category of interest and provided many kinds of HAI incidence information 
across hospital categories. This study can be seen as a comprehensive summary of HAI 
incidences by pathogen. For example, CLABSI incidence information was provided for different 
service categories: overall, medicine, surgery, pediatrics, ICU, and non-ICU. This broad range of 
HAI incidence information (e.g., overall and for medicine, surgery, pediatrics, and non-ICU) was 
made available through hospital-wide surveillance; the ICU was selected for targeted 
surveillance because it had significantly more HAIs due to characteristics of its patients’ severity 
and need for intensive care.  
Second, this incidence study provided HAI incidences broken down according to each 
pathogen group. We were able to examine the incidences of HAIs not just for the pathogens of 
greatest concern (e.g., MRSA, C. difficile), as is typically seen in publications, but also for every 
category and for all isolated healthcare-associated pathogens (e.g., Escherichia coli, 
Enterobacter species), information that is usually unavailable in the literature. Thus, this 
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incidence study is unique in that it provides pathogen-specific HAI incidence information across 
all ranges of healthcare-associated pathogens.  
Third, this incidence study provided an adjusted incidence density using exact 
denominator information, such as patient-days and device-days (e.g., central-line days, Foley-
catheter days, and ventilator days) for each analysis category (e.g., pediatrics, non-ICU) across 
hospital settings. Our results may be used as reference data for pathogen-categorized HAI 
incidence because, to our knowledge, very few studies have reported incidence density according 
to pathogen.  
Fourth, this study provided information about both short-term incidence (e.g., 1 year) and 
changes in the incidence of HAIs by pathogen over the study periods (a 7-year analysis based on 
patient-days and a 6-year analysis based on device-days). This method allowed us to observe the 
increasing incidence of C. difficile-associated HAIs and the significant decrease in the incidences 
of HAIs caused by other pathogens across analysis categories.  
Fifth, to compare this incidence change with changes in the population at risk for HAIs, 
we also examined the trend in patient-days over the 7-year study period. Although the patient 
population at risk increased significantly during the study periods, we observed a decreasing 
trend in the incidence of HAIs caused by all pathogens except C. difficile, as shown in Chapter 2, 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.4.  
Sixth, our incidence density study provided relative incidence difference information to 
help leaders understand the meaning of figures representing the estimated incidence changes in 
HAIs by pathogen per 1,000 person-days. Lastly, this study adds clinical support to recent HAI 
studies’ reports of a significant increase in C. difficile and its emergence as a healthcare-
associated pathogen in hospital settings. 
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Cost-effectiveness analysis. To our knowledge, this is the first cost-effectiveness study 
to compare alternative surveillance screening strategies (i.e., all hospitalized patients vs. ICU 
patients only vs. no screening) in the United States using a modeling approach. While expert 
groups disagree about whether MRSA control necessitates active surveillance screening (Jackson 
et al., 2004), our study provides evidence from a hospital perspective to support decisions about 
using an active surveillance strategy to screen patients for MRSA upon admission to academic 
hospital settings. In addition, this study compared three alternative strategies for active 
surveillance screening for MRSA using a modeling approach that included 1,000 simulations and 
a sensitivity analysis for variations in each input parameter. By adopting a modeling approach, 
we were able to avoid ethical concerns, such as negligence. If we had used an experimental study 
instead of modeling to obtain these data, we probably would have had to withhold active 
surveillance screening for patients in the control arm. Although active surveillance screening has 
not been proven to have a beneficial effect, it is assumed that it could reduce potential MRSA 
transmission to hospitalized patients.  
Survey of hospital visitor policies. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine 
hospital visitor policies related to implementing isolation precautions. This survey study found 
substantial variation in visitor PPE use policies among acute care hospitals in North Carolina. In 
addition, based on the narrative responses from frontline IPs, this study examined current 
problems with implementing isolation precaution policies for hospital visitors and provided IPs’ 
ideas and suggestions for solving current problems. In addition, by using the existing education 
and consultation program, the Statewide Program for Infection Control and Epidemiology 
(SPICE), we were able to achieve relatively high response rates (68.4%) to online surveys 
without providing incentives for responding. 
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Overall, this dissertation illustrated an infection-control connection. The study began with 
basic data-driven evidence based on an examination of the HAI incidence by each group of 
pathogen, then progressed to the proactive intervention of finding carriers upon their admission 
to the hospital and implementing immediate isolation precautions. The study then proceeded to 
examine further macroscopic hospital policy issues about PPE use for visitors of patients on 
isolation precautions under the current guidelines which do not require visitors to participate in 
isolation precautions. For example, MRSA has been the predominant pathogen of HAIs and has 
placed considerable burden on hospitals, including increasing mortality (Shorr, 2007). To 
prevent and control the transmission of MRSA, CDC guidelines recommend active surveillance 
screening of patients upon hospital admission and implementing contact precautions (Siegel et 
al., 2007). Although the incidence study (Chapter 2) and visitor policy survey (Chapter 4) 
examined MRSA as well as all other pathogens, the three topics of this dissertation study are 
connected via MRSA; they examine the incidence of HAIs by MRSA (Chapter 2), the use of 
active surveillance screening for MRSA carriers (Chapter 3), and hospital visitor policies for 
PPE use when visiting patients on contact precautions for MRSA (Chapter 4; Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 The connection of three chapters through MRSA. Note. HAI = Healthcare-associated infection; CEA = 
Cost-effectiveness analysis; MRSA = Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; VRE = Vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci; MDR = Multidrug resistant. 
 
Limitations of the Dissertation 
Despite its many strengths, this study has some limitations.  
Incidence study. First, the results of this study of HAI incidence by pathogen and the 
changes in HAI incidence may not be representative of all acute care university hospitals in the 
United States. Second, this incidence evidence is based on hospital-wide surveillance; therefore, 
it cannot be compared with incidence evidence from targeted surveillance (priority-based, 
usually site-directed [e.g., SSI] or unit-directed [e.g., ICU]), which is common at most hospitals, 
because surveillance studies that differ in their scope and approach cause variations in the 
sensitivity and specificity of HAI case findings (Allen-Bridson et al., 2012). For example, 
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targeted surveillance missed approximately 50% of HAIs that were found using hospital-wide 
surveillance (Weber et al., 2012). Third, although one of our study’s strengths was its ability to 
describe the magnitude of HAI incidence across hospital settings, we could not identify 
important HAI incidence differences that were caused by other factors, such as patient 
populations’ underlying diseases or changes in antimicrobial use. Lastly, we could not identify 
the exact infection control interventions that had decreased the incidence of HAI by most 
pathogens at the study hospital during the study period because the decrease in HAIs occurred 
across all study categories and throughout the hospital without any experimental trials of specific 
infection control measures. 
Cost-effectiveness study. The main limitation of this study was the lack of reliable data 
for some key input parameters, such as the overall and relative effectiveness of active 
surveillance and isolation in either the ICU or non-ICU settings, and the relative prevalence 
difference of MRSA HAI between the ICU and non-ICU settings. Thus, we had to make 
assumptions based on clinical expertise; for example, the MRSA HAI rates in the non-ICU 
setting were lower than the rate in the ICU based on the fact that the likelihood of MRSA HAI is 
assumed to be higher among ICU patients. Therefore, the use of assumptions for key input 
parameters due to a lack of available data may limit the validity of the study results, as 
commonly occurs with model-based CEAs. In addition, the modeling techniques we used may 
limit the validity of the results. For example, we could not include MRSA mortality as our one of 
the end points of hospitalization in our decision tree model due to a lack of reliable MRSA HAI-
attributable mortality data. This study also did not model transmission timing or transmission 
pathways because of the uncertain, complex transmission of MRSA from asymptomatic 
colonized patients. Lastly, these study results may not be applicable to small, community 
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hospital settings because active screening using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is not feasible 
within small hospitals’ limited resources.  
Survey of hospital visitor policies. This study has several limitations arising from the 
use of the questionnaire itself as a survey instrument. The length of the survey (29 questions 
estimated to take 10 to 30 minutes to complete) may have caused potential reporting bias, 
including nonresponse, given the substantial responsibilities of IPs, especially at small- to 
medium-sized hospitals. Online survey request by email could add reporting bias if the surveys 
are rejected by the security functions of institutional email accounts or are ignored by IPs due to 
their job demands. Second, we could not clearly separate PPE use for each category of isolation 
precautions in the survey questionnaire and had to provide multiple-choice options for many 
questions due to a lack of supporting evidence. Third, although we were able to report the IPs’ 
experience-based opinions about problems and possible solutions, we were unable to suggest 
specific recommendations supporting the need for visitors to use PPEs in the same way required 
of HCP due to a lack of sufficient scientific evidence indicating visitors’ behaviors and their role 
in the transmission of HAI pathogens in hospital settings.   
 
Implications for Research and Practice in Hospital Infection Control 
 The findings of this study suggest several important implications for further research and 
for infection control practices in hospitals.  
The issue of the emerging healthcare-associated pathogen Clostridium difficile  
We observed an increasing incidence of HAIs (gastrointestinal infections) by C. difficile, 
a finding that complemented similar reports from recent hospital epidemiology studies (Miller et 
al., 2011). C. difficile is becoming the most problematic healthcare-associated pathogen in 
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hospitals in the United States. Because C. difficile infection occurs with the disruption of normal 
intestinal microbiota after the use of broad spectrum antibiotics (e.g., clindamycin, 
cephalosporins, fluoroquinolones), antimicrobial restrictions to reduce exposure to antimicrobial 
therapy may be needed as more scientific supporting evidence emerges (Johnson & Gerding, 
2012).  
In addition, asymptomatic carriers (usually fecal excretors) of C. difficile can be a risk 
factor; therefore, further research on the role of active identification screening and immediate 
isolation for these carriers is required to control C. difficile in hospital settings. More research on 
environmental contamination by asymptomatic C. difficile carriers is also necessary because 
contamination of the room environment surfaces of patients infected with C. difficile (e.g., the 
bathroom, bed pans, and electronic thermometers) by C. difficile spores has been reported as a 
great source of risk for C. difficile transmission (Johnson & Gerding, 2012; Weber & Rutala, 
2011). Nonetheless, much work is still needed to examine the role of asymptomatic carriers in C. 
difficile transmission and to establish more effective infection control recommendations (e.g., 
active surveillance screening upon hospital admission) in response to C. difficile’s emerging role 
as a major HAI pathogen.   
In the current CDC guidelines, enteric precautions are not listed and all enteric pathogens 
including C. difficile should prompt use of contact precautions (Siegel et al., 2007). However, as 
our survey of hospital visitor policies showed, some hospitals have implemented enteric 
precautions to reinforce the use of contact precautions for C. difficile. Thus, further research is 
needed to determine the efficacy of enteric precautions instead of contact precautions, and the 
need for enteric precautions should be separated from contact precautions; for example, research 
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is needed to determine whether the use of enteric precautions can reduce the patient’s room 
contamination or the risk of HAI with C. difficile better than the use of contact precautions can.  
Active surveillance screening for important healthcare-associated pathogens 
In the Netherlands, a low incidence of MRSA was sustained for 5 years (2000-2004) 
using a thorough “search and destroy” policy (Vos et al., 2009). However, the implementation of 
active surveillance screening for MRSA in acute care hospitals in the United States is difficult 
because expert groups (SHEA and HICPAC) have provided different opinions about the need for 
screening, based on the fact that MRSA is already an endemic problem in hospitals (Shenoy, 
Walensky, Lee, Orcutt, & Hooper, 2012). Thus, more research is needed on other issues related 
to active surveillance screening that have not been clearly defined in the United States. Such 
issues include the identification of an appropriate target populations, the identification of 
microbiologic methods of active surveillance screening for MRSA, and the appropriate interval 
of active surveillance screening. In addition, although the CDC guideline includes decolonization 
recommendations for MRSA, the decolonization of MRSA in carriers’ nasal cavities using an 
antimicrobial agent (e.g., mupirocin) remains difficult to implement in hospital settings due to a 
lack of sufficient evidence to balance the emerging problem of a mupirocin-resistant MRSA 
strain with decontamination’s effects on reducing the transmission of MRSA (Siegel et al., 2007). 
Thus, further research should be conducted to solve these complicated problems related to 
preventing MRSA HAIs. 
In fact, active surveillance screening is recommended for not only MRSA, but for other 
pathogens, such as VRE and MDR gram-negative bacilli (Siegel et al., 2007). However, there are 
significant variations in implementing screening methods for various MDR pathogens 
(Pogorzelska et al., 2012). Additionally, hospital infection control programs should have 
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adequate resources (e.g., financial support and staff to perform the screening) to implement 
active surveillance screening and to ensure that infection control measures are taken.  
The related issue of implementing isolation precautions 
Although CDC and HICPAC have provided guidelines for hospital infection control 
using isolation precautions, many unresolved issues remain and await further research. 
Implementing isolation precautions can reduce the transmission of not only one specific 
pathogen, but several pathogens that have the same transmission mode at the same time. 
However, the continuous implementation of isolation precautions does not always guarantee the 
prevention of transmission of healthcare-associated pathogens. In hospitals with a high 
prevalence of HAI, any intervention is likely to reduce HAI occurrences; however, the same 
intervention may be less effective in hospitals with a low prevalence of HAI. Therefore, the 
eradication of HAI may be more difficult or impossible in institutions with a low prevalence of 
HAI.  
In addition, factors that contribute to individuals’ compliance with isolation precautions 
are not well studied. Although HCP are required to comply with isolation precautions, actual 
compliance rates in hospital settings are not high. According to a recent study, adherence to 
contact precautions in intensive care units (ICU) was significantly higher than it was in non-ICU 
settings, and adherence by patient care staff was better than adherence by other staff and visitors 
(Clock et al., 2010). The study reported the following adherence rates: for hand hygiene, 19.4% 
on room entry and 48.4% on room exit; 67.9% for wearing a gown and 77.1% for disposing of a 
gown; and 67.5% for wearing gloves and 63.5% for disposing of gloves (Clock et al., 2010). To 
examine factors underlying low compliance rates and to improve compliance with isolation 
precautions, further research on human behavior and environmental and organizational factors is 
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required. By extension, attention to the visitor’s role in the transmission and prevention of HAIs 
is needed because visitors can serve as facilitators or reservoirs of healthcare-associated 
pathogens. 
In contrast, no recommendations are currently available for the discontinuation of 
isolation precautions (contact precautions). This lack of recommendations often presents a 
problem when hospitals must determine the timing of and standards for discontinuing isolation 
precautions without supporting guidelines or sufficient scientific evidence. According to a recent 
electronic survey of the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology 
(APIC) membership about hospital policy for discontinuing contact precautions, hospitals’ 
discontinuation policies vary in terms of the screening timing, method, intervals, sites sampled, 
number of samples, and off-antibiotics period prior to screening (Wright, 2012). In fact, a 
discontinuation policy is needed because hospitals maintain isolation precautions for the 
rehospitalization of patients with a previous history of isolation precautions, even though a 
substantial portion (e.g., 21%, according to a recent study) of patients no longer need contact 
precautions (Vikram et al., 2010). In addition, to reduce the unnecessary efforts and costs of 
contact precautions, further studies are needed to evaluate the economic outcomes of the duration 
of appropriate implementation of isolation precautions.  
In sum, much more research is needed on issues related to isolation precautions, 
including cost issues, ethical issues, and practical issues related to the working conditions or 
characteristics of institutions (e.g., the organizational culture for patient safety and quality 
improvement), including behavioral discrepancies in acknowledging infection control principles 
and other human factors (e.g., getting lazy and forgetting) that underlie all kinds of medical 
errors. 
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Hospital-wide efforts for infection control 
Many of the recommendations in the CDC’s infection control guidelines require a 
comprehensive approach at the organization level, including administrative involvement, to 
ensure that infection control measures are implemented and to prevent HAIs. Such an approach 
includes judicious use of antimicrobial agents, adequate nurse staffing, effective communication 
systems, and performance improvement efforts across hospital settings (Siegel et al., 2007).  
Although we could not identify the exact infection control measures that might have 
induced the study hospital’s decreased incidence of HAIs by all pathogens except C. difficile, we 
could assume that these factors included a good long-term infection control program, continuous 
implementation of multiple infection control interventions, hospital-wide quality improvement 
initiatives based on the Six Sigma strategy, and an infection control liaison program across 
hospital settings. Further study is needed to provide data to support our speculation that these 
measures played a role in decreasing the incidence of HAIs. Although it seems strange to 
implement a production quality improvement concept that originated in manufacturing industries, 
the use of the Six Sigma concept in hospitals is aimed at creating a hospital culture of quality 
improvement at all levels. This quality improvement culture is achieved via purposely training 
healthcare teams to implement a rigorous Six Sigma methodology, which involves the steps of 
define, measure, analyze, improve, and control (Ruiz & Simόn, 2012). In statistical terms, Six 
Sigma means only 3.4 defects per million; in other words, an error-free rate of 99.99966%, 
which is based on the concept that 99% error free with a 3.8 sigma level is not sufficient for 
patient safety in a hospital (Ruiz & Simόn, 2012). For example, by adopting Six Sigma 
improvement process to identify possible causes of HAIs and change the problematic practices in 
the design of the infection control interventions, a recent study reported a significant reduction in 
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HAIs (CLABSI and VAP) and mortality rate in the pediatric ICU (Harris et al., 2011). Because 
effective communication is important in hospital infection control, infection control liaison 
nurses at each department can facilitate infection control practices in their departments by 
learning from IPs and taking away customized messages for specialized departmental infection 
control education needs (Hoffman & Clontz, 2012). Thus, adopting quality improvement 
concepts and a liaison program as additional approaches to enforce infection control measures at 
each department is expected to effectively prevent HAIs; however, this expectation needs to be 
supported with scientific evidence. 
New approaches for hospital infection control 
Of the HAI components that we examined through the “chain of HAIs” and related 
multifactorial interactions among agent, host, and hospital environment, many studies have 
examined pathogen-specific HAIs or environmental issues, such as outbreaks caused by the 
contamination of specific devices or environmental surfaces. It is true that those areas need more 
research because of their significance to HAIs and infection control. Although some research 
interests have focused on protecting HCP from acquiring HAIs through occupational exposure  
(e.g., hepatitis B infection after a sharps injury; Henderson & Beekman, 2012; Weber, Rutala, & 
Schaffner, 2010), relatively less attention has been paid to preventing HAIs by improving 
patients’ host defense mechanisms. Using another “see-saw model” concept of epidemiology for 
interactions between agent, host, and environment (see Figure 5.2), we may be able to prevent 
more HAIs by enhancing host defense mechanisms.  
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Figure 5.2 See-saw model of the interactions of the three components of healthcare-associated infections. 
Adapted from “Models of interactions of agent, host, and environment” by L.K. Archibald, 2012, 
Principle of infectious diseases epidemiology, p. 7. In C. G. Mayhall (Eds.), Hospital epidemiology and 
infection control. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. 
 
Some interventions to enhance the host defense mechanism and prevent HAIs can be 
found in the literature. Immunoprophylaxis, such as the intravenous administration of 
immunoglobulin, may help to reduce HAI incidence and provide an alternative approach to 
preventing HAIs in specific patient populations (e.g., surgical ICU patients), as some studies 
have reported (Black et al., 2012). As another example, selective decontamination to eradicate 
existing gram-negative pathogens in the digestive tract may serve as a prophylaxis for ventilator-
associated pneumonia in ICU patients (Black et al., 2012). For the emerging problem of C. 
difficile as an HAI pathogen in hospital settings, fecal bacteriotherapy (also known as fecal 
transplantation) might help infection control efforts by facilitating the early termination of C. 
difficile infection. This treatment, which has no adverse effects and a high success rate, provides 
an effective intervention for C. difficile-associated diarrhea by restoring the normal intestinal 
microbiota (Guo, Harstall, Louie, Veldhuyzen van Zanten, & Dieleman, 2012). However, more 
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research is needed to support the implementation of these interventions as a standard in clinical 
practice. 
In the near future, economic evaluation and comparative effectiveness analysis may 
receive more attention in hospital epidemiology and infection control due to limited resources 
and the need to make comparisons among alternative infection control measures. To perform this 
economic analysis, more reliable data (e.g., incidence rate, mortality, and cost data) should be 
available for a range of HAIs and infection control issues. In general, hospital epidemiology 
researchers may not fully understand the policymaking process, and some researchers discourage 
the inclusion of policy recommendations in research reports without a supporting decision 
analysis that reflects complicated contexts or conditions (Abramson, 2012). However, without a 
frontline expert who understands the complex mechanism of HAI occurrence and infection 
control issues, economic evaluations would lose their value as decision-making tools for hospital 
infection control. Thus, more infection control professionals need to be trained in economic 
evaluation methods and comparative effectiveness research for the future of hospital infection 
control strategies. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study examined three topics related to HAIs and infection control measures, ranging 
from HAI incidence to hospital policy. This study has several strengths and limitations, and it 
provides some important implications for research and clinical practice in hospital infection 
control.    
As healthcare becomes more complicated with the use of increasingly advanced 
techniques involving invasive procedures, a more vulnerable patient population, and more 
 167 
 
standards for high healthcare quality required by external factors (e.g., CMS’s non-
reimbursement policy for hospital acquired adverse events, the Joint Commission [TJC]’s 
accreditation criteria), hospital infection control faces greater challenges. Although a zero-
tolerance approach is desired for successful infection control interventions and some proportion 
of healthcare-associated infections is reasonably preventable, 100% HAI prevention is probably 
not achievable (Umscheid et al., 2011). As we reviewed, HAI causation is multifactorial; thus, 
some patients acquire HAIs during their hospitalization and some do not, depending on 
interactions among many factors related to the agent, transmission, and host. Every human has 
many endogenous microorganisms and any individual can be either a susceptible host or an 
intermediate transmission route of infectious agents as a reservoir. Thus, although we do our best 
to prevent 100% of HAIs in hospital settings, we may not be able to create the desired HAI-free 
hospital. However, the rigorous battle against invisible healthcare-associated pathogens should 
never stop. It is the duty of hospital infection control to protect patients from attacks by 
healthcare-associated pathogens by encouraging the collaboration of all HCP in the hospital.  
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